CHAPTER SIX

COAL INDUSTRY OF THE SAKHALIN REGION IN 1946-1991

PARAGRAPH 1 ENTERPRISES OF THE COAL INDUSTRY OF THE ISLAND IN THE FIRST POST-WAR DECADE.

On August 9, 1945, true to its allied obligations, the Soviet Union entered the war with Japan. In the period from 11 to 26 August 1945, during the Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk offensive operation, Soviet troops occupied the entire territory of South Sakhalin. However, during the hostilities in the south of the island, many enterprises, scientific institutions and temples were destroyed, and on the part of "individual fighters and commanders" there were cases of theft of equipment, materials and property of various industrial enterprises in the south of Sakhalin. It should be said that the Japanese themselves also destroyed valuable equipment, took it away, buried it in the ground, hid it in the forests ...

It should be noted that representatives of the civil administration arrived on the island a month after the end of the military operation and therefore the Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk Regional Department for Civil Affairs was organized by the command of the Far Eastern Military District only on September 22, 1945 work of the coal industry of South Sakhalin.

By the Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR of September 24, 1945 No. 2443-652s "On the organization of the Sakhalinugol coal industry plant on Sakhalin Island", the Sakhalinugol trust formed in November 1931 was renamed the Aleksandrovskugol trust, which became part of the Sakhalin Union Coal Mining Plant, formed on September 28, 1945. The plant also included the trusts "Sirauraugol" ("Makarovugol"), "Maokaugol" ("Kholmskugol") and "Esutoruugol" ("Uglegorskugol") and two mine administrations directly subordinate to the plant: "Kavakami" ("Yuzhno-Sakhalinskoye") and "Naibuti" ("Dolinskoye").

In January 1946, the People's Commissariat of the Coal Industry was divided into two independent People's Commissariats, soon renamed ministries: the Ministry of the Coal Industry of the Western Regions of the USSR (Minister Dmitry Grigorievich Onika) and the Ministry of the Coal Industry of the Eastern Regions of the USSR (Minister V.V. Vakhrushev, and since January 1947 - A.F. Zasyadko). In September 1947, the USSR officially approved a national holiday - "Miner's Day". The first celebration of the Miner's Day took place on August 29, 1948. In December 1948, both regional ministries were merged into a single Ministry of the Coal Industry of the USSR, headed by Alexander Fedorovich Zasyadko.

In the postwar years, the task of restoring the national economy of the country became the main one before construction, as one of the leading branches of material production. The previous system of management of the industry, established in wartime and involving the over-centralization of financial, material resources and labor resources, in the new conditions turned out to be ineffective. In 1946, in the course of the reorganization of construction management on the principle of industry specialization, the People's Commissariat for the Construction of Fuel Enterprises was created. In 1948, in connection with the liquidation of this People's Commissariat, its functions were transferred to the Ministry of Coal Industry. After some time, the idea of even greater specialization

of construction organizations was implemented. In particular, the Ministry of Coal Construction of the West and the Ministry of Coal Construction of the East were created.

In accordance with the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR No. 124/43 of February 5, 1946 "On the nationalization of lands, banks, industrial and municipal enterprises, railway and water transport and communications of the southern part of Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands", the head of the civil department D.N. Kryukov issued an order on the transfer of coal mines to the jurisdiction of the Sakhalinugol plant of the People's Commissariat of the Coal Industry of the Eastern Regions of the USSR. The cost of material resources accepted on the balance sheet of the plant as of November 1, 1945 was expressed in the amount of 303 million rubles.

Table XXI

The state of the coal mining industry of South Sakhalin on November 1, 1945

Name	Quantity	Acts
Mine Administrations	28	8
Galleries	31	7
Inclined shafts	26	1
Blind biases	13	-
The front of the face line	2490 running m.	2170 running m.
The length of the main mine workings	40500 running m.	14000 running meters
Power plants	14	4
Total capacity of power plants	29900 thousand kWh.	13360 thousand kWh.
Electrical substations	55	17
Length of power lines	287 km.	109 km.
Loading hoppers	21	8
Total capacity of bunkers	20500 tons	12820 tons
Length of surface rails	210.6 km.	103.0 km.
Locomotives	78	49
Cars	3167	1260
Mine workshops	22	8
Living area	895.6 thousand sq. m.	504 thousand sq. m.
Clubs	8	-
Theatres	2	-
Cinemas	6	-

The Sakhalinugol plant includes 33 mines (2 of them are mothballed), a mechanical ore repair plant in Toyohara, an explosives plant in Esutoru, two coal distilleries in Naihoro and Naibuchi, a briquette factory in Maoka and a carpentry workshop in Shiritori . The acceptance of enterprises was formalized by acts of nationalization and inventory of fixed assets and material assets as of November 1, 1945.

It should be said that the technical condition of coal mines, energy, ore repair and transport facilities at that time was characterized by a lack of mechanisms and equipment due to the fact that: firstly, during the war, equipment was not delivered to the island, and secondly, 17 mines were mothballed back in 1944, and a significant part of the valuable equipment and mechanisms was exported to Japan.

It is also necessary to note the extreme deterioration of the main equipment of the mines, which was imported to southern Sakhalin after prolonged use in Japan. In addition, in the south of the island there was no central repair and mechanical economy, as a result of which there was no normal repair of equipment and mechanisms, which, according to Japanese rules, were supposed to work until they failed, that is, for wear and tear.

As mentioned above, the hostilities in South Sakhalin significantly disrupted the work of industrial enterprises in the coal industry, as a result of which the level of production decreased significantly, as can be seen from the following table.

Table X XII

The state of mines in South Sakhalin at the end of September 1945

Name of the trust / mine management	List of mines	In conservation	Destroyed, flooded	At work
Sirauraugol	8	-	3	5
Maokaugol	6	3	-	3
Esutoruugol	15	15	-	-
Kawakami	1	-	1	-
Naibuti	1	-	-	1
Total	31	18	4	9

The table clearly shows that at the time of the nationalization of the coal industry in southern Sakhalin there were 31 mines, but in September 1945 only 9 of them were operating. This amount could in no way meet the island's needs for solid carbon fuels. Therefore, the civil administration of South Sakhalin has taken steps to put into operation a number of mothballed and abandoned mines.

Taihei Mine was commissioned on October 1, 1945, Nishisakuta on October 4, Tinnai on October 13, Minami-Tinnai on October 15, Tennai on October 16, Shiritori on October 25, Toro on October 27, Toyohata on November 1, and Higashi-Shikutan on November 14 . (See the Russian names of the mines in Appendix No. 1). The actual daily production of the commissioned 9 coal mining enterprises was 1200 tons. Thus, in October 1945, there were 17 mines in the south of the island, and in November - 19 mines, which together produced up to 3700 tons of coal per day.

In the period from September 1945 to June 1946 in southern Sakhalin, the Sakhalinugol plant restored and partially put into operation 11 mines, pumped out 1425 thousand cubic meters of water, refixed 9593 running meters of mine workings. The number of stopes from 45 in October 1945 to June 1946 increased to 85, the front of the face line from 2170 running meters was increased to 3446 meters, or increased by 1,5 times. During this period, 4 cutting machines, 540 jackhammers, 247 electric drills, 162 drilling hammers, 52 conveyors, 60 compressors, 132 pumps, 41 electric locomotives were put into operation.

They began to put in order the work of the transport facilities of the mines. During the first half of 1946, 48 steam locomotives, 854 cars, 134 km of railway tracks were repaired and put into operation, 22.7 km of railway rails, 228 switches were replaced.

For 9 months of operation, the plant mastered 21.8 million rubles. investments, including 8 million for mining, 4 million for buildings and structures, 0.7 million for housing and social life and 2.9 million rubles. residential buildings were purchased. However, this money was clearly not enough, and therefore the head of Sakhalinugol P.A. Rozenko appealed to the Khabarovsk Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) with a petition for the allocation of an additional 50 million rubles to the plant. working capital.

Unfortunately, the documents do not provide an answer to the question of whether the requested money was received. However, digital data show that in 1946 the plant restored 14 mines, of which 6 were put into operation, pumped out more than 4 million cubic meters of water, and refixed over 20 thousand running meters of workings. Thus, it can be assumed that, if not 50 million, then some of them were received by the plant.

The plant's management paid great attention to the restoration of coal processing enterprises. By order of the Ministry of Coal Industry of the Eastern Regions of the USSR No. 113 of May 24, 1946, the plant planned to repair 6 processing plants and 5 sorting plants, to organize coal preparation departments at trusts. On the basis of this order, the workers of the plant repaired and restored the processing plants of Toro, Nishisakuta, Minami-Nayoshi, Naihoro, Kawakami, Naibuchi, Kitakanzawa, Toyohata and sorting Taihei, Nishisakutan, Naikawa, Tennai, simplified sorting Tinnai and Tomarikishi, Shiraura, Tayei, Sakutan rock sampling plants. Thus, in 1946, 5 coal sorting plants with a total capacity of 580 tons per hour, 8 processing plants with a total capacity of 800 tons per hour were restored. In total, in 1946, about 543.5 thousand tons of raw coal were processed at the processing plants, 1116.5 were sorted thousand tons of run-of-mine coal and 432.8 thousand tons of large-grade coal were produced. In 1947, 17 processing plants, 9 sorting plants, 4 rock picking plants for raw coal were already operating in the mines of Sakhalin. The total capacity of all processing plants was 1520 tons / hour. However, 7 factories (with a total capacity of 520 t / h) worked only in the summer, and the rest were poorly adapted to operation in winter conditions.

The work of the plant on the restoration of coal mining enterprises was complicated by the fact that the significant energy base available in the coal industry, numbering 29 turbines with a total capacity of 29900 kW, was used only by 30 percent. Of the 14 power plants in the south of the island, only 4 were operating. In 1946, in addition to the operating ones, 10 power plants with a total capacity of 14900 kW were put into operation. Due to this, electricity generation increased from 9.9 million kWh in the 4th quarter of 1945 to 15 million kWh in the 2nd quarter of 1946. On January 1, 1947, the total capacity of existing power plants at the coal enterprises of South Sakhalin reached 32835 kW.

I note that the power plants in the mines were equipped mainly with turbine generators of Japanese and American brands "Hitachi", "Jungstrom-Mitsubishi", "Brown-Boveri", "Escher-Wyss", "Lang", "Isawajima", "Thomson-Gauston", etc., produced in 1896, 1916 and 1920. Attention was drawn to the extreme deterioration of the equipment of power plants.

Naturally, the Soviet industry did not have any opportunity to produce components and spare parts for such mechanisms. The equipment of mines and surface structures was also exclusively of Japanese origin, and it was not possible to debug it on your own, without having the necessary components on hand. As a result, the level of mechanization of production processes in 1946 was expressed in the following figures: machine excavation - 5,6 percent, hammer - 7,3 percent, explosive - 85,3 percent. Therefore, in his memorandum to the secretary of the Khabarovsk Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) R.K. Nazarov, the head of the Sakhalinugol plant, P.A. Rozenko asked for permission to place orders for mining equipment and materials in Japan for a total of 5 million rubles.

In the second half of 1946, domestic downhole mechanisms began to arrive at the mines of South Sakhalin. Only for the specified year, 7 domestic cutting machines, 331 jackhammers, 100 electric drills, 15 scraper and 9 belt conveyors were put into operation. It should be said that the introduction of mechanization made it difficult for local workers (Japanese) to oppose.

In 1947, the mines of the island already had 136 lifting machines and winches, 67 compressors, 38 cutting machines, 45 conveyor drives, 416 drilling and 1163 jackhammers, 510 manual electric drills. However, of the 2375 pieces of equipment, 48,8 percent were actually used. Thus, although formally progress was made in the mechanization of the coal enterprises of South Sakhalin, in fact, the equipment supplied to the island was used extremely inefficiently. The reason for this was the poor work of the repair base, as well as the lack of spare parts.

Gradually, the haulage and transportation of coal normalized. Thus, the level of mechanization of haulage on January 1, 1947 was 76 percent, against 65 percent on January 1, 1946. However, by the beginning of 1947, out of 63 electric locomotives available, 42 machines were in operation, and 10 electric locomotives were put into operation in 1946. Of the available 6755 trolleys, 3299 units were in operation. The reason for such a small percentage of usable trolleys was the lack of ball bearings. In 1946, the heavy-duty trolleys sent from the mainland were not commissioned due to the lack of tippers, the discrepancy between the track width of domestic trolleys and the track width of the mines (610 and 762 mm).

It should also be noted that in some mines, loading and unloading operations occupied a very significant place in the work process. For example, at mine No. 8/9 of the Makarovugol trust, there was a threefold transshipment of coal, which is why up to 50 percent of the staff of all mine workers was used daily for surface transportation.

Great difficulties arose with the transportation of Sakhalin coals to the mainland. Initially, it was assumed that the export of mined and captured coal from coastal mines would be carried out by Morflot. In fact, it turned out that in the 4th quarter of 1945, Morflot could not organize coal loading at all and the shipment was carried out directly by the plant. Acceptance of coal port points by Morflot began only in June 1946 and dragged on until the end of the 3rd quarter. 3 port points were accepted: Toro, Kitokozawa and Nishisakutan. As a result, in 1946, with an export plan of 1100 thousand tons, the actual export amounted to 236 thousand tons, or 21,4 percent.

Therefore, mining operations in coastal mines were curtailed, but coal mining in the remaining mines had to be accelerated, which led to the implementation of the annual plan by 200-300 percent in a number of mines. (Taihei, Toro).

In subsequent years, the issue of transporting mined coal continued to be in limbo. In 1948, the head of the plant, P.A. Rozenko, in a letter to the secretary of the regional committee, Dmitry Nikanorovich Melnik, reported that "870 thousand tons of coal were prepared for export at the port points of the plant's mines. From long-term storage, coal becomes unusable and burns from spontaneous combustion. The fight against spontaneous combustion distracts a large number of workers.... At the Agnevo mine there are 58024 tons of coal mined in 1940-41. It has a temperature of 80 degrees and there are several fires.

The plan for the export of coal in 1948 was also not fulfilled. The main reasons were the poor condition of the piers, the lack of kungas, and difficult loading conditions. In this regard, the Sakhalin Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) asked the Council of Ministers of the USSR to allocate loans to the Sakhalin Shipping Company for the construction of a mechanized pier at the Makaryevsky port point with a capacity of up to 200 thousand tons for navigation. In the end, on June 18, 1948, the Council of Ministers of the USSR issued a decree No. 2204-915c, which outlined a number of measures to strengthen the export of coal from Sakhalin.

The main burden of providing coal to Sakhalin consumers fell on 10 railroad mines. However, 7 of these mines were semi-artisanal in nature with limited production capacity, and 2 mines (Naihoro and Kawakami) were taken over in a dilapidated state. Therefore, the plant had to speed up coal mining in the mines where restoration work was underway, which delayed the progress of the latter.

The deterioration of equipment, flooding of mine workings during floods, the presence of non-explosion-proof transformers and motors underground, the complete absence of explosion-proof electrical equipment, the lack of a mine fire service, the use of flame lamps with silicon lighters and a number of other factors led to an increase in accidents. So, in 1946, at the mines of the plant (including the mines of the trust "Aleksandrovskugol ") there were 266 accidents, in 1947 - 342 accidents. Thus, over the year, the increase in accidents amounted to 28.5 percent. To reduce the number of accidents, the plant's management did the following work: control over the gas regime was installed at all mines;* a plan was drawn up to replace electrical equipment with explosion-proof equipment; the condition of underground cable networks has been improved; four mines were

equipped with dust barriers; 2 inert dust factories were put into operation; Soviet gasoline lamps were introduced; Operating rules, safety regulations, instructions, etc. have been translated into Japanese.

