Аннотация: The Wolfpack naval tactic against the Principles of electromagnetism. The conceptual-historical essay.
The Wolfpack naval tactic against the Principles of electromagnetism. The conceptual-historical essay.
The Content:
1. The Preface.
2. The military planning and the Second World War (on the example of the submarine fleet of the Third Reich).
3. The Scientific tasks during the Second World War (on the example of the underwater warfare of Karl Dönitz).
4. University of Birmingham against Kriegsmarine.
5. The Worldview imbalance. The capsizing of the Third Reich.
1. The Preface.
The biography of Karl Dönitz and his professional way clearly illustrate how the relative shortcomings of worldview of the figures of the Third Reich led to the collapse of Nazi Germany.
The collapse of the underwater war, of the Wolfpack naval tactic, the collapse of the Kriegsmarine - this is a demo model that characterizes the general collapse of the Blitzkrieg and the Wehrmacht.
2. The military planning and the Second World War (on the example of the submarine fleet of the Third Reich)
The First World War ended. But military planning did not end.
Prior to the restoration of the German submarine fleet in 1935, Karl Dönitz reflected on issues of strategy and tactics. Personnel were being prepared for the future submarine fleet.
After 1935, planning continued. A submarine fleet that was optimal in numbers and composition was being prepared.
In 1939, Britain and France declared war on Germany. Submarine war was planning. A naval operations were planned ...
The naval forces, opposing Germany, also did a planning - at the strategic and tactical levels. The optimization of the naval forces of the adversaries of Nazi Germany in terms of strength and composition was carried out. Specific actions at sea were planning.
3. The Scientific tasks during the Second World War (on the example of the underwater warfare of Karl Dönitz)
If you focus on the memories of Karl Dönitz, then in his pre-war reflections (on the underwater war and on the Wolfpack naval tactic) the scientific problems are not noticeable.
Naturally, the submarine fleet is a high-tech "product", "device". (The same high-tech mechanisms as, for example, drones - in our time). Clearly, a science is needed.
At the same time, the main expert, the main military philosopher is Karl Dönitz. (I would like to do without an ironic connotation).
He states the naval superiority of the future adversaries of Germany. He foresees, however, the possibility of victory in an underwater warfare. He develops and implements the Wolfpack naval tactic allowing to achieve success with relatively small forces in the fight against a stronger opponent. Scientific problems are. Scientific problems will be. But they do not occupy a significant place in the military philosophy of Karl Dönitz.
The memoirs of Karl Dönitz clearly show the scientific problems that arose before him after the outbreak of war, after 1939:
(A) the torpedoes problem,
(B) the naval communication (signal) problems (the naval communication confidentiality problems),
(C) the problem of increasing the speed of submarines.
For an example, we will give a description of how the "torpedoes problem" was solved.
"And although the commission"s activities shed light on the causes of the failure of torpedoes, the main reasons for the unsuccess of submarines during the Norwegian operation were not identified until February 1943.
On January 30, 1942, a radiogram was received from a U-94 submarine (located in the Atlantic) stating that in the process of checking torpedoes (strictly speaking, sailors usually not fulfil on board a such an operation) revealed excessive pressure in the surge chamber ... "
Thus, the long period activities to study a complex phenomenon - torpedo failure - ended ... with successful research on board a submarine (and not in a scientific organization) - during a naval campaign.
Was the Academy of Sciences in the Third Reich? If it existed, the crew of the submarine (in any case, commander and officers) could be accepted into the Academy of Sciences ... After which the officer's crew of the combat submarine would be staffed by the members of Academy ...
Scientific problems faced the opponents of the Third Reich. For example, the UK has optimized its defense against the Luftwaffe and against the Kriegsmarine.
By the time of the Battle of Britain in mid-1940, the Royal Air Force had fully integrated radar systems into national air defense.
The key event was the cavity magnetron in the UK, which allowed the creation of relatively small radar systems ...
In February 1940, Great Britain developed a magnetron, capable of generating microwave energy in the kilowatt range, paving the way for second-generation radar systems.
At the University of Birmingham, a research group that included John Randall and Harry Booth created a radically new device - a magnetron with a cavity. This device has made it possible to use microwave radars.
4. University of Birmingham against Kriegsmarine
Karl Dönitz probably did not give any place to the University of Birmingham in his military plans. Such an assumption seems completely natural. If the University of Birmingham were considered by Karl Dönitz as one of the opponents, then the military philosophy of Dönitz could have turned into a theory of the development of science, and in general - into a concept of the development of civil society.
However, at some point, Karl Dönitz felt the results of the activities of a scientific group that included John Randall and Harry Booth, who conducted research at the University of Birmingham.
Here is how Karl Dönitz described the collision of the Third Reich"s submarine fleet (and, in general, the Kriegsmarine) with a scientific group that included John Randall and Harry Booth (and generally, with the University of Birmingham):
"The new means introduced into the battle by the enemy - escort aircraft carriers, support groups, and aircraft capable of overcoming vast distances - of course, by themselves were by no means a small force. But their crushing success is due primarily to the short-wave radar operating on 10-centimeter waves. Having this miraculous device, the enemy could detect submarines on the surface of the water, send their ships or planes to them and destroy them at any time, day or night, in any weather, in conditions of thick fog and poor visibility. "
"The advent of radars, and first of all their installation on airplanes, practically deprived submarines of the opportunity to conduct combat operations on the surface of the water. Attacks of "wolf packs" on convoys in the northern Atlantic Ocean - at the main theater of operations, where air cover has traditionally been the strongest, have now become impossible ... We lost the battle for the Atlantic. "
5. The Worldview imbalance. The capsizing of the Third Reich
In that picture of the world, which was at the disposal of the leaders of the Third Reich, there were not of a various important elements.
For example, they overestimated the military factor.
They did not understand the changing geopolitical position of the Germany and the Europe.
The constructed political and managerial system led to inevitable major erroneous decisions in various fields. In the confrontation with primitive communities, these errors would probably be corrected and would not lead to defeat. In the process of the war with major powers with enormous intellectual potential, the viciousness of the decision-making mechanism led to defeat.
Major erroneous decisions in various fields became fatal for the Wehrmacht and for the Kriegsmarine.
Dönitz, for example, points to the wrong decisions in the spheres of:
(A) the organization of support for the naval forces from the side of the Luftwaffe (Goering"s "special" position in the hierarchy - "Everything that is flying belongs to me"),
(B) the planning the number of submarines,
(С) the determining research priorities for the Navy.
The significant strategic mistakes on the Eastern Front can be noted:
(1) The simultaneous strategic offensive in several directions in 1941,
(2) A series of incorrect strategic decisions by the German command in the Stalingrad direction,
(3) The catastrophic erroneous decisions of the German command associated with the Battle of Kursk ...
The decisions to attack Poland and to start a war on two fronts are fundamentally erroneous.
The worldview imbalance - in the form of an over-estimation of the military factor and a number of other worldview shortcomings - led to the capsizing of the Third Reich.
The Nazi Germany went to a bottom.
September 6, 2019 09:07
Translation from Russian into English: September 6, 2019 12:31.
Владимир Владимирович Залесский "Тактика "волчьих стай" против принципов электромагнетизма. Концептуально-историческое эссе".