Аннотация: Makei, Lavrov. Three foreign policy versions.
Makei, Lavrov. Three foreign policy versions.
According to media reports, a meeting was held in Moscow between the foreign ministers of Belarus and Russia - Makei and Lavrov.
Lavrov allegedly spoke in the sense that Russia does not intend to enter into negotiations with the representatives of the Belarusian opposition until these representatives acquire the quality of legality.
'... There is no need for us to meet with representatives who request such contacts until they form their structure in accordance with the legislation of the Republic of Belarus. We work in different countries with the opposition, but with the opposition, which functions in the legal field, "- said the head of the Russian Foreign Ministry." [unofficial translation](https://ria.ru/20200902/belorussiya-1576628362.html?utm_source=yxnews&utm_medium=desktop)
In this regard, two tactical foreign policy versions arise and one more general, one might say, strategic.
First version. Svetlana Tsikhanouskaya has the status of a participant in the presidential elections in Belarus in August 2020. Thus, she has the quality of legality. Hence, one can assume that Minister Lavrov's statement demonstrates Russia's readiness to negotiate with Svetlana Tsikhanouskaya, - the candidate who actually won the election.
Second version. Minister Lavrov's words can be understood in the sense that Russia is giving some time to the current leadership of Belarus to appoint a representative of the opposition to an official post. For example, a time for the appointment of Tsikhanouskaya to the post of prime minister. With the support of Russia, the current leadership of Belarus can negotiate with Tsikhanouskaya most effectively and conclude an agreement with her that is most beneficial for today's ruling stratum. And after a representative of the opposition gets a post, then do not be offended - Russia will start negotiations.
Of course, I want to believe in these versions ... However, the absence of political flexibility, the absence of the quality of a politicality - a lack of the ability to organize the interaction of interests of various social groups in generally accepted political forms - raises doubts ... Don't we take wishful thinking ?...
Perhaps there are no plans to conduct any negotiations with the Belarusian opposition ...
In this regard, we will express a more general version.
Third version. This version is based on a comparison of three historical examples that demonstrate the depth of discrediting the state and the results of this discrediting.
1) At some point (On April 1814), at the final phase of the confrontation between Napoleon I and the coalition forces, Prince Talleyrand took measures to form a provisional government, became the head of this government, and invited the coalition troops to enter Paris. The coalition entered Paris. But it didn't look like an occupation, but a friendly visit. Russian Emperor Alexander I lived in the house of Prince Talleyrand. Respect for the state, and the state structures themselves were preserved. Under the Bourbons, the industrial revolution began in France. France became one of the most powerful economically developed European powers. Napoleon I remained in world history, covered with glory.
2) Despite all the political maneuvers of Napoleon III, irritation grew in society in relation to his policy. After the defeat at Sedan (1870), Napoleon III was captured, his power as emperor and the reputation of the highest state institutions were significantly discredited. The opposition declared a republic. Then the Paris Commune arose. German occupation ... A five billion franc war indemnity ...
In this example, we see a relatively deep discrediting of the state and the consequences of discrediting - the declaration of a republic; the Paris Commune, the occupation, the indemnity ...
If there was a provisional government during the time? ... But there was no Prince Talleyrand with his talents ...
3) Khodynka (1896) and the words of Nicholas II about "meaningless dreams" (1895) opened the era of public irritation towards the authorities and the era of discrediting the state.
During the First World War, the discrediting of the state reached such a level, to such depth that even without a strategic defeat (there were several major defeats, but, in general, the victory of the Anglo-French-Russian coalition with the entry into the war of the United States was inevitable) the tsarist regime fell (February 1917), and several of the most important structures of the state, including the army, were eventually destroyed ... Lenin organized the support of the Brest Peace from side of Russia, and made statements about Russia's withdrawal from the Western world order ....
Again, as in the case of the fall of Napoleon III, there was no person who could free the country from one dynasty, preserve the state, the monarchical system, transfer power to another dynasty without internal upheavals and revolutions ...
These three examples show the influence of such a phenomenon as discrediting the state on subsequent domestic and foreign political events.
If in the first example there was no significant discrediting, and in the second example the discrediting was deep, but moderately deep, then in the third example the discrediting was the deepest, prohibitively deep. In the third example, we see the partial liquidation of the most important systems of the state.
All of these three examples lead us to the third version. The more and longer Russia supports Alexander Lukashenko, the more and more, deeper and deeper a discrediting of the Union State of Russia and Belarus will be ...
September 2, 2020 16:38
Translation from Russian into English: September 2, 2020 22:59.
Владимир Владимирович Залесский 'Макей, Лавров. Три внешнеполитические версии'.