In addition to accidents, the normal operation of mines was disrupted by fires. On January 1, 1947, twenty-three fires were registered at the plant, seven of which occurred in 1945. To fight fires, by the end of 1946, the plant created 2 special offices - Makarovskaya and Uglegorskaya, which performed a small amount of drilling and silting * work at the Nishisakutan, Tennai, Naikawa and Tomarikishi mines.

In 1946, there were 3191 cases of industrial injuries in the plant, of which 113 cases were severe and 47 fatal. The main sources of injuries were landslides, falling pieces of rock and coal, accidents during the transportation of people and goods. Protective items such as rubber gloves, helmets, and self-rescuers were completely absent from the mines.* Thanks to the measures taken to improve the safety situation, in 1947 there was a decrease in occupational injuries - 2054 cases, or 35.7 percent less than in 1946. Of these, 37 are severe and 53 are fatal. The fall of lumps of coal and rock accounted for 30.4 percent, the transportation of goods and people - 14.5 percent, the collapse of coal and rock - 10.5 percent of all cases. The causes of injuries were poor discipline, deterioration of mining and geological conditions of mining, unsatisfactory condition of haulage tracks, deterioration of the trolley fleet, insufficient illumination, etc.

It should be said that the Ministry of Coal Industry of the Eastern Regions of the USSR did not pay enough attention to such an important issue as geological exploration. In this regard, the Sakhalin Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), sending its proposals to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) on the further development of the economy of South Sakhalin, asked the latter to take into account the poor exploration of the geological reserves of Sakhalin coals, determined at 6,5 billion tons, and to oblige the Ministry of Coal Industry to organize the Sakhalinugle Exploration Trust by January 1, 1947, but the creation of the latter was delayed.

In the materials to the protocol No. 2 of the meeting of the bureau of the Sakhalin Regional Committee of the CPSU (b) of November 18, 1947, it was noted that the exploration of coal was unsatisfactory. At that time, the survey was carried out by Dalugolrazvedka and Dalgeology. However, the latter did not share the results of work with the plant. In 1946-1947 the brigade of VUKHIN Minchermet of the USSR under the leadership of engineer Ryabukho carried out work to determine the possibility of obtaining metallurgical coke from the coals of South Sakhalin. However, at the request of the plant to share the results of the research, the author Ryabukho officially requested 12,000 rubles for his work "The coals of South Sakhalin as a raw material base for the ferrous metallurgy of the East of the USSR."

In addition to the problems associated with imported equipment, coal transportation, an increase in accidents, and poor geological exploration of Sakhalin's coal reserves, there were great difficulties with the labor force. Coal mining and restoration work in the mines of South Sakhalin required 28 thousand people, but there were only 15586 people of the local population, of which an average of 13170 people went to work. In this regard, P.A. Rozenko asked the Khabarovsk Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) to oblige the Commander of the Far Eastern Military District to mobilize 12 thousand people of the male Japanese population of the island for coal mines. This measure yielded results: by July 1946, the number of workers in the coal industry in the south of the island increased from 13125 people to 21804 people or 1,65 times.

However, the development of coal mining in mines with Japanese workers and employees had its own characteristics.

First of all, it should be said about the low production rates for piecework payment of the main professions: miners, fasteners, drillers. Compared to the corresponding conditions of the Soviet mines, the production rates in the mines of South Sakhalin were two times less.

Those who worked on hourly wages did not have material incentives to exceed production standards. Having fulfilled the norm, the workers, depending on the orders at the mine, either quit their jobs and sat idly by until the end of the shift, or simply went home.

The complete absence of overalls at coal enterprises was striking, since the Japanese did not import the latter to the island, and the plant did not receive anything from the supplying organizations. As a result, the workers walked half-naked. There were cases when in some mines two workers took turns dressing in one overalls. What can we say about overalls, when even the outerwear of the overwhelming number of miners has become completely unusable. Many of them did not have a change of underwear, bedding.

The food supply of the workers was completely unsatisfactory, and the supply of manufactured goods did not exist at all. In the food ration, natural rice accounted for 70 percent of the ration, and 30 percent for gaoliang, miso, soybeans and fish. The workers did not receive tobacco at all. There have been cases of delays in the purchase of rice, the main food of the Japanese. For example, in the mines of the Uglegorsk district, food was issued with a delay of a month.

The problem of food and commodity supply was complicated by numerous cases of theft of provisions, scarce materials and money. Thus, the heads of the working supply department (ORS) of the Siraurauugol trust, Utkin and Badyagin, systematically plundered food and engaged in drunkenness, for which they were removed from work. In 1946, theft in the amount of 437 thousand rubles was committed in the Uglegorskugol trust, 11 thousand rubles in the Aleksandrovskugol trust, 84 thousand in the Makarovugol trust, and Kholmskugol trust "- by 64 thousand rubles, and in general, thefts of 651 thousand rubles were recorded at the plant.

In the minutes of the closed meeting of the party meeting of the plant of July 16, 1946, it was noted that the write-off of waste from products was carried out according to the principle of who wanted how much. At the same time, no one adhered to state standards, as a result of which there was a squandering of products. The audit, carried out at the insistence of the party meeting, revealed that there were no accounting records on the basis of the ORS, and there was absolutely no accounting of material values.

Due to the low standards of food supply and its inaccurate distribution, theft and squandering of food supplies, workers were forced to purchase most of the food on the market. However, between 1945 and 1946, market prices for manufactured goods and foodstuffs rose sharply, while workers' earnings remained the same. In addition, due to the lack of banknotes, wages, as a rule, were issued with delays. For example, in the mines of the Uglegorsk district, wages were issued with a delay of 1-2 months. Thus, workers who had previously made up for the lack of supply by purchasing goods and products on the market could no longer do so. The manager of the plant, P.A. Rozenko noted that the wages of coal workers in South Sakhalin were 30 percent lower than the wages of fishermen and wallets, and proposed to increase wages in the industry by at least 50 percent.

Problems also arose with the school education of children. I note that in the mines of South Sakhalin in 1946 there were 33 schools: 28 primary and 5 incomplete secondary schools (including 10 Russian schools). However, there were no stationary heating stoves in schools, and the freezing cold in the classrooms did not at all contribute to the process of assimilation of new knowledge. It was difficult to solve the issue of preschool education. On January 1, 1947, there were only 13 kindergartens in South Sakhalin, of which only 1 Russian for 15 children, the rest were Japanese.

Medical care was also unsatisfactory, since Russian doctors were absent, and Japanese medical workers for the most part abused their official position, giving exemption from work to absolutely healthy people. For example, at the Kawakami mine, a Japanese doctor, Ezoe, issued certificates of exemption from work to Japanese women Kubobori and Neizawa when they were completely healthy. Sick leave was completely absent, and instead of them, workers were issued certificates, which made it difficult to pay benefits and take into account the reasons for absenteeism.

The housing issue spoiled the mood of the miners very much. It must be said that in southern Sakhalin, the Sakhalinugol plant got a significant Japanese-type housing stock, namely 6949 houses

and 71 dormitories with a total area of 619439 sq. m., (including in dormitories - 53060 sq. m.). However, with the wear and tear of over 50 percent, there were 178098 sq. m. of housing. In many mines, the housing stock has been operated for more than 10 years and at the same time has not been repaired at all. On average, 1 worker in South Sakhalin accounted for 5,6 sq. m.

The vast majority of residential buildings and barracks were Japanese-built, representing wooden buildings of frame type with external wall cladding of 10-15 millimeter boards on overlapping slats, with internal wall cladding with plywood. Such housing was completely unsuitable for the Russian population. To solve the housing problem, by Order of the Ministry of Coal Industry of the Eastern Regions of the USSR No. 394 / a of October 29, 1946, it was decided to build individual houses for sale to workers. However, the construction of residential buildings in this year was not carried out, since the order of the Ministry, as well as the funding limit, was received by the plant only on November 20, 1946, and the construction project on December 9.

As a result of all the above problems, desertion, low labor productivity, turning into passive sabotage and completely unsatisfactory discipline among workers, especially Koreans, were widespread among the workers of the Sakhalinugol plant. Absenteeism and desertion of Japanese workers became widespread. So, in the month of August 1946, the number of truants was: 125 people in the Uglegorskugol trust, 739 people in Kholmskugol, 371 people in Makarovugol, 185 people in the Naibuti mine, 348 people in Kawakami. In total - 1781 people. The number of deserters at the plant was 245 people.

Desertion had to be dealt with somehow. By a resolution of the Military Council of the Far Eastern Military District, it was decided to prosecute all workers who left their jobs after the first of August 1946 as deserters. As a result, court stations were set up in the Naibuchi, Kawakami and Naihoro mines, where there were the most truants, for their speedy conviction. It was also proposed to introduce a special form of identity card on the island, different for each industry, which would allow workers to be assigned to the place of work.

The combination of these measures gave its results: if in 1946 13630 people skipped work, and 1382 people deserted from enterprises, then in 1947 there were 2,5 times fewer truants - 5145 people, and the number of deserters decreased by 56 people.

However, the Soviet leadership was well aware that the Japanese could not be forced to work with threats and repressions alone. Therefore, the most important transformations in the social sphere were carried out on the island. So, from February 1, 1946, Japanese labor legislation was abolished, which meant: an 8-hour working day was introduced instead of 10-12 hours, four days of rest per month instead of two.

It must be said that until March 1946 in South Sakhalin, there was no rationing of labor for all types of work, wages were made at times according to the existing Japanese rates and Japanese wage systems. From March 1, 1946, prices for all types of work became 50 percent higher than in the mines of Donbass. And from April 1, the Soviet wage system was introduced in South Sakhalin.

The improvement of workers' settlements, the construction of dormitories, canteens, shops, clubs, libraries, kindergartens also began. So in Naibuchi in 1946, a new canteen for 350 people was built, 2 canteens for Japanese and Korean workers were repaired. The Kawakami mine has 2 canteens for the local population and one canteen for Russian workers, and a canteen for 500 people has been built in Naihoro.

Bakeries were built at the Tomarikishi, Koshiho, Naibuchi, Toro and Taihei mines, dormitories were renovated and preparations for winter were carried out. The ORS trading network has expanded. By the end of 1946, it consisted of 35 shops, 11 canteens and 11 other subsidiary enterprises. By July 1946, 8 clubs for 6200 seats were equipped and opened in the mining villages, 6 cinemas with 3000 seats.

In addition, it was decided to increase the norms of food supply (initially, workers were given 1200 grams of rice, 40 grams of sugar, 300 grams of meat (fish) per day, 50 grams of tea, 300 grams of tobacco, 5 liters of sake per month), to provide workers with overalls, for which it was supposed

to allocate 15 thousand sets. It was also planned to pay the deposits made by Japanese coal workers in Japanese colonial banks before the occupation of South Sakhalin by Soviet troops, totaling 5 million yen.

It should be noted that it was planned to establish double salaries for Russian workers, northern rations and other benefits that were not provided for Korean and Japanese workers. This was to be helped by the Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR No. 263 of February 2, 1946 "On the Administrative Structure and Introduction of Soviet Laws in South Sakhalin", which extended to the territory of Northern and Southern Sakhalin the effect of the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of August 1, 1945 "On Benefits to Persons Living in the Far North", which provided for the following benefits:

1. payment of 10% allowances (up to 100 percent of the tariff rate or salary) after 6 months of work;

2. provision of additional leave from 18 to 30 days;

3. permission to combine vacations for no more than 3 years (up to 6 months, not including travel time on vacation) with travel expenses;

4. payment for the return travel of the employee and his family members to the mainland and payment for baggage transportation at the rate of up to 240 kg per employee and up to 80 kg for each family member;

5. provision of living space according to the standards in force in the area;

6. additional payment of the difference between the actual earnings and the social insurance benefit on the certificate of incapacity for work;

7. when calculating the length of service that gives the right to receive a pension, one year of work on Sakhalin shall be counted as two;

8. Employees retain the right to living space on the mainland for the duration of the employment contract.

It should be noted that these benefits applied exclusively to employees who entered into contracts with enterprises for a period of at least 3 years. However, the latter circumstance led to ridiculous incidents. Workers who have 2-year contracts and, of course, do not receive interest allowances tried to leave the island in order to conclude a three-year contract with one of the offices of organizational recruitment in Khabarovsk or Vladivostok and return to Sakhalin.

Continuing the conversation about benefits, let's say that a number of subsequent Resolutions of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR gave individual ministries and departments the right to pay employees a one-time allowance in the amount of 1-2 monthly salaries when renegotiating contracts for a new three-year period. In addition to this benefit, coal industry workers were allowed to pay an additional 1/4 of the monthly salary for each family member.

On August 25, 1946, the Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR "On raising wages and building dwellings for workers and engineering and technical workers of enterprises and construction sites located in the Urals, Siberia and the Far East" was adopted.

Taking into account, the resolution said, that the harsh climatic conditions of the regions of the Urals, Siberia and the Far East create additional difficulties for workers and engineering and technical workers engaged in hard labor - in the extraction of coal, ore, oil, in metallurgy ... - The Council of Ministers of the USSR considers it necessary: a) to increase in comparison with the existing norm wages for the above-mentioned categories of workers and engineering and technical workers, as well as b) significantly increase the program of housing construction in the Urals, Siberia and the Far East, primarily for workers and engineering and technical workers engaged in heavy work. To this end, the Council of Ministers of the USSR decides:

1. To increase wages by 20% from September 1, 1946 in the Urals, Siberia and the Far East: to workers and engineering and technical workers of coal industry enterprises engaged directly in coal mining and loading and unloading operations ...

3. To approve the following plan for housing construction in the regions of the Urals, Siberia and the Far East with its implementation during the second half of 1946 and 1947: a total of 60750 residential buildings with a total area of 4 million 200 thousand square meters, including: 50650 individual two-three-room residential buildings with a kitchen (wooden and stone); 10,100 communal residential buildings (stone and wooden), with the number of 55,000 apartments.

4. To establish that 50,650 individual residential buildings under construction in the second half of 1946 and in 1947 are sold to workers, engineering and technical workers and employees of enterprises at the following price: a two-room residential building with a kitchen, a wooden chopped one - 8 thousand rubles and a stone one - 10 thousand rubles; A three-room residential building with a kitchen, a wooden chopped one - 10 thousand rubles and a stone one - 12 thousand rubles.

5. To provide workers, engineering and technical workers and employees with the opportunity to acquire ownership of a residential building, oblige the Central Communal Bank to issue a loan in the amount of 8 - 10 thousand rubles to those who buy a two-room residential building with a maturity of 10 years and 10 - 12 thousand rubles to buy a three-room residential building with a maturity of 12 years with a charge of one percent per year for using the loan.

To oblige the Ministry of Finance of the USSR to allocate up to 1 billion rubles for the issuance of loans to workers, engineering and technical workers and employees.

One of the most acute in the coal industry of South Sakhalin was the issue of managerial personnel. Of course, at the head of all production enterprises were Soviet specialists. The former Japanese leadership was at best left in the positions of deputies, and in some cases Japanese engineers were even demoted. In 1946, the total number of Soviet engineering and technical workers in the plant system was 326 people, of which 113 people were in senior positions. The total number of Japanese engineers was 831 people, but only 17 of them were listed in the administrative apparatus.

It should also be said about the antagonism that existed between the Japanese and the Koreans, which manifested itself in the sabotage of the activities of the Japanese mine administration, in absenteeism, etc. A significant part of the Koreans refused to work together with the Japanese, demanded to be sent to their historical homeland.

They tried to eliminate antagonistic manifestations by involving foreign workers in socialist competition, which at the plant was extremely diverse in its forms, starting with the individual and ending with the participation of labor collectives of trusts in it. As early as 1946, all mines had socialist obligations. They were staffed by standing committees to sum up the results of socialist competition for each month. So, according to the results of the socialist competition of the coal mines of South Sakhalin in November 1946, the Naibuti mine was recognized as the winner, for which it was awarded the Red Banner.

Either the ideas of socialism and communism, or the fear of Stalin's camps, or the improvement of the social situation, or maybe all of this taken together, influenced the ability of Japanese workers to work. Thus, the productivity of the slaughterer in May 1946 was 15.5 tons, 2.2 times more than in October 1945, the labor productivity of the underground worker was 25.1 tons, or 2 times more than in October 1945.

Nevertheless, in the period from 1946 to 1948, the enterprises of Sakhalinugol systematically worsened their work, as can be seen from the following table:

Table XXIII

The main economic indicators of the Sakhalinugol plant in 1946-1948

Year	Sinking of preparatory workings in running meters	The current slaughter line at the end of the year in m.	Coal production in thousand tons.
1946	36567	4456	2389,9
1947	31323	3389	2429,6
1948	26927	3689	1976,4

As a result, transport, power plants and industrial enterprises of the island worked with great interruptions, did not have fuel reserves for the autumn-winter period. The result was a decrease in output, failure to fulfill the plans of the main industrial enterprises of the region.

In December 1946, an agreement was reached between the USSR and the USA on the repatriation of the Japanese population from the Soviet Union. From October 1946 to May 1948, the first stage of mass repatriation of Japanese nationals from the Sakhalin region took place. It was supposed to repatriate 30,000 people every month. But this directive of the government was not implemented. On the ground, there was no interest in accelerating the dispatch of the Japanese population to their homeland, since it constituted the main labor force, having lost which, many industries, including the coal industry, could stop.

On August 28, 1947, the Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 3014 was issued, providing for the accelerated repatriation of Japanese prisoners of war from the Sakhalin Region. By December 10, 1948, 275329 people were repatriated from South Sakhalin to Japan. It should be noted that the issue of settling South Sakhalin by Soviet citizens began to be resolved even before the start of repatriation. On April 4, 1946, the Council of Ministers of the USSR adopted a resolution on the voluntary resettlement of 4,000 families to Sakhalin. On April 7, 1946, the Council of Ministers of the USSR adopted a Resolution on granting the following package of benefits to settlers to South Sakhalin: free baggage transportation, receiving a non-refundable allowance in the amount of 3 thousand rubles for the head of the family and 600 rubles for each family member, obtaining a loan for the construction of an individual residential building and economic establishment, etc. As a result, by 1948, the number of arrivals was already more than 450 thousand people.

The repatriation of the Japanese population had a strong impact on the work of the Sakhalinugol plant, because more than 50 percent of the total personnel of the enterprise were Japanese.

Table XXIV

The number of employees of the Sakhalinugol plant by national composition in 1947-1949.

	01.01.1947.	%	01.01.1948	%	01.01.1949	%
Total working people	26343	100	24116	100	22519	100
Russian	7168	27,2	11661	48,4	20714	92
Japanese	16376	62,2	10565	43,8	-	-
Koreans	2799	10,6	1890	7,8	1805	8

Due to the reduction in the number of Japanese workers, an intensified supply of labor from the mainland began to the mines of Sakhalinugol. The first miners and engineers began to arrive on the island as early as January 1946. People came from Primorye, Kuzbass ... In 1947, 4428 people arrived to work in the plant's system, and in 1948 - 10229 people. In total, from 1947 to 1949 26322 people were admitted to the enterprises of Sakhalinugol.

At that difficult time, at the call of the party and the government, young people, strong, hardy, hardworking, went to the mines of Sakhalin. A lot of newcomers, young miners worked in the mines. It would have been difficult for them if experienced, knowledgeable people had not come to the rescue ...

One of them was the slaughterer Nikolai Ivanovich Proyavko. He opened wide to the youth his own treasury of experience. In a short time, he taught young miners the art of wielding a jackhammer, properly fastening the vaults, and rationally using every minute.

Who is this Nikolay Proyavko? He was born in 1913, at the age of 17 he entered one of the mines in the Donbass, where he was initially enrolled as a rollback.

You need a little wisdom to become a real rollback. Everyone will be able to roll the car to the hatch, from where the ember is pouring, fill it to the brim and then push it along the dark damp drift. This simple matter was given immediately. Nicholas knew every meter of his path, descents, ascents, knew where to drive "with a breeze", where to slow down ...

But youth is restless and restless. She needs to know everything, see, feel everything with her own hands. Nicholas asked to work as a slaughterer. Although not immediately, he mastered this complex mining science.

In October 1946, Proyavko arrived on the Sakhalin land. At the Dolinskaya mine, he was given a face. Having become acquainted with the mine, Nicholas once said to the head of the site:

- We work quietly. You can't do that.

The next day they prepared lava for him, gave him 2 fasteners, a timber carrier, and a rollback. Without tension, Nicholas easily mined 144 tons of coal per shift. Soon, the Dolinets worked with advanced Donbass methods, greatly increasing coal production.

On August 28, 1948, Nikolai Ivanovich Proyavko was awarded the title of Hero of Socialist Labor by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR for outstanding achievements in increasing coal production, restoring coal mines and introducing advanced methods of work.

The same honorary title was received by another Sakhalin miner - the foreman of the pile breakers of the Mgachi mine, Kirill Ivanovich Karaulov.

Unfortunately, most of the employees of the plant did not have the same personal qualities as N. Proyavko and K. Karaulov. In the pursuit of recruiting labor in terms of quantity, the recruiters did not pay any attention to the qualitative composition of the recruited workers, and as a result, among the recruited were sick, people who did not inspire confidence, previously convicted, etc. As a result, the qualitative composition of those arriving on the island was extremely unsatisfactory. Almost half of the workers, arrived in 1948 was unsuitable for heavy physical labor and underground work. 44 per cent of the arrivals were women. Even disabled people with work books were brought.

Such "lawlessness" lasted for quite a long time. So, in 1953, a worker V.N. Mikhailov arrived from the Oryol region to work at Sakhalinugol with a bilateral hernia, and from the Vinnitsa region - a worker A.K. Dannik, suffering from pulmonary tuberculosis ... These people were not suitable for physical labor. In addition, a large number of pregnant women arrived, who had to be sent back at the expense of the plant, since Sakhalinugol could not provide their future children with a place in the nursery.

In addition to the "orphans and wretched" in 1953, 1551 mental specialists entered the mines of the plant. Among them are 181 teachers, 178 health workers, 280 counting workers, 286 sales workers, 149 agronomists and livestock specialists, 463 employees, 5 artists, and 9 others. This practice of recruiting workers led to the turnover of workers, to the unnecessary expenditure of public funds, to the importation of specialists who could not be used in industry. After all, in those days, a doctor or teacher was not eager to retrain as a carpenter or slaughterer!

It should be noted that in the same year, a large number of people who were once fired for violating labor discipline, as well as persons who were amnestied in 1953, were brought to work at Sakhalinugol. Of these workers already on Sakhalin, 325 people were convicted by the people's courts as not going to work.

The departure of Japanese workers initially made it possible to improve the situation with labor discipline in enterprises. Compared to 1948, the number of truants decreased to 1918 people, or more than 2 times. However, soon the situation changed radically - the increase in the number of truants occurred exponentially. So in 1951, 2579 truants were recorded in the plant, in 1952 - 8762, in 1953 there were 14069 workers who walked without good reason 40896 man-days. Such a powerful

increase in the number of violators of industrial discipline is explained by the abolition in 1952 of the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of December 26, 1940, which provided for a punishment of two years in prison for absenteeism and being late for work without good reason.

Despite this, labor productivity in the mines and open-pit mines of the plant has steadily increased, as can be seen from the table below.

Table XXV

Average monthly labor productivity in the mines and open-pit mines of the Sakhalinugol plant in 1946-1953

Year	1946		1947		1948		1949		1950		1951		1952		1953	
Average monthly productivity of a mining worker	plan	fact	plan	fact	plan	fact	plan	fact	plan	fact	plan	Fact	plan	fact	plan	Fact
In mines (tons)	-	16,6	18,6	18,9	23,9	19,6	21	19,3	-	-	-	-	22,1	22,1	-	-
On open-pit mines (tons)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	89,4	98,9	-	-
By merge	-	16,6	18,6	18,9	23,9	19,6	21	19,3	23	23	25,6	24,4	24,8	25	26,6	26,2

However, the data of the same table indicate that the actual growth in labor productivity of the plant's employees at the end of the 40s lagged behind the planned one. In 1950, 32.8 percent of the maintenance workers, 33.8 percent of the slaughterers and pile breakers, and 33.4 percent of the tunnellers did not comply with the established labor productivity standards. In the same year, the Commission of the Ministry of Coal Industry of the USSR conducted an inspection of the mines of the plant, during which it was revealed that most of the working time was occupied by downtime. So, at mine No. 1/2 of the Uglegorskugol trust for an 8-hour shift, productive operations amounted to only 3 hours and 40 minutes. Due to waiting empty, the loss of time was 1 hour and 50 minutes.

The main reasons for the lag in labor productivity from the planned figures were recognized:

1. Power outages, which caused frequent downtime of workers, accidents. For example, in 1953, the mines of the Uglegorskugol trust were disconnected from electricity 59 times for a total of 362 hours, the mines of the Aleksandrovskugol trust had 265 hours of downtime due to a power outage, the mines of the Makarovugol trust experienced 927 outages. In total, in 1953, there were 1310 outages with downtime of 1845 mine hours and 850 restrictions with downtime of 1115 mine hours.

2. Poor supply of mine trolleys and untimely provision of mines with fastening wood. So, in 1953, the implementation of the plan for the supply of timber by Glavsakhalinlesbumprom was unsatisfactory. 87.5 thousand cubic meters of fastening and scaffolding were not delivered. Due to the lack of fastening timber, the Yuzhno-Sakhalinskaya and Dolinskaya mines operated with great interruptions.

3. Unsatisfactory ventilation of the preparatory faces, which caused downtime for workers. It should be said that all the mines of the plant were considered dangerous for gas. Thus, 5 mines had a passport of super-catering,* 3 - of the third category, 4 - of the second category, 7 - of the first category. In 1950 alone, there were 257 cases of gassing of preparatory workings and 1 case of gassing of the stope. The main cause of the explosions was the frequent shutdown of the fans due to wear and tear.

To prevent methane explosions, all operating mines were equipped with artificial ventilation systems. By 1952, the mines had 4 main and 49 district ventilation units. In 1953, the mines of the plant were ventilated by 55 fans with a total capacity of 32143 cubic meters per minute. However, a large number of fans in the mines had low productive power, which made ventilation difficult to control. By January 1, 1954, there were 108 partial ventilation fans in the mines to ventilate the

preparatory faces. However, due to a power outage in 1953, there were 219 cases of gassing of the preparatory faces.

4. Distraction of workers in basic professions to extraneous work.

In the annual production reports, in addition to the above, the following reasons were indicated - complete unskilled new workers, poor labor organization, a huge number of absenteeism due to illness, a large number of absenteeism, etc.

Among the reasons was the low qualification of newly arrived workers. To improve the skills of arriving workers, the plant was forced to organize on-the-job training courses. In 1949, with a technical training plan of 3967 people, 4508 people were actually trained, or 113,5 percent of the plan. In 1950, the training network of Sakhalinugol consisted of 6 training and course plants and 18 training centers, staffed by teachers. Engineering and technical workers of mines and trusts were involved in classes with young people. However, the training and course plants experienced an acute shortage of specialized literature. In particular, there were no books on mining.

In the second half of 1952, a mining and mechanical school with a 6-month training period, designed for 60 students, was opened at the training and course plant of the Uglegorskugol trust. In 1953, the school graduated 20 electricians and 34 drivers of coal loading and rock loading machines.

Improving the skills of workers has had a positive impact on reducing the number of accidents. So, in 1950, 751 accidents were recorded, in 1951 - 424 accidents, in 1952 - 296 accidents. In addition, there was a decrease in occupational injuries. For example, in 1950, compared with 1949, there was a decrease in the number of accidents by 7.3 percent, a decrease of 19 percent in fatalities, and an increase of 19.1 percent in serious accidents. In 1951, the number of accidents decreased by 16.3 percent, but the number of fatalities increased by 60 percent. The causes of accidents were falling pieces of coal and rock, interruptions in the supply of fastening timber, lack of discipline and non-compliance with safety regulations. The situation was aggravated by the lack of lamps and life-saving equipment. So in 1950, the provision of mines with battery lamps was 81 percent, and self-rescuers - 83,8 percent of the need. There was also an acute shortage of indicators for the determination of methane. Alas, in subsequent years, the situation at the safety front has not undergone positive changes. For example, in 1951, the provision of battery lamps was 78 percent, gasoline lamps - 66 percent, self-rescuers * - 94 percent.

A special place in the section "accidents and accidents" is occupied by explosions of coal dust. To prevent them, inert dust was used in the mines of the plant. Unfortunately, two stationary installations for the production of inert dust could not cope with its production in full. As a result, in 1950, the plant's management decided to build five simplified inert dust factories at mines No. 4/6 (Makarovugol), No. 4 (Kholmskugol), No. 15 (Uglegorskugol), Mgachi (Aleksandrovskugol) and Dolinskaya, as well as the construction of a central inert dust factory based on Gomonovsky limestone in the village of Pobedino. In 1951, 5 inert dust factories were built and put into operation, and existing inert dust factories were repaired at 3 mines. However, the construction of the central factory in Pobedino was not started due to the lack of design estimates. By 1954, the plant had 8 factories of inert dust with a total capacity of 4 tons per hour. The total consumption of dust in 1953 amounted to 5503 tons with a plan of 6627 tons, that is, 83 percent of the plan.

In the late 40s and early 50s, intensive fire fighting was carried out at the mines of the plant. For example, in 1951, 22 fires were extinguished in trusts. To improve fire safety in 1951, 108 metal doors were equipped at the Sakhalin mines, 15 pieces of fire-fighting trains, 34 underground and 21 surface fire-fighting warehouses were equipped. Also, 4905 meters of fire-fighting water supply were laid, 175 Rotta nuts were installed,* 723 fire extinguishers, 18 volunteer mine rescue teams with a total number of 380 people were organized, and 18 explosive engines were replaced with explosion-proof ones. In 1953, 13700 meters of air duct were adapted for water supply in the mines, 4490 meters of fire-fighting water supply were laid, concreting was carried out and the pit pits of mines were brought into a fire-resistant state, The flexible cable was replaced with an armored one.

In the early 50s, extensive exploration work began on the island. To organize them in 1949, the Sakhalinuglegeology trust was created. As a result of the work of the exploration parties of the trust in the bowels of the island, the richest deposits of coal and brown coal were identified. According to geologists' estimates, the reserves of solid hydrocarbon fuels in the bowels of the island amounted to about 20 billion tons, of which over 50 percent lay at a depth of up to 300 meters. These data made it possible to begin increasing coal production, which by 1953 had reached 3 million tons (See Appendix No. 2).

In the late 40s and early 50s, the pace of mechanization of the region's coal industry increased. New equipment and machinery began to be imported to the island. On January 1, 1950, the plant had 3 Makarov combines*, which were located at mine No. 14 ("Makarovugol"), Mgachi ("Aleksandrovskugol") and mine No. 1/2 ("Uglegorskugol"). But during the operation of the machines, the operators of the combines discovered design flaws: the cutting chains of the combine were often torn, as they were made of low-quality steel. In April 1950, the plant received 2 combines of the "Donbass" type, In August - 3 more combines.

However, the existing fleet of machines was used completely unsatisfactorily. On January 1, 1950, out of 36 cutting machines, only 7 were used, out of 3 combines - one, out of 19 rock loaders - 6, out of 14 coal loaders - 5. On January 1, 1951, out of 45 cutting machines available to the plant, only eleven were working. Their capacity was 2090 tons per month against 3850 tons according to the plan. The level of machine notching was 11.1 percent against 30.3 percent of the plan. The productivity of the working harvesters was also extremely low and amounted to 1908 tons against planned 4500 tons. As a result, the level of mechanized bulk in 1950 was only 3,6 percent with a plan of 31,3 percent.

In addition to increasing the level of mechanization of mining, issues were resolved to improve the haulage and transportation of coal. In the first half of 1951, manual haulage was practically eliminated, temporarily existing due to a lack of battery acid and the late production of AK-2 electric locomotives at mines No. 1/3, No. 5/6 and No. 8/9 of the Kholmskugol trust and the Oktyabrskaya mine. Horse haulage has been significantly reduced. By 1952, it remained at 2 mines - "Mgachi" and No. 5/6. The rope haulage was also reduced. If in 1949 it was available at 12 mines, then in 1950 - only by 6. All of the above types of haulage were replaced by a more advanced and productive electric locomotive haulage. In 1949, electric locomotive haulage existed at 10 mines, in 1950 it was introduced at 6 more mines. As a result of the introduction of electric locomotive haulage at the mines of the Aleksandrovskugol and Kholmskugol trusts, the condition of the haulage tracks and workings has significantly improved, and as a result, the mines have been able to increase the haulage of coal.

Thus, the muscular efforts of humans and animals were gradually replaced by electric traction. By the beginning of 1950, the plant had 52 electric locomotives, and by January 1, 1951, the fleet of electric locomotives already consisted of 87 machines, and explosion-proof battery electric locomotives were put into operation at super-categorical gas mines No. 4 (Kholmskugol), Yuzhno-Sakhalinskaya, No. 4/6 and No. 15 (Uglegorskugol).

However, many of these machines were not functioning. The reason was that of the 1280 battery cells for explosion-proof electric locomotives received in 1950 from the Irkutsk office of Glavsnab, 80 percent ended up with broken tanks damaged during transportation. The trolley fleet worked poorly. In 1950, out of 3573 trolleys, only 2689 or 75.2 percent were in operation. In 1951, the car fleet was used by 78 percent. Of the 3723 trolleys, 2846 pieces were in operation.

At the beginning of the 50s, the issues of coal shipment to consumers continued to remain unresolved. For example, the plan for the supply of Sakhalin coal in 1950 was fulfilled by 71,7 percent. With a shipment plan of 2713 thousand tons, 1944.4 thousand tons were actually shipped In 1951, with a transportation plan of 2619 thousand tons, 2158.6 thousand tons were actually shipped. Thus, the downtime of coal port points in the navigation of 1951 amounted to 220 days, including "Oktyabrsky" - 120, "Makarievka" - 55, "Mgachinsky" - 45 days.

In addition to the sea export of coal, the plant used rail transport to deliver fuel to intra-island consumers. However, loading plans were chronically not fulfilled here either. For example, the plan for the shipment of coal by railway cars in 1950 was fulfilled by 80.4 percent due to the failure to provide mines with railway empty.

In addition to the railway, the plant actively used vehicles. On January 1, 1954, Sakhalinugol had a fleet of 745 vehicles. However, of this number, only 401 cars were on the move, and 266 cars were in long-term repairs and could not be restored due to lack of spare parts. The plant's application for auto parts for 1953 in the amount of 790 thousand rubles was approved only for 445 thousand rubles (56 percent).

Despite the fact that over 30 percent of the cars were idle waiting for repairs, the road freight plan in 1953 was fulfilled by 117,9 percent (4215 thousand tons of cargo were transported), in terms of traffic volume, the plan was fulfilled by 136,6 percent (14658 thousand ton-kilometers were made). Overfulfillment of the plan was achieved by increasing the working day of cars to 10 hours instead of the planned 8 hours, as well as postscripts.

It must be said that the Sakhalinugol plant had a very high production cost of mined coal, which is illustrated in the following table:

Table XXVI

The cost of production of a ton of coal in the mines and open-pit mines of the Sakhalinugol plant in 1946-1953 (in rubles and kopecks).

Year	1946		1947		1948		1949		1950		1951		1952		1953	
	plan	fact	plan	fact	plan	fact	plan	fact	plan	fact	plan	fact	plan	fact	plan	fact
The cost of coal mined underground	118-68	110-80	115-48	132-93	142-28	166-59	179-92	196-35	174-99	186-34	-	188-18	175-69	194-62	182-03	187-04
The cost of open-pit coal	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	67-41	58-38	-	67-71	61-60	70-37	67-08	66-24
Consolidated cost of 1 ton of coal	118-68	110-80	115-48	132-93	142-28	166-59	179-92	196-35	159-20	167-84	157-94	172-05	159-21	176-53	163-58	166-04

The table clearly demonstrates that at the end of the 40s there was a constant increase in the cost of coal mining. For example, in 1949, the overrun per ton amounted to 16 rubles 43 kopecks, and the total amount of the rise in price was expressed by the figure of 14,5 million rubles.

The reasons for the increase in the cost of coal were:

1. Lack of standard leave and, as a result, overconsumption of materials in production. For example, in 1949 alone, the overconsumption of explosives amounted to 132483 kg, amounting to 324.6 thousand rubles in monetary terms. In 1951, with a plan for the consumption of timber per 1000 tons of production of 58 cubic meters, the actual costs amounted to 61.3 cubic meters, and the total overconsumption of timber was expressed by the figure of 5619 cubic meters. The main reasons for this were the negligence of the managers of coal enterprises, "who did not show a proper struggle for savings", as well as the fact that timber suppliers supplied thick-gauge ore resistance that did not meet the issued specification, as a result of which significant waste was obtained during cutting.
2. Wage overruns.
3. Low labor productivity.
4. Shortages of timber. So, in 1949, instead of the mine racks laid down according to the plan 118503 m 3, Sakhalinugol was supplied with only 93853 m^3, which had an extremely negative impact on the production plan and the quality of mine workings.

The work of the mines was also negatively affected by the forest fires that took place in the areas of coal enterprises in 1950, which led to the disabling of two mines, a break and a decrease in coal production in almost all mines of the island as a result of the distraction of workers to fight forest fires.

However, since 1950, after the start of open-pit coal mining, the consolidated cost curve slowly went down. From 1949 to 1953, it decreased by more than 20 rubles. But if the actual cost of the mines was significantly lower than planned, then the cost of underground mining at the mines of the plant, as in previous years, continued to outstrip the planned one.

Of course, the increase in the cost of the main products directly proportionally affected the increase in the losses of the plant.

Table XXVII

Profit and loss account of the plant "Sakhalinugol" in 1945-1953 (in thousand rubles)

Damages	1945	1946	1947	1948	1949	1950	1951	1952	1953
From implementation	20548	120474	178667	237387	119609	110984	N/A	174045	160922
According to experiments that did not give results	21	6	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Natural disasters	508	548	2154	1179	1029	4525	N/A	1099	393
Maintenance of canned enterprises		1466	N/A	919	3653	7729	N/A	1480	1004
Debts	N/A	1	89	247	315	651	N/A	117	178
Bad debts	77	105	1243	1731	1509	1584	N/A	4085	917
Theft	N/A	N/A	216	124	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
HOUSING	N/A	1136	1059	998	1560	1845	N/A	2224	3112
Past years	59	139	1234	7433	191	139	N/A	22922	N/A
Other	244	1324	N/A	318	2454	339	N/A	400	6558
Total	21457	125199	182662	250336	130320	127796	150107	206372	173084
Profit from sales	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	69639	N/A	34227	42389
Repayment of debts	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	688	N/A	11	107
Other	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Penalties and fines	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	165	N/A	303	718
Total	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	70492	N/A	34541	43214
Balance of losses	21170	125037	181683	249194	121887	57304	N/A	N/A	N/A
The amount of the state subsidy	155850	185264	211447	N/A	-	-	-	-	-

Simple calculations show that in 1945-1953 the plant received over 1367 million rubles. losses, of which in the first place was the article "losses from the sale of main products". In the "honorable" second place were losses from the operation of the housing and communal services plant on the balance sheet. An analysis of the data in the table convinces us that losses under the item "housing and communal services" grew from year to year, despite the fact that the amount of living space was decreasing every year. So, if on January 1, 1950, Sakhalinugol had 379954 sq. m. of housing, then on January 1, 1954, it had only 328763 square meters of living space at its disposal. As a result of the reduction in the number of housing and the increase in the number of employees from 1949 to 1953, the amount of living space per person decreased by a factor of 1.7, as clearly illustrated in the table below.

TABLE XXVIII

The amount of living space per employee in the trusts of the Sakhalinugol Combine in 1947-1953 (in sq. m.).

Year	1947	1949	1950	1951	1952	1953
Combine	6,0	8,7	7,1	5,9	5,8	5,2
"Aleksandrovskugol"	4,8	5,0	3,8	5,3	5,3	4,8
"Uglegorskugol"	6,4	14,4	13,6	8,3	7,0	5,6
"Kholmskugol"	6,1	6,4	5,2	4,1	4,8	5,0
"Makarovugol"	7,8	6,7	4,9	3,7	5,6	4,5
"Yuzhno-Sakhalinskaya"	4,5	4,9	5,3	4,4	5,5	6,5
"Dolinskaya"	5,0	4,7	5,0	5,8	5,4	5,2

At the same time, the plan for the commissioning of new housing was chronically not implemented. So, in 1951, 32128 sq. m. were put into operation with a plan of 40 thousand sq. m. or 83 percent of the plan, and in 1952 - 26625 sq. m. or 72 percent of the plan. In total, in 1946-1952, more than 166 thousand square meters of living space were put into operation. Housing construction by year is distributed as follows:

Table XXIX

Commissioning and re-equipment of the housing stock at the enterprises of the Sakhalinugol plant in 1946-1952 (in sq. m.).

Year	1946	1947	1948	1949	1950	1951	1952	Altogether
Built and put into operation	21798	7800	15455	17149	45074	32128	26625	166029
Including refurbished	20478	6155	10570	8993	360	-	-	46556

A more favorable situation has developed with the overhaul of dwellings. For example, in 1951, the plant mastered funds for the overhaul of the housing stock and social and cultural buildings in the amount of 15134 thousand rubles. with a plan of 15000 thousand rubles, and in 1952 the overhaul plan was fulfilled by 102.8 percent, repaired 61642 sq. m.

In addition, one of the ways to solve the housing problem as soon as possible, the plant considered the conclusion of contracts for individual development. The construction of individual housing in 1946-1951 is presented in the table:

TABLE XXX

Construction of individual residential buildings in the system of the Sakhalinugol plant in 1946-1951

Year	1946	1947	1948	1949	1950	1951	Altogether
Residential buildings built	12	31	100	359	679	625	1797
Their total living area (sq m.)	614	939	3000	10723	20377	18548	54192

However, not all the houses built were occupied. So, in 1951, 1094 contracts were concluded with individual developers, it was planned to build 800 individual residential buildings with a total area of 24,000 sq. m., of which 625 houses were built, and only 546 houses with a total area of 16380 sq. m. were inhabited. The way out of this situation was to be the supply of prefabricated panel houses from the mainland. Only in 1951, the Molotov House-Building Plant supplied Sakhalin miners with 49 houses with a total area of 14,3 thousand square meters.

Heavy losses to the plant were caused by overspending of the wage fund. So, in 1950, the plant allowed an overrun on the payroll fund in the amount of 2846 thousand rubles. For example, the mechanic of the steam power economy instead of 1200 rubles received 1650 rubles, the head of the material and technical warehouse instead of 690 rubles. received 980 rubles, fan drivers instead of 21 rubles 94 kopecks, received 28 rubles 04 kopecks. In addition, half of the staff of workers were assigned arbitrary rates that were higher than the maximum. So, the head of the PTO (mine No. 4/6) was set a salary of 2100 rubles. instead of the required from 1350 to 1800 rubles The salary of the road master exceeded the maximum allowable norm by 50 rubles, the accountant - by 75 rubles, the track worker - by 75.5 rubles.

It should also be noted that there was a discrepancy in wages at the enterprises of Sakhalinugol. If, say, a metalworker of the VII category of construction and installation works had a rate of 64.51 rubles, then at the mining plant the same metalworker received 33.75 rubles, and at the EMM mines - 27.93 rubles. Due to the lack of passports of norms and prices at the enterprises of the plant there were frequent changes in norms and prices, as well as the establishment of understated norms due to incorrect consideration of conditions when calculating the norm.

As a result, an exceptionally favorable atmosphere was created for all kinds of postscripts and distortions in wages. For example, on February 6, 1950, the production rates were fulfilled by planters by 227 percent, by lumberjacks by 153 percent and by transporter carriers by 192 percent. Such high percentages of compliance with the norms were obtained as a result of additions to the unfulfilled volumes of work on timber delivery and carrying of conveyors. At sites No. 2 and No. 3 of mine No. 1/2 of the Uglegorskugol trust, in January alone, additions worth over 48 thousand rubles were found.

Significant financial injections were also required to improve cultural, welfare and medical services for miners and their families. In 1953, for the cultural service of workers in the mines and enterprises of the plant there were 19 clubs for 4828 seats, 24 libraries with a total number of books 79000, in which 10427 readers were registered. The clubs had 11 brass bands. During this year, 1399270 people were served in the clubs with film screenings, 286 lectures and reports were read, 94 amateur art circles functioned at the clubs with a total of 1339 people engaged in them.

By the beginning of the 50s, there were 28 medical institutions at the plant's enterprises: 14 hospitals, 4 polyclinics, 10 outpatient clinics. However, the medical care of the miners in those years was unsatisfactory. Ambulance stations in the mines did not have ambulances (there were only 5 cars in 15 mines), there were no dental workshops and dental offices, X-ray units in polyclinics and medical centers ... In order to improve the health care of mine workers, the plant's management asked the Ministry of Coal Industry of the USSR to provide for the construction of 8 night tuberculosis sanatoriums for 400 people in the investment plan for 1952.

Significant monetary expenditures were also required to improve the commodity supply of miners. In 1952, the URS of Sakhalinugol fulfilled the turnover plan by 100,3 percent. In 1952, sausages were sold by 18 percent more than in 1951, fish - by 11.3, butter - by 25.8, milk - by 30, vegetables - by 33 percent, pasta - 2 times. All this clearly reflected the growth of the material well-being of the mining population.

The work of catering has also improved. In most miners' canteens, the assortment minimum of dishes was maintained, the consumer was offered a choice of up to 7 names of cold dishes and snacks, up to 3-4 names of first courses and up to 10 names of second courses, up to 5 names of hot

and sweet drinks. In addition, the canteens expanded the production of bakery and confectionery products.

Thus, in the second half of the 40s - early 50s in South Sakhalin, the process of restoring the war-destroyed mining facilities in the south of the island took place. Blasted and flooded mines, worn-out equipment, lack of sufficient investment, the reluctance of Japanese coal miners to work for the "Soviet invaders" served as the sum of the reasons that led to the extreme complexity of the restoration processes. And, nevertheless, in a few years, more mines were restored on the island, new mines were opened, geological exploration was carried out, Japanese miners were completely replaced by Soviet workers. The Sakhalin coal industry was given the opportunity to further develop and increase the rate of coal mining.

PARAGRAPH 2 DEVELOPMENT OF THE COAL INDUSTRY IN THE PERIOD OF INDUSTRIAL MANAGEMENT REFORM

The 50-60s of the life of Soviet society were marked by a significant number of reforms associated with the name of N.S. Khrushchev. From the moment of his accession to the "party throne", Khrushchev strongly encouraged the decentralization of the management of industrial enterprises located in individual republics of the Union, as the difficulties of managing from Moscow a huge industrial complex, growing from year to year, increased. From the very beginning, the management of industry through branch ministries created difficulties for Stalin's successors, so in 1957-1958 Khrushchev tried to reform the management of industry.

Khrushchev's radical proposals, made by him in 1957, were based on the organizational forms of the first years of the Soviet state. Industrial enterprises were to be managed by local bodies (economic councils), and not by sectoral governing bodies. The economic councils had to manage all industrial enterprises on their territory, regardless of their profile. With the help of the new system, they hoped to use raw materials in the most rational way, eliminate industry isolation and departmental barriers, counter deliveries.

The very idea of decentralizing economic management for such a huge country initially met with positive responses. However, in the spirit characteristic of the administrative-command system, this reform was presented by its authors as a miraculous one-time act capable of radically changing the economic situation in the country. There were no doubts about the reform, since it came from Khrushchev himself. Thus, theterritory of the USSR was divided into 105 economic administrative regions, and the management of the national economy within these regions was carried out by the Councils of National Economy (Sovnarkhozes).

The organization of the economic councils gave some effect, expressed in the fact that meaningless counter transportation of goods was reduced,a lot of small enterprises from various ministries, duplicating each other, were closed. The freed up space and funds were used to organize new industries. The process of technical reconstruction of enterprises has accelerated: in 1956-1960 3 times more new types of machines, units were put into operation, devices than in the previous fiveyears. There was a significant reduction in the administrative apparatus at enterprises.

However, there have been no fundamental changes in the development of the economy. The network of created economic councils practically coincided with the administrative division that existed in the country, and was not conditioned by the organization of the territory on the basis of economic criteria. The new bodies became simply multisectoral ministries with similar tasks, but only at the regional, not at the republican level. And since each branch of industry retained its specific needs, the dissolved Ministries very soon reappeared in Moscow under the guise of

departments of the State Planning Committee or technical committees. As a result, the administrative apparatus of the economy was not abolished, but became even more difficult and complex. Enterprises, instead of petty tutelage of ministries, received petty tutelage of the economic councils. The reform did not reach the enterprise, the workplace. And I couldn't get there, because I wasn't focused on it. The whole reform was ultimately reduced to a bureaucratic reorganization.

The military industry and several important industries were not subject to reform. Alas, the coal industry was not included in this list of "untouchables".

In 1957, even before the liquidation of the Ministry of Coal Industry of the USSR (1961), the Sakhalinugol plant became subordinate to the Council of National Economy of the Sakhalin Administrative and Economic Region (Sakhalin Council of National Economy), formed on the territory of the Sakhalin Region in accordance with the Decree of the Council of Ministers of the RSFSR of June 1, 1957. And after the abolition of the Sakhalin Council of National Economy in 1963, the plant became subordinate to the Far Eastern Council of National Economy (which existed until 1966).

On September 18, 1957, a section of the coal industry was established at the Sakhalin SNH. Its chairman was the chief engineer of the Sakhalinugol plant N.F. Perminov, and since 1961 - F. Aksarin.

In August 1957, the deputy chairman of the Sakhalin Council of National Economy, B. Gorbunov, sent to the Sakhalinugol plant for "consideration and conclusion" the proposals of the workers made at meetings of workers and employees of enterprises and organizations of the region when discussing the theses of the report of N.S. Khrushchev "On further improvement of the management of industry and construction". He asked within three days to prepare and submit to the planning department of the SNH proposals on the following issues for subsequent submission to the SNH for discussion.

1. Liquidate the trust "Uglegorskugol"
2. Liquidate the trust "Aleksandrovskugol".
3. To merge the management of mine No. 4 and Shebunino.
4. Liquidate coal trusts and a plant on Sakhalin, leaving only 2 trusts in the northern and southern parts of the island.

Unfortunately, the documents of the central and local archives do not contain statements by administrative employees of Sakhalinugol on the issues raised. However, the decisions of the SNH were not long in coming. On August 9, 1957, by the Decree of the Sakhalin Council of National Economy, the Makarovugol Trust was liquidated, and on April 13, 1959, by the Decree of the same Council of National Economy, the Aleksandrovskugol Trust ceased to exist. (By the way, the Kholmskugol trust ceased to function back in 1954.)

In the early 50s of the twentieth century, radical changes began to occur in the world that affected the coal industry. Coal has lost its role as the only, practically uncontested source of energy. Oil, gas and nuclear power made coal a very serious competition. However, all these changes to a small extent affected the Sakhalin coal industry, since oil and gas were available only in remote and sparsely populated areas of the north of the island. Its southern part was heated exclusively with coal.

By 1960, the coal industry of the Sakhalin region accounted for about 40 percent of the total gross output of the Sakhalin Economic Council and occupied 33 percent of the industrial and production personnel. According to geologists, by the beginning of the 60s. on Sakhalin there were 32 percent of the total reserves and 35 percent of the coal of the Far East. And if in 1940 coal production in the Sakhalin region accounted for 8,1 percent of the total production of the Far East, then in 1950 this share was already 17,7 percent, and in 1958 - 21 percent.

It should also be borne in mind that if the share of coal in the country's fuel balance in the 60s of the twentieth century was 50 percent, then in the Sakhalin region it reached 80 percent. Sakhalin

coal was still exported, it was consumed by some regions of the Far East, where about 1 million tons were exported annually.

According to the territorial principle, Sakhalin coals were used in 2 main directions - within the region and for export outside it. In 1960, the Sakhalin Oblast consumed about 74 percent of the mined coal, and the rest was exported to the Khabarovsk and Primorsky Territories, the Amur, Magadan and Kamchatka regions, coal was supplied to the Ministry of the Navy, and also exported.

According to the method of transporting coal to consumers, all mines were divided into coastal and railway. From seven coastal mines, coal was delivered to consumers exclusively during the navigation period. Among them were all the mines of the Uglegorskugol trust, as well as the mines of Northern Sakhalin. From eight railroad mines, coal was transported along the Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk Railway of the Ministry of Railways. In addition, coal was delivered from the open-pit mines to consumers by road. In 1955, the plant had a fleet of 846 cars, of which 585 were involved in the work. Despite this, the 1955 transportation plan of 5560 thousand tons was fulfilled in the amount of 6375 thousand tons.

Railroad mines mined high-ash coals of grade D and B-3. The products of these mines were sold mainly within the island for industrial enterprises, transport and household needs.

Coastal mines produced low-ash coals of a high degree of metamorphism.* Shipment of coal from these mines was possible only by sea, and loading was carried out in the roadstead by die-coats.* Coals were shipped for export, for bunkering ships, as well as to the ports of the Far Eastern coast, to Kamchatka and the Kuril Islands.

However, the lack of natural harbors in the coal areas of the island complicated and increased the cost of loading operations. Moreover, to the north of Kholmsk, the port points of the west coast froze, and all coastal mines could load only during the navigation period. This circumstance hindered the development of the extraction of the best quality gas coals. As in previous years, the supply of sea tonnage for loading was also unsatisfactory. In 1955, with a plan of 853,000 tons, only 710,000 tonnages were supplied. Of the 118,000 tons of coal, only 67,000 were exported solely for reasons of failure to ensure the supply of tonnage by consumers.

It should be said that the mid-50s was a period of crisis of old planning. The reforms, the changes made led to confusion in the managementapparatus and failures in the implementation of the Sixth Five-Year Plan. However, the government did not recognize this and replaced the five-year plan with a seven-year plan, which was designed for the years 1959-1965. As a justification for this measure, it was argued that the scale of management had changed and long-term prospects for the development of the national economy were required.

Although the seven-year plan clearly spoke of the need to make a major breakthrough in providing the people with housing, his ideas were reduced to the accelerated development of capital-intensive industries of group "A". The tasks of complete mechanization in the construction industry were clearly unrealistic.

On January 6, 1958, at a meeting of the coal section of the Sakhalin Council of National Economy, a draft long-term plan for the development of the coal industry of the Sakhalin Region in 1959-1965 was heard. The project provided for the allocation of significant capital investments for the completion of the construction and reconstruction of 4 mines with a total capacity of 1365 thousand tons per year, as well as the construction of an enrichment plant for 2000 tons per day. From 1960 to 1963 it was planned to carry out the construction of the Lermontov open-pit mine No. 2 with an enrichment plant with a production capacity of 600 thousand tons of coal per year, as well as to begin the reconstruction of mines No. 16/17, No. 1/2 and Dolinskaya. The reconstruction of these mines would make it possible to increase coal production from 1299 to 2100 thousand tons, increase the productivity of miners by 41 percent, as a result of which production costs per unit of production would sharply decrease (the cost of production of 1 ton of coal was projected to decrease by 7.23 rubles), which would allow mines not only to abandon state subsidies, but also to have a

profit of about 45 million rubles a year each. In addition, according to the calculations of experts, the cost of reconstruction of these mines should have fully paid off within four years.

By 1960, the Sakhalinugol plant included 16 operating mines and 1 coal mine, several electromechanical repair workshops, an ore repair plant, 5 coal processing plants, factories for the production of inert dust, as well as the Langeri mining department, which develops a loose gold deposit with dredges.

In 1960, the production capacity of the mine fund was revised. They were increased from 3667 thousand tons, approved by the Ministry of Coal Industry of the USSR in 1949, to 4635 thousand tons, or by 26,4 percent. It should be noted that 5 mines had a production capacity of over 300 thousand tons, 4 - from 200 to 300 thousand tons and 7 - below 200 thousand tons per year. Thus, most of the Sakhalin mines were of low production capacity.

It should be emphasized that the growth of production capacity was achieved mainly in mines producing coal - by 31.4 percent, and in mines mining brown coal - only by 19.6 percent. In 1960, of the total volume of coal mined, coal mining was 59 percent, and open-pit mining was 15.7 percent.

Basically, the island's mines developed high-calorific gas (G), long-flame (D) and brown (B) coals. (Mark "D" - 30.2 percent, "G" - 62 percent, "F" - 4.3 percent, "K" - 1.5 percent, "T" - 1.1 percent, "KO" - 0.9 percent). The vast majority (92.2 percent) of the reserves of Sakhalin hard coal belonged to gas and long-flame grades. 5 of the most powerful mines located on the west coast of the island worked on gas coals. On the long-flame mines - 4 mines, including the largest mine in Sakhalin - Dolinskaya. On coking and fatty coals - 2 mines with very limited reserves. And finally, 6 mines and 1 open-pit mine worked on brown coal.

Coal had a high calorific value from 7650 to 8450 kcal / kg. Brown coals had a calorie content of at least 7000 kcal / kg. Note that the ash of Sakhalin coals is refractory, which improves the conditions for their combustion in furnaces. In addition, all Sakhalin coals were low-ash (average ash content of 15-16 percent) and had medium enrichment.

An important factor in improving the economic performance of mines was to improve the quality of coal. Thus, a decrease in the ash content of mined coal by only 0.1 percent gave the plant savings in the amount of 1750 thousand rubles. per year. In 1959, the ash content of shipped coal was reduced by 0.2 percent against the planned level. The average ash content of all marketable coal in Sakhalin in 1960 was 14,1 percent, against 30,6 percent for the Khabarovsk Economic Council and 21,8 percent for Primorsky. The ash content of Sakhalin coals shipped for export to Japan was 9.9 percent, the navy - 10.3 percent, consumers of other economic councils - 13.4 percent.

The reduction in the ash content of Sakhalin coals was largely achieved through coal enrichment, that is, the removal of mineral impurities and waste rock. One of the methods of coal enrichment was mechanical, based on the use of jigging machines,* with the help of which 35 percent of the mined coal was enriched, while in the USSR as a whole the coverage of mechanical enrichment in 1956 was only 27 percent. The cost of mechanical enrichment of coal was 2.4 times lower than manual rock selection with incomparably better product quality and lower losses of coal in waste.

Coal processing at processing plants grew from year to year. If in 1946 the factories processed 514 thousand tons of raw coal, then in 1956 - 1230 thousand tons By 1961, the coal mines of the plant operated 5 processing plants with a total annual capacity of 1820 thousand tons of ordinary coal. However, many processing plants did not meet modern technical requirements: they did not have rock, storage and sludge facilities, treatment devices, their equipment was outdated and worn out. As a result, concentrators had extremely high losses of coal in sludge water and waste. Coal losses reached 6-8 percent of the processed amount. In 1956 alone, 33,000 tons of coal were lost by coal processing complexes. In addition, washing water was completely discharged into natural reservoirs, polluting them with coal sludge. It should also be noted that the processing plants at mines No. 15 and No. 16/17 were not adapted to work in winter conditions and worked seasonally, Only in summer.

In this regard, in 1960-1965 it was decided to reconstruct the processing plants at the Dolinskaya mines, No. 4, No. 4/6, No. 15 of the Uglegorskugol trust and, in addition, to build processing plants at the Yuzhno-Sakhalinskaya, Mgachi mines, as well as an enrichment plant at the 16/17 mine.

To reduce product losses during enrichment, it was supposed to install hydrocyclones in factories to capture sludge. To find out the efficiency of the use of these units, in 1957, as an experiment, an installation with 8 hydrocyclones was installed at the processing plant at the Dolinskaya mine. The test results showed that the cost of 1 ton of sludge caught by the installation is determined at 20-25 rubles. At a cost of a ton of sludge of 140 rubles, this gave savings of 115-120 rubles per ton. In addition, reducing the contamination of washing water due to the separation of part of the sludge from it made it possible to close most of it inside the factory and drastically reduce the amount of wastewater.

Of particular note is the fact that until the end of the 70s in the Far East, coking coals were not found in industrial volumes. The only exceptions were Urgal coals, but they were distinguished by high ash content and extremely difficult enrichment. It should be noted that Sakhalin coking coals, in comparison with Urgal coals, had a significantly (2-3 times) lower ash content, a higher calorific value and were much easier to enrich. Thus, high-quality sintering coals of Sakhalin at that time were considered as the only ones for the development of the metallurgical industry of the Far East.

According to geological surveys of the 50-60s, Sakhalin coals mainly occurred in medium-thickness layers. Of the total number of coal seams, 90 percent had a thickness of 0.6 to 3.5 meters. The fall of the strata is inclined and steep; 45 percent had a drop of 32 to 45 degrees and 35 percent had a drop of 45 to 90 degrees. There were significant adit reserves, which facilitated and reduced the cost of their production. The vast majority of the reservoirs had an average thickness. The interlayers ranged from 1 to 50 meters, the most common were the layers of close together.

Most of the balance coal reserves (78 percent) were concentrated at depths of up to 300 meters. However, the occurrence of the strata was characterized by complex tectonics. Mine fields were complicated by geological disturbances with discontinuity and cut by igneous rocks. The soil and roof of the strata were of medium or weak stability. Many strata had a false roof consisting of carbonaceous mudstones.

It should be noted that almost all coal seams in the Sakhalin mines were gas-bearing and dangerous for dust. In the 50-60s the gas content reached 60 cubic meters per 1 ton of mined coal. There have been cases of sufflar* gas release. In this regard, the plant's management paid special attention to measures for degassing and intensive ventilation of coal workings.

In 1959, work was carried out on the degassing of mine No. 1/2 by drilling degassing wells. Gas suction was carried out by RMK-4 vacuum pumps. From July 6, 1959 to May 6, 1960, 800 thousand cubic meters of methane were pumped out of the mine, daily pumping ranged from 1200 to 4000 cubic meters. On the fourth of June 1960, the coal section of the TPP SNH decided to recommend to the Sakhalinugol plant to provide for the degassing of coal seams at mines No. 4, No. 6 and No. 15 of the Uglegorskugol trust and the Mgachi mine. And also considered it expedient to use the gas obtained at the same time in local boiler houses.

In the middle of the twentieth century, the plant carried out work on the introduction of new coal development systems. In 1954-1960 the mines of the plant made a transition from a continuous development system to a pillar system, which required a radical restructuring of the mining industry. In 1960, 2/3 of all underground mining was carried out by the pillar system. This made it possible to carry out a more perfect organization of production and significantly improve the use of mechanization.

In addition, at mine No. 7, on the initiative of the labor collective, a shield system for excavating steeply falling seams was mastered,* which made it possible to dramatically improve the technical and economic performance indicators. The use of the switchboard system made it possible to increase the productivity of workers engaged in cleaning works* from 10 tons per shift to 22 tons,

or more than 2 times. The consumption of fastening timber per 1000 tons of coal production in the mine amounted to 30.7 cubic meters against 56.7 cubic meters under the previous development system, or reduced by 26 cubic meters.

Coal mines did not stand aside from technical innovations. In 1954, at the open pit mine No. 14 of the Makarovugol trust, engineering and technical personnel, with the active support of workers, introduced the most advanced transport-free system for stripping. This allowed the workforce to raise coal production by 1.5 times. Only in 1959, the volume of stripping work * in this way at the plant was completed by 155 percent of the planned.

It is known that the open method of coal mining increases labor productivity by 4-6 times and reduces the cost of production by 2-4 times. Open-pit coal mining in the Sakhalin region, as well as throughout the Far East, increased every year, as follows from the table below.

Table XXXI

Open-pit coal mining in the Far East and the Sakhalin Oblast in 1950-1960 (in thousand tons)

Open-pit coal mining	1950	%	1955	%	1960	%
Far East	4680	100	7126	152,3	8952	191,3
Sakhalin Oblast	324,73	100	591,2	182	758,8	233,7
The share of the Sakhalin region in the total open-pit coal production in the Far East	-	6,9	-	8,3	-	8,5

The table shows that open-pit coal mining in the Sakhalin Oblast has increased by more than 2 times over 10 years, while in the Far East as a whole it has increased only 1,9 times.

It must be said that the condition of some existing mines built in the pre-war years no longer corresponded to the current level of technology, which was the main reason for the low productivity of workers and the high cost of coal. At many underground coal enterprises, each seam was opened by independent working, had its own lifting, ventilation, and, as a rule, was an independent site with one longwall. For example, mine No. 1/2 "Udarnovskaya" had 7-8 such independent sites and produced 1000 tons of coal per day. Mine No. 6 produced coal through an inclined shaft and four separate inclined galleries. It produced 850 tons per day and had 6 production sites for 4 stopes. It should also be noted that the sinking of preparatory workings in many mines was carried out mainly by hand. In total, 11.9 percent of workings with mechanized loading of rock were completed in 1958, and 12.3 percent in 1959.

To improve the technical condition of coal mining enterprises, back in 1949-1950, the reconstruction of 5 mines (Makaryevka, Yuzhno-Sakhalinskaya, No. 15, No. 6 and No. 4) and the restoration of 2 mines - No. 4/6 and No. 4 ("Uglegorskaya") were started. At other enterprises, work was carried out to improve their condition.

For the mechanization of cleaning operations in different mining conditions in the mines of the region there were 6 types of mining combines: "Donbass-1", "Donbass-4M", "Gornyak", "Kirovets", "Shakhtar" and "LGD-2".

The advantage of mining combines* was not only that they increased the productivity of workers, but with their help the work of miners was facilitated, such labor-intensive work as manual loading of coal on a conveyor in longwalls was eliminated,* and the processes of drilling, charging and blasting boreholes ***** in longwalls were almost completely eliminated . In addition, harvesters sometimes made it possible to extract coal in such longwalls, where normal excavation was impossible or extremely time-consuming. So, at the Mgachi mine, for these reasons, the V seam was not developed for a long time in the entire mine field. With the introduction of the Gornyak

combine, the excavation of this seam was quickly mastered, and with its help, 160 thousand tons of high-quality coal were mined in just one year. In general, in 1960, the volume of mechanized bulk of coal in the stopes at the hollow and inclined seams amounted to 489.9 thousand tons, and the level of mechanization of these works was 31.3 percent.

It should be noted that in 1960 the volume of mechanized passage of mine workings amounted to 19 km and the level of mechanization of these works was 40 percent. The effectiveness of the use of mining combines is visible on the example of the underground section of the Lermontov Mine Administration, achieved by the team of I.I. Derenevsky. Here, the average monthly penetration rate was significantly increased, the number of tunnellers decreased by 40 people, the productivity of the tunneller increased by almost 3 times, and the cost of sinking was reduced by more than 2 times. Thanks to the use of roadheaders in the Lermontov Mine Administration, one combine team replaced the work of 4 brigades.

Simultaneously with the restoration of mines and the acceleration of the pace of mechanization of cleaning operations at the enterprises of the plant, all obsolete mining equipment was replaced with high-performance mining equipment. At the end of the 50s, the PK-2m and PK-3 tunneling machines were put into operation at the mines of the plant, ensuring the passage of workings for coal and rock. In addition, the UMP-1 and S-153 loading machines of obsolete designs were replaced with more advanced PPM-4, EPM-1 and UP-3 machines. Heavy-duty dump trucks YAZ-222 with a carrying capacity of 10 tons were put into operation at open works. All this made it possible to significantly increase coal production. (See Appendix No. 3).

In the course of the implementation of a number of important measures to streamline the mining industry, improve the technology and mechanization of work, the introduction of new equipment in 1960, the following technical and economic indicators were achieved: the average length of the stope was increased to 70 meters against 53 meters in 1950, or increased by 30 percent, the average monthly movement of the stope line was 24.3 m against 17.7 m, or increased by 37 percent, the load on one stope* increased to 146 tons against 67 tons, or increased by more than 2 times.

As a result of the introduction of mechanization, renewal and modernization of mining equipment, the labor intensity of work at the mines of the plant was significantly reduced. So, if in 1950 there were 578 workers per 1000 tons of coal mining, then in 1960 their number decreased by almost 2 times. The number of workers engaged in preparatory workings per 1,000 tons of underground mining decreased from 254 workers to 185, or 27 percent, during the comparable period, and the number of surface workers decreased from 380 to 260, or 31.5 percent.

In most mines, technological complexes on the surface were a very bottleneck. They were extremely primitive, consisted of adapted buildings and structures of a temporary type, equipped with low-productivity and worn-out equipment. Only 4 mines had mechanized timber warehouses. Due to the lack of proper timber warehouses in the mines, the unloading of timber and railway cars was mechanized by only 6 percent. At the Yuzhno-Sakhalinskaya and No. 4 mines, due to the scattered and primitive nature of the timber warehouses, the cutting of incoming timber cost almost as much as it cost to harvest it in the forest and deliver it to the mine.

The lag in the mechanization of work in timber warehouses was explained by the lack of funds for the construction of mechanized timber warehouses and the lack of the necessary equipment, primarily cranes for unloading, stacking and loading timber.

As a result of the above factors, the labor intensity of work on the surface remained high, and in a number of mines these works employed about 1/3 of the total number of workers in production, with an average for the Union of about 20 percent. For example, the proportion of surface workers to the total number was 39 percent at mine No. 4/6, Shebunino - 36 percent, Yuzhno-Sakhalinskaya - 35 percent, and mine No. 1/2 - 30 percent. In 1960, the reconstruction of the surface technological complexes of a number of mines began, but it was carried out extremely slowly, within the limits of insufficiently allocated capital investments.

In the mid-50s, work began on the transfer of machines and mechanisms of mines and open-pit mines of the plant to automatic and remote control. In accordance with a number of decisions of the plenums of the Central Committee of the CPSU, specific measures were developed for the coal industry to mechanize production processes, transfer machines and mechanisms to automatic and remote control, replace and modernize obsolete equipment, and further improve mining technology. So, on May 26, 1960, the Decree of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR "On measures to improve the technical and economic indicators of the coal industry on the basis of integrated mechanization and automation of production processes" was published.

As a result, the number of machines operating on remote control in 1960 compared to 1958 increased by 3.5, and on automatic control - by 6.5 times. (In 1960, at the coal enterprises of Sakhalinugol, 67 units operated on remote control, and 38 on automatic control).

In 1960, at all mines, the transfer to remote control of shunting winches at underground loading points of all operating longwalls, as well as all winches on the surface of mines - for pulling up railway cars for loading, was fully completed. It should be noted that the amount of work performed on the transfer of machines and mechanisms to automatic and remote control for the most part was carried out by the production personnel of the mines without the help of specialized organizations.

The management of Sakhalinugol noted that it was possible to transfer a much larger number of installations to automatic and remote control, but for this the plant lacked the necessary equipment. For example, the SNH supply department supplied the mines of the plant with only 50 percent of the cable from the allocated funds.

It should be noted that the transfer of machines and installations to automatic control made it possible to free up more than 200 people of minders with an annual salary fund of 300 thousand rubles. In total, as a result of the implementation of the developed organizational and technical measures, in 1960, 270 workers were released at the Sakhalin mines with an annual salary fund of 500 thousand rubles.

In the second half of the 50s - the first half of the 60s, the coal enterprises of Sakhalinugol carried out an active reconstruction of the track facilities, the renewal of the electric locomotive fleet. As a result, in 1955, the mines completed the mechanization of such heavy and labor-intensive work as delivery and haulage, as well as the loading of coal into railway cars. By the end of 1956, manual and horse-drawn haulage was completely replaced by mechanized haulage in the mines, including electric locomotive haulage accounting for 91 percent, and conveyor delivery for 9 percent. For the haulage of coal from the faces to the surface, mainly electric locomotive traction was used. In 1960, 27.5 km of haulage rail tracks were overhauled at the plant's enterprises, 11 trolley pushers were installed at the Makaryevka, Mgachi, Oktyabrskaya, No. 10/13, No. 4, Shebunino and Yuzhno-Sakhalinskaya mines, 9 sets of TSSE-1 equipment for controlling switches from moving electric locomotives were put into operation, 1350 trolleys, 37 electric locomotives, 31 chargers for charging batteries were additionally put into operation. In addition, a cable car to the rock heap* of the Dolinskaya mine was put into operation and the reconstruction of the rock farm at the Yuzhno-Sakhalinskaya mines, No. 4/6, No. 15, No. 6 and No. 4 was carried out.

Despite the significant pace of equipment modernization, most of the equipment available in mines and open-pit mines belonged to outdated designs and required early replacement. Therefore, no more than 60-70 percent of the available equipment was in operation. The productivity of the machines was low and amounted to 2900 tons per month for the Donbass combine or 73 percent of the plan for the plant and 2500 tons for the Gornyak combine or 78 percent of the plan. In some mines, this figure was even lower - 53 percent.

The main reasons for downtime and poor technical condition of mine mechanisms were the unsatisfactory condition of the repair base and power supply.

The repair base of the plant that existed in the 50-60s did not meet the needs of the mines. This was especially true of the CEMM of the Uglegorskugol trust and the mine mechanical workshops, which had insufficient production space and a worn-out machine park.

In the late 50s - mid-60s, the mines did not have a reliable energy base: out of 17 mines, 13 received electricity from their own power plants with a total installed capacity of 58.2 thousand kW. Only mine No. 10/13 received electricity from the power plant of the Poronai Paper Mill.

All power plants had low-power turbine generators from 500 to 7000 kW. and low operating steam pressures for turbines from 12 to 20 kg / sq. cm, which led to high fuel consumption for electricity generation. Fuel consumption at most power plants was 1.2-1.4 kg/kWh, and only at the Shakhterskaya power plant, which has more powerful turbine generators - 3600-7000 kW, operating at a steam pressure of 22 kg/sq. cm, fuel consumption was slightly less and amounted to 0.89-0.9 kg/1 kWh.

High fuel consumption led to an increase in the cost of electricity, which in 1960 amounted to 6.2 kopecks per kWh. As a result, the cost of electricity in the cost of a ton of coal mined at the plant was 1.05 rubles. or 5 times more than the average for the coal industry of the USSR. In addition, the electricity generated by their own power plants had a different frequency - 50-60 hertz, which led to damage to equipment.

In total, in 1960, the plant's power plants generated 187 million kWh of electricity and received 7.8 million kWh. Specific energy consumption for coal mining in the same year amounted to 16.9 kWh per 1 ton. It should be noted that in 1960, the Sakhalinshakhtostroy trust disrupted the installation of a 4000 kW power train. in Aleksandrovsk, as well as the construction of power lines from the power train to the Oktyabrskaya and Makaryevka mines, as a result of which in 1961 the mines of this area had an unstable power supply.

With the completion of construction and commissioning of the district Vakhrushev power plant, the mines were transferred to a reliable and inexpensive energy supply, and the mine power plants of the plant ceased to exist.

It is known that one of the important processes of coal production is the fastening of preparatory and clearing faces. As a fastening material, timber was widely used, cut into mine racks and puffs, the cost of which reached 10 percent of the total cost of a ton of coal mined.

However, the erection of wooden support* was laborious work; 6 percent of all underground workers, mostly highly qualified, were employed to maintain the workings fixed by the forest, and the cost of maintaining the mine workings in the mines of the plant amounted to more than 800 thousand rubles per year.

Since 1953, in the coal industry of the island, the introduction of metal arched support, made from a special profile by the Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk Ore Repair Plant, has been started for fastening the main preparatory workings with a long service life.

This support - strong, durable - made it possible to improve the condition of the preparatory workings and ensured safe working conditions for workers, and the cost of maintaining it, in comparison with wooden, was on average 2-3 times lower, and in some cases 5-6 times.

On January 1, 1956, the plant had 5 longwalls with metal support with a plan of 10. In 1955, 3288 meters of preparatory workings were fixed with metal. In 1960, about 30 km of the main preparatory workings were fixed with metal support. The economic effect of reducing the cost of maintaining this volume of workings fixed with metal, in comparison with wood, amounted to 200 thousand rubles per year.

Since 1957, metal racks for fastening stopes began to be introduced at the mines of the plant, and later - metal organ support of the OKU and MOS types. By 1961, 7 stopes were fixed with this support at mines No. 1/2, No. 6, No. 15, Makaryevka and Oktyabrskaya. The economic effect of the introduction of the novelty is seen in the example of mine No. 6, where, thanks to this support, savings in forest fasteners per 1000 tons of mined coal of 12.8 cubic meters were achieved and the cost of a ton of coal was reduced by 25 kopecks.

Thus, the use of metal support made it possible to achieve a reduction in the consumption of expensive fastening wood. If for a number of years the coal industry of the region did not fit into the established consumption rate of fastening timber and the actual consumption was 62.7 cubic meters.

m. at a rate of 58.6 cubic meters. m. per 1000 tons of production (only in 1955, the overconsumption of fastening timber amounted to 12430 cubic meters in the amount of 2200 thousand rubles), then by 1961, thanks to the introduction of substitutes for fastening timber, Consumption decreased to 57.7 cubic meters per 1000 tons of coal production. However, the workers treated metal racks the same as wooden ones. As a result, up to 35-40 percent of the metal support was lost on each cycle.

The material and technical supply of Sakhalin mines and open-pit mines in the second half of the 50s - early 60s of the twentieth century was generally satisfactory. However, from year to year, the plant received insufficient funds for some materials and equipment, the absence of which in the mines made it difficult to work and caused an increase in the cost of coal mining. The mines lacked adhesive glass tape, insulating tape, static capacitors, and oxygen valves. There was a shortage of equipment and materials for the railway facilities of the plant - there were not enough bolts, crutches, etc. The Department of the Forest Industry and Timber Sales undersupplied thousands of cubic meters of fastening timber to the mines, fulfilling the supply plan only by 80-90 percent. In addition, non-standard timber was often received from suppliers. The average cost of 1 cubic meter of timber in 1955 was 175 rubles 13 kopecks with a plan of 169 rubles 32 kopecks due to an increase in the supply of more expensive floating timber.

The shipment of certain types of equipment was often disrupted due to the fault of some suppliers. But the plant itself, due to negligence towards its own vehicles, disrupted the delivery of goods and equipment from warehouses to mines and open-pit mines. So, in the mid-50s, instead of purchasing 2-3 tugboats and 10-12 barges, the plant acquired 10 tugboats and 2 barges. As a result, the departmental fleet of the plant was used very poorly: the boats were more moored than they were in operation. From year to year, this hampered the supply of mines and caused millions of losses to the state.

As in previous years, the cost of a ton of coal in the mines of Sakhalin continued to be very high. For individual mines of the plant in 1959, the cost of one ton of coal ranged from 30.7 rubles (Oktyabrskaya Mine) to 16.8 rubles (Dolinskaya Mine), averaging 20.0 rubles for the plant for underground work and 6.3 rubles for open pit work, in total - 17.9 rubles.

It should be noted that Sakhalin coal was one of the most expensive in the country. Its average cost in equivalent fuel (t. c.t.) in the main coal basins of the Far East of the country was:

TABLE XXXII

COST OF COAL IN THE FAR EAST IN 1960

Name of the region	Cost of 1 ton in rubles.	In% of the average cost of 1 ton of coal in the USSR
Far East	13,42	129,8
Primorsky SNH	13,88	134,2
Khabarovsk SNH	13,35	129,0
Amur SNH	4,44	42,9
Magadan SNH	13,44	129,9
Sakhalin SNH	23,93	231,4

So, the extraction of a ton of Sakhalin coal was more than two times more expensive than the average for the USSR and almost 10 rubles more expensive than all other Far Eastern coals.

The cost of Sakhalin coal was significantly higher than the average for all economic councils of the USSR, as a result of the fact that production costs for coal mining in the conditions of the island were higher than the national average. The increase in production costs of the Sakhalinugol plant was caused by the following main factors:

- additional, in comparison with the mainland, costs associated with increased price lists of wholesale prices for timber. So, if on average in the country 1 cubic meter of the mine rack cost 18,4 rubles, then on Sakhalin - 21,9 rubles, or higher by 3.5 rubles, which increased production costs by 800-900 thousand rubles;
- lack of mechanized timber warehouses in the mines - 250-300 thousand rubles;
- complex mining and geological conditions of the deposit, causing an increased, against the mainland, consumption of timber and other materials. In the mines of Sakhalin, about 1000 cubic meters of underground coal production consumed about 60 cubic meters of forest, while in most mines of the mainland, forests were consumed almost 2 times less. Only due to the increase in timber consumption caused by difficult mining and geological conditions, about 2.5 million rubles were additionally spent in the mines of the island;
- the high cost of explosives caused by the importation of raw materials to the island from remote areas, as well as the increased costs of "wear and tear" and other materials - more than 2 million rubles;
- increased costs for the element "fuel" - 480-500 thousand rubles, caused by the maintenance of a large number of inefficient production boilers and the high cost of coal for production and technical needs - 500 thousand rubles;
- high cost of electricity. The share of the element "electricity" in the total production costs of the Sakhalinugol plant was 6,1 percent, while for Rostovugol - only 1,6 percent, the Lugansk Council of National Economy - 2,1 percent, and in the whole coal industry of the USSR - 2,8 percent. If the average cost of electricity in the Union was 24 kopecks, then in the mines of Sakhalin - more than 1 ruble, or more than 4 times higher - a rise in price of about 3,5 million rubles;
- additional wage costs - 23.7 million rubles, of which:

1. Due to the reduced labor productivity compared to the mainland caused by the technical backwardness of the Sakhalin mines. So, if the average monthly productivity of coal mining workers on average throughout the industry of the economic councils was 43,1 tons in 1960, then on Sakhalin 33,1 tons, or 10 tons lower. In 1960, 25 percent of workers in cleaning works and 23.5 percent of workers in preparatory work did not comply with the production standards at the plant. In some mines, this percentage reached the level of 69 (mine No. 4). Only due to low labor productivity, additional costs amounted to 6.7 million rubles.

2. Due to the payment of increased wages for work in remote areas 17.0 million rubles, including:

a) percentage allowances for workers for work in remote areas, amounting to the general fund of about 13.5 percent, or 5.2 million rubles;

b) additional vacations for workers in the amount of 12-18 working days, which exceeded the vacation on the mainland by 50-75 percent - about 1.8 million rubles;

c) an increase in tariff rates (salaries) against the Donets Basin by 40 percent gave an increase in the cost of the wage fund of about 6.5 million rubles;

d) payments, in accordance with employment contracts, to workers on sick leave up to 100 percent of earnings due to production, which was not the case on the mainland - about 400 thousand rubles;

e) payment of increased one-time remuneration for years of service in the coal industry, in connection with increased tariff rates and salaries - about 300 thousand rubles;

f) additional costs for payment of increased salaries, one-time remuneration and vacations of engineering and technical workers and employees - about 2.8 million rubles.

- increased costs for depreciation of fixed assets caused by the presence of mines with a greater load on the island; So, if in all the mines of the Council of National Economy of the USSR the average annual load on one mine was in 1960 466 thousand tons, then in the mines of the island only

237 thousand, or almost 2 times lower - over 600 thousand rubles, for the same reason, the costs of "other monetary expenses" were higher than on the mainland by 6.0 million rubles.

In addition to the above reasons, the factors affecting the high cost of Sakhalin coal were:

a) technical backwardness of the mines of the plant;

b) dispersion of mining operations caused by the absence of a single opening of the deposit;

c) the presence of primitive surface technological complexes, as a result of which the labor intensity of work on the surface of mines was 25-30 percent higher than the average for the Union;

d) the presence of mines with low production capacity. So, out of 16 operating mines, 7 had a capacity of up to 500 tons per day, 3 mines - from 500 to 1000 tons and only 6 mines - over 1000 tons per day.

Labor productivity and cost in mines with different production capacities in the early 60s are characterized by the following indicators:

Table XXXIII

Average daily mine production	Average monthly labor productivity (t/month)	Cost of coal (rub./1 t.)	The share of mines in total production (%)
Up to 500 tons	22,5	25-25	14,8
500-1000 tons	29,3	19-18	24,5
1000 and above	31,4	18-03	44,4
Open works	134,2	5-41	16,5
By plant	33,1	17-30	100

It is quite obvious that the high cost of Sakhalin coal worsened the economic development of the Far Eastern Territory, and the high price was an obstacle to its greater distribution along the coast. For example, the cost of Sakhalin coal in the port of Nakhodka in 1958 was 52.9 rubles. t. t. t., wholesale price with transport costs 39.7 rubles. t. t. t. At the same time, the cost of coal from the Suchanskoye deposit of the Primorskugol plant in the port amounted to 15.4 tons of fuel equivalent and, accordingly, the wholesale price of 14.75 rubles. t. c. t. (ordinary grade "G").

As a result, the Primorsky SNH, in calculations for the future, planned to completely abandon the consumption of Sakhalin coal. The Khabarovsk SNH conditionally accepted the delivery of Sakhalin coal in the amount of only 30 thousand tons, the Magadan SNH considered it possible to develop its own fuel base and conditionally accepted the delivery of Sakhalin coal in the amount of 20 thousand tons, but Kamchatka, due to the increase in the number of industrial enterprises, planned to increase the consumption of Sakhalin coal to 350 thousand tons.

The problem that arose had to be urgently addressed. Of course, the island's coal industry could be focused solely on meeting the needs of the island. However, in this case, all external consumers would fall away, and the region's economy would gain nothing from this. Therefore, the party leadership of the region and the administration of the plant decided, taking into account the geographical location of the island, the quality of coal and its reserves, to orient the coal industry of Sakhalin to increase the export of coal from the island, in particular, to Japan and the coast of the Far East. In this case, a radical restructuring of the industry was required, with the aim of a sharp (3-4 times) reduction in the cost of coal and the transformation of the coal industry from unprofitable to profitable. To drastically reduce the cost of mined coal, the plant planned to concentrate coal production at 5 large mines using integrated mechanization on them.

The long-term plan for the development of the island's coal industry provided for a significant improvement in the technical and economic performance of coal enterprises. This improvement was planned to be carried out through the following areas:

- reconstruction of existing mines;
- liquidation of low-productivity mines with low technical and economic indicators;
- expansion of mechanization and automation of production processes;
- increase in coal production in mines that produce the highest quality coals;
- transfer of mines and sites to more economical modes of operation;
- increasing the movement of stopes and the load on the stopes;
- improving the organization of labor and production processes;
- reduction of specific rates of consumption of materials and electricity.

The management of the plant made proposals to reconstruct 11 out of 16 coal mines. The implementation of such a reconstruction would make it possible to increase the annual production capacity of the island's mines to 8 million tons without the construction of new enterprises, ease working conditions and reduce costs. After the reconstruction of all mines, labor productivity was projected to increase by 1.5 times, and the annual savings in mining would be about 20 million rubles.

The increase in the production capacity of the reconstructed mines was supposed to create conditions for the closure of small, unproductive mines with a large unprofitability. These included the mines "Arkovo", No. 4/6, No. 5/6 (closed in July 1961), No. 7, "Oktyabrskaya" (closed in October 1962). The closure of these mines, scheduled for 1961-1963, according to experts, would further increase labor productivity by 30 percent and reduce costs and planned losses for coal mining by at least 4,9 million rubles.

It must be said that some "hotheads" made proposals to close not only particularly unprofitable mines, but also those enterprises that did not reach profitable work, namely: Shebunino, Telnovskaya, Mgachi, Tikhmenevskaya, Yuzhno-Sakhalinskaya. In particular, such proposals were made by the head of the technical department of the plant Alekseev. He proposed to leave only profitable enterprises - the mines "Boshnyakovo", "Udarnovskaya", "Dolinskaya" and Lermontov Mine Administration.

However, in the Sakhalin Regional Committee of the CPSU, the idea of closing the above mines was perceived "with hostility". The first secretary of the Sakhalin Regional Committee of the CPSU, Pavel Artyomovich Leonov, in his book "Essays on the History of the Sakhalin Organization of the CPSU" wrote about this initiative as follows: "When the Sakhalin Economic Council existed, its employees made proposals and even attempts were made to close some mines of Sakhalin, as unpromising, to reduce coal production. Well aware that the transfer of the national economy of the region to oil and gas is premature, the regional committee of the CPSU took measures to prevent the curtailment of the coal industry.

And yet, many unprofitable mines continued to function, drawing on significant financial resources of the island's economy and increasing its unprofitability. For example, in 1959, the coal industry accounted for 18 percent of the total gross output of the region, but at the same time, losses from the sale of coal reached 19.7 million rubles, which accounted for 20.3 percent of the total losses in the region's industry. In total, from 1951 to 1960, the plant received 123964 thousand rubles. losses, as evidenced by the data in the above table.

Table XXXIV

The cost of commercial products and the result of the main activity of the Sakhalinugol plant in 1951-1960

Periods	Cost of marketable products	Commodity products (thousand rubles)	The result of the main activity (thousand rubles)	Costs per 1 ruble of marketable products (kopecks)

	(thousand rubles)			
1951	77670	70654	+ 7016	109,9
1952	73704	62239	+ 11465	118,4
1953	79054	68934	+ 10120	114,7
1954	92485	80910	+ 11575	114,3
1955	95316	84550	+ 10766	112,7
1956	96410	83330	+ 13080	115,6
1957	98228	86421	+ 11807	113,6
1958	107825	93256	+ 14569	115,0
1959	117068	99644	+ 18424	118,5
1960	119654	104512	+ 15142	114,5

("+" - losses; "–" - profit.)

In 1960, out of a total loss of 16 million rubles, losses from the sale of marketable products amounted to more than 15 million rubles, of which only from the sale of raw coal 13100 thousand rubles, or 82 percent.

In addition, the plant had over 800 thousand rubles. losses that do not depend on the production activities of the enterprise. These losses were as follows:

1. from the maintenance of housing and communal services of non-coal enterprises. In 1960, more than 360,000 rubles of state subsidies were spent for these purposes;
2. from the maintenance of clubs and pioneer camps - about 430 thousand rubles.
3. natural disasters and other losses - over 40 thousand rubles.

Planned losses for run-of-mine coal were largely caused by the difference between the high level of production costs and the existing wholesale prices. Cm. Table:

Table XXXV

The gap between the cost of coal mined and the selling price in 1951-1960

Year	Commercial coal mining (thousand tons)	Cost of 1 ton of coal (RUB)	Selling price of 1 ton	The gap between the cost price and the selling price (RUB)	Total result in thousand rubles (loss)
1951	2544,1	19-31	16-91	2-40	6103,0
1952	2538,2	19-30	14-72	4-58	11625,0
1953	2898,6	17-92	14-59	3-33	9652,0
1954	3376,4	17-01	14-43	2-58	8711,0
1955	3588,5	16-63	14-40	2-23	8002,0
1956	3536,6	16-97	14-32	2-65	9372,0
1957	3814,0	16-91	14-30	2-61	9954,0
1958	4141,3	17-13	14-20	2-93	12134,0
1959	4385,3	17-90	14-21	3-69	11796,0
1960	4546,0	17-30	14-40	2-90	13183,0

From the above data it can be seen that in 1951-1960 the loss on ordinary coal amounted to more than 100 million rubles, or 81 percent of the total losses in the coal industry of the region.

To cover the unprofitable operation of the mines, the plant received a state subsidy. For 1955-1960 Sakhalinugol received over 974300 thousand rubles of subsidized payments from the state, and

their size increased every year. If, for example, in 1954 the size of the state subsidy to the trust "Uglegorskugol" was 23.6 million rubles, then in 1958 it increased to 54.8 million, and in 1959 to 76.6 million rubles. In addition, the leaders of the trust allowed mismanagement in the expenditure of money, materials, explosives. There were also cases of squandering loans, services to other organizations without compensation, etc.

Since 1960, on the initiative of the miners of mines No. 16/17, No. 1/2 and the Lermontov Mine Administration, socialist competition has been widely developed at the enterprises of Sakhalinugol for the reduction of state subsidies and the transition to break-even work by the mid-60s. In 1959, the state subsidy to the plant was reduced by 22 million rubles, and the planned losses of the plant were reduced by 30.7 million rubles. In 1960, the enterprises of the plant planned losses were reduced by the amount of 1316 thousand rubles. In 1961, 3 mines worked profitably, against one in 1959. Compared with the plan of 1959, the planned losses on January 1, 1962 were reduced by 34.2 percent or 8 million rubles. However, in 1960, 4 enterprises of the plant made excess losses in the amount of 225 thousand rubles. And in 1961 their number increased by 1.5 times, and the amount of excess losses increased by 2.3 times.

Innovators made a significant contribution to reducing costs and improving the work of enterprises. So, in 1955, 467 rationalization proposals were received for Sakhalinugl, 296 of them were introduced into production with actual savings of 4528,2 thousand rubles. In 1959, more than 6 million rubles were saved from the introduction of rationalization proposals. In 1960, 1297 rationalization proposals were received, 23 percent more than in 1959. Of these, 1099 were accepted and 905 were put into production, or 45 percent more than in 1959. Savings from implementation amounted to 7.2 million rubles against the plan of 6.5 million rubles.

Inventors also contributed to the improvement of the technical equipment of coal enterprises. For example, in 1961, at mine No. 15 of the Sakhalinugol plant, a belt-chain conveyor invented by Mikhail Anatolyevich Sobolev, an engineer of Sakhalingiproprom, was put into industrial tests. It was the first underground large-falling conveyor in the USSR. Its capacity reached 120-130 tons per hour. The prototype was made at the Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk Ore Repair Plant on the recommendation of the Committee for Inventions and Discoveries under the Council of Ministers of the USSR, which issued Sobolev an author's certificate.

In the middle of the twentieth century, the organization of production and work of miners changed significantly. An important factor in increasing labor productivity was the introduction of a progressive method of organizing labor according to a cyclical schedule. The first on Sakhalin proposed the use of cyclicity in the work of V.F. Solovyov. Working according to the new method, Solovyov's brigade in 1954 produced 4000 tons of excess fuel, and in 1957 - already 18 thousand tons.

However, the transition to the cyclical schedule was hampered by a number of circumstances. It was necessary to retrain workers on the job, to teach them related professions. In addition, it was necessary to employ the redundant workers. We managed to cope with these difficulties.

In the faces switched to the cyclic schedule, the average speed of movement was 41.5 linear meters, while in the longwalls not transferred to the schedule - 21.8 meters, the daily production of cyclic longwall was 210 tons, and in the longwall not converted to cyclicity - 121 tons, labor productivity at the outlet was 4.7 and 3.5 tons, respectively.

It should be noted that the transfer of longwalls and the preparation of faces according to the cyclicity schedule were often carried out without taking into account mining and geological conditions, as a result of which only a small number of faces fulfilled the established norms. For example, in 1964, 35-30 percent of all operating longwalls worked according to the cyclicity schedule, while only 8-9 percent of the total number of longwalls fulfilled the cyclicity standard. The reasons for non-compliance with the cyclicity standard were also called insufficient preparation of longwalls, the unsatisfactory organization of labor in these longwalls and, in addition, "the frivolous attitude of the heads of trusts and mines to this issue."

When working on a cyclical schedule, the main form of labor organization was specialized teams that perform individual works of the production process. Some brigades drilled the face,* others loaded, others fastened. It must be said that the usual organization of the work of miners, united in brigades by profession, had many drawbacks. The driller did not care about the affairs of the fastener, and the PPM driver even considered it shameful for himself to do other work besides loading the rock.

For the high-performance work of mining crews, it was necessary that the workplace be prepared for their arrival in the longwall: fires were moved, rubble strips were tightened, fastening timber was supplied, the longwall face was drilled and fellowed, etc. In practice, it was usually rarely possible to organize such a clear work of all miners working only in their profession due to often unforeseen delays.

Untimely delivery of explosives delayed blasting in the longwall and, therefore, caused downtime for pile breakers. If by the end of the mining shift there was coal and part of the longwall was not fixed, then in the preparatory shift there were downtime of butchiks and firefighters.

An analysis of the time spent by conventional crews showed that they spent an unacceptably long time on auxiliary and so-called unproductive work (cleaning the face, marking boreholes, replacing crowns, tightening the roof and sides, rolling loads, building up ventilation and water pipes, etc.).

Extraneous work, which people were sometimes forced to do, reduced labor productivity, and consequently reduced the amount of progressive surcharges, which did not cause the miners any desire to engage in extraneous work.

It was necessary to find such a form of organization of labor in the longwall so that it would not stand idle, so that coal would be transported in a continuous stream, and all technological processes associated with mining would end in the shift allotted by the schedule. Most importantly, the organization of work was to eliminate the downtime of brigades, increase labor productivity and increase the earnings of miners. Such an organization of work was found and called complex, when working lavas perform all processes, regardless of the main profession. Here you had to be a jack of all trades. The first to use the integrated organization of labor on Sakhalin were the following brigades: Streltsov from mine No. 5/6, V. Pilgrim from the Yuzhno-Sakhalinskaya mine, A. Zheltov and K.P. Kopylchenko from the Dolinskaya mine, Ivanov from mine No. 4, Gneushev from the Mgachi mine, Dvornikov from the Shebunino mine, Dmitrienko from mine No. 10/13.

For example, in 1956, Streltsov's brigade brought the average monthly productivity of the Donbass combine to 4550 tons (against 2700 tons in 1955), and in the first half of 1957 it increased to 5000 tons.

However, highly skilled workers were not very satisfied with this organization of labor because they had to work on an equal basis with everyone else. A way out of the situation was found. The entire team received payment according to the final result, depending on the amount of coal mined. Among the members of the brigade, earnings were distributed according to the qualifications and amount of work performed by each. On average, the earnings of one slaughterer in the Kopylchenko brigade in 1956 amounted to 5-6 thousand rubles.

In the 50-60s a new movement arose in the USSR - the brigades of communist labor. Members of these brigades, as well as members of the DIP brigades (catch up and overtake) in the early 30s,- tried to introduce communist methods into their daily lives, spend their free time together, and improve their educational, cultural and technical level.

Brigades of oil workers, fishing artels, logging collectives, workers of collective farms and state farms of the island region, as well as workers throughout the country, assumed increased socialist obligations for the early fulfillment and overfulfillment of production plans, norms and tasks. The brigades of Sakhalin miners did not lag behind them. For example, on April 15, 1954, the miners of the Vakhrushev mine signed an agreement for socialist competition with the miners of mine No. 18-bis of the Chistyakovanthracite trust of the Stalinugol plant.

In 1961, Pavel Abramchenko's team of miners of the Makaryevka mine summoned the brigade of Nikolai Mamut (Krasnodon), which was widely known in the country at that time in the country, to socialist competition for the early implementation of the seven-year plan of 5.5 years. This decision was not easy for the young miners: for a long time they figured out, compared, argued ... Who knows how these disputes would have ended if it had not been for the foreman - Pavel Trofimovich Abramchenko.

As a child, he never thought he would become a miner. As a 14-year-old boy, he dreamed of the day when he would stand at the machine next to his father. In 1940 he entered the vocational school, but failed to graduate. The war prevented. For two years, Pavel was hiding from mobilization in Germany, but still the Nazis tracked him down and sent him to the north of France. In 1945 he returned home to Zaporozhye. But my father's house was destroyed, and there was no one from my family. Life had to start anew, in a new place, with new people. Pavel enlisted on Sakhalin and soon found himself at the Makaryevka mine.

They put him as a student to Peter Slivinsky, a tunneler. At heart, the "teacher," who was only a few years older than his student, cursed desperately. It is necessary that they slip him this puny, thin shorty. His strength, probably, the cat cried.

However, the newcomer turned out to be surprisingly dexterous, hardy and smart. You will show once how to put the support, you do not need to explain the second time. The teacher and the student quickly found a common language, became attached to each other.

In 1946, Abramchenko went to the slaughter on his own, and in December 1948 he was appointed brigadier. At first, he took on everything: he dragged the fastening wood into the lava, "knocked out" the empty wood, chopped coal with a jackhammer along with everyone. However, I soon realized that the main thing in the work of a foreman is to organize work, arrange people so that everyone is in their place. I didn't even notice how the brigade went to the front lines.

Abramchenko's brigade was the first at the mine to abandon the jackhammer and switched to breaking the face.

... With a rustle, the drill enters the black chest of the layer. The light of a miner's lamp rushes around the drill, forcing the edges of coal fractures to play. The darkness in the mine is special, thick and sticky. The faint light of the bulbs gets bogged down in it, snatching only what is nearby, then it stalls, as the voice of a person stalls here.

Cartridges obediently fall into the boreholes. Wires stretch like multi-colored snakes. The miners fall silent, look at the blaster. An oppressive silence looms. A dull explosion shakes the mine. Pieces of coal are pouring from the roof. The dust is dissipated, drawn out by a powerful jet of fans, and again the rustling of the drill, conveyor, the knock of the butt.

The explosion subsides, coal flows from the lava in a miserly stream.

"We will fasten," the foreman cheerfully exclamation.

There is a screech of a saw, the tapping of an axe, the smell of coal is mixed painfully with the earthly resinous smell of wood ...

Soon, the workers of the brigade mastered the cutting machine. Due to the drilling of boreholes not by 1.5, but by 2 meters, labor productivity was increased and cost was reduced. They began to reuse the fastening scaffolding ... So it made sense for the brigade to go to the competition, to take on increased obligations. The foreman understood this. The brigade also understood ...

I must say that the forms of social competition at the plant were quite diverse, and what they could not come up with themselves, they were adopted from other enterprises of the country. For example, in 1961, the foreman of mine No. 6, Nikolai Fedorovich Folomov, read in the magazine "Soviet Miner" that the brigade of communist labor of mine No. 7/8 of the Krasnolugugol trust began to fight for the "Lugansk hour" - for the sixth hour of the shift to extract coal for the seven-year plan. It quickly flashed through the foreman's head: "Is it possible with us? No, you have to think about it, it's not easy."

The idea of the "Sakhalin hour" is firmly entrenched in my head. I figured out, calculated how many meters of penetration can be given in excess of the plan. I decided to consult with my teammates. Viktor Sokolov was the first to support the idea of the Komsorg of the site, and the rest of the guys did not stand aside. The issue was brought up for discussion in the mine committee.

The words of N. Folomov sounded clearly and confidently at the meeting:

- We consulted in the brigade and decided to support the initiative of the Luhansk miners. For 5 hours of the shift we fulfill technical standards, and the sixth - the "Sakhalin hour" - we will work in the seven-year plan.

The head of mine No. 6, Ivan Leontievich Savintsev, supported the initiative of the young. The initiative was also approved by the Uglegorsk City Committee of the CPSU.

In 1962, the crew fulfilled the annual sinking plan by 110%, and the technical standards of each miner were 120%. The whole secret was to save time. To do this, the team switched to a comprehensive labor system: one shift, having worked out the prescribed norm, prepared the face for the next to start sinking without delay.

Great success in the social competition was achieved by a comprehensive daily team of miners of the Mgachi mine under the leadership of Ivan Tikhonov, who monthly exceeded the production standards by 10-15 percent, a team of electric locomotive drivers of the Yuzhno-Sakhalinskaya mine under the leadership of Osadchy, who fulfilled the plan for the transportation of goods by 125 percent.

Collectives that won primacy in socialist competition were awarded challenge Red Banners and cash prizes. Thus, according to the results of socialist competition for the first quarter of 1963, the staff of the Yuzhno-Sakhalinskaya mine was awarded the Red Banner of the Council of Ministers of the RSFSR and the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions and the first prize in the amount of 14 thousand rubles. The Challenge Red Banner of the Sakhalin Council of National Economy and the Regional Council of Commerce and Cash Prizes totaling 23200 rubles were awarded to the collectives of mines No. 16/17 and Shebunino.

In those years, the best leaders who fulfilled the production standards by at least 110 percent were the machinists of mine No. 1/2 Vasily Kitidov, mine No. 5/6 - Ivan Debkov, mine No. 4/6 - Andrey Kharitonov, mine No. 4 - Semyon Rassolenko, excavator operator of the Lermontov mine administration Mikhail Vazhenin, foreman of the miners of the stope of mine No. 16/17 Sergey Belykh, foremen of the miners of the stope of mine No. 10/13 Semyon Kaygorodov and Nikolai Gubarev, Ivan Chulkov, foreman of mine workings of mine No. 1/2, Leonid Shelest, foreman of mine excavators of the Dolinskaya mine, Sergey Klimov, foreman of the combine team of tunnellers of mine No. 16/17, Konstantin Polukarov, foreman of the crew of the Voronezhets-5 excavator of the Lermontov mine administration, and many others.

The successes of the coal industry of the region in the late 40s and early 60s were highly appreciated many times in the all-Union competition of miners. 1247 miners of the region were awarded orders and medals of the USSR: 90 people - the Order of Lenin, 178 people - the Order of the Red Banner of Labor, 17 people - the Order of the Badge of Honor and 962 people - medals. 131 miners were awarded the title of "Honorary Miner", over 100 people were awarded the badge "Miner's Glory", 823 - the badge "Excellence in Socialist Competition".

In the middle of the twentieth century, the Soviet and party authorities continued to work to improve the working and living conditions of miners. In August 1956, all mines in Sakhalin were transferred to a discontinuous working week, and a two-shift coal mining regime was established at the cleaning operations.

A single day off made it possible to repair haulage tracks, downhole machines and mechanisms in a timely and high-quality manner. It also made it possible to eliminate the sliding schedule of workers' exits, made it possible to have a permanent composition of mining teams, helped to improve the skills of workers, strengthen production discipline, and improve the organization of labor. After the transition to an intermittent week, the number of workers who did not meet production standards

decreased by about 8.5 percent. In the second half of 1957, labor productivity increased by 14.3% compared to the second half of 1956, and for individual mines: Yuzhno-Sakhalinskaya - by 39.6%, No. 1/2 - by 15.1%, No. 4 - by 27.7%, Shebunino - by 24.3%, Dolinskaya - by 17.8%.

According to the decision of the XX Congress of the CPSU and the Resolutions of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR of August 7, 1958 No. 896 and 899 "On the transfer to a 7-hour working day", in August - September 1958, the transfer of the coal enterprises of the Sakhalinugol plant to a 6-7 hour working day began, which finally ended in 1960. Underground workers were transferred to a 6-hour working day, and the rest of the workers and employees of the plant's enterprises began to work for 7 hours. However, on December 2, 1960, the State Planning Committee of the USSR, the Ministry of Finance of the USSR and the State Bank of the USSR sent a memorandum to the government, in which they noted that "the decisive reason for the unprofitability of a large number of heavy industry enterprises is that what has taken place in recent years in a number of its extractive industries ... A significant increase in wages due to its streamlining and reduction in the length of the working day was not compensated by a corresponding increase in labor productivity.

Thus, wage growth lagged far behind labor productivity growth, the gap between these two indicators led to an increase in the cost of production. For example, in 1959, the wages of coal mining workers at Sakhalinugol enterprises increased by 360 rubles per month, or 18 percent compared to 1958. But at the same time, labor productivity in the island coal industry in 1959 compared with 1958 increased by 0 percent.

On Sakhalin, northern allowances with a coefficient for work in areas equated to the regions of the Far North should be added to this problem. It should be noted that in the cost of production of the Sakhalinugol plant, wages were 42,5 percent. The share of northern allowances in the average earnings of a worker was initially 19 per cent, subsequently increasing to 50 per cent.

It should be said that cash payments for work in the Far North and equivalent areas were calculated regardless of the size of the implementation of norms or planned targets. At a number of enterprises, there were cases when some of the workers did not comply with the norms, but the shortfall in wages at piece-rate rates was more than covered by allowances.

Table XXXVI

Wages of workers of the Dolinskaya mine who do not comply with production standards for January 1955.

Surname	Profession	Days worked	Percentage of compliance with production standards	Accrued wages		
				On piecework payment	Addition	Altogether
Danilov F.K.	sinker	25	64,0	1226	1500	2726
Kolesov A.I.	sinker	27	84,0	1473	1500	2973
Lizunov A.A.	sinker	26	76,0	1223	1500	2723
Nelyubin F.Y.	timberman	21	79,0	917	1040	1957
Barsky G.U.	timberman	23	75,0	1067	1237	2304

As a result, the wages of workers who fulfilled the norms did not differ significantly from the wages of workers who did not comply with the norms, which did not stimulate the growth of labor productivity. At the enterprises of the coal industry, where brigade piecework was used, there were facts of workers' refusal to work in the same brigade with those who received 100 percent of the tariff premium, since they "do not work well".

It is known that in the summer-autumn period, workers of many enterprises of the country were involved in field work, in other words, "for potatoes" or "for silage". According to the Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 686 of June 28, 1958, mine workers sent to agricultural work should be paid only 50 percent of the average monthly earnings. Of course, this government decree did not arouse any enthusiasm among the miners to help the Soviet collective farmers. They used various tricks to shirk this duty ("fake" medical certificates, numerous exemptions from agricultural work, family circumstances, etc.). Therefore, despite the danger of punishment, the management of the plant continued to pay the "rural" miners salaries at the full tariff rate. This factor also exacerbated the gap between wages and productivity.

In the mid-50s, the problem with the lack of engineering and technical workers was resolved at the enterprises of the plant. Since 1953, a significant number of young specialists have been arriving at the plant's enterprises every year, which made it possible to provide highly qualified personnel with the main engineering and technical positions in mines and open-pit mines in a short time. On January 1, 1956, the enterprises of Sakhalinugol had 242 specialists with higher education and 686 with secondary education.

In 1954, the first secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev, paid a visit to Sakhalin. However, the good weather and the magnificent preparations of the local party bosses did the Sakhalin people a disservice. From that moment on, the country's leadership began an active attack on the benefits and privileges of the islanders, considering them an unnecessary luxury.

In particular, the central party bodies indicated that the existing benefits granted to the Sakhalin residents by the resolutions of August 1, 1945 and February 2, 1946 were outdated and outdated. The obsolete benefits included: payment for return travel, booking apartments on the mainland, a long vacation period. The excesses included the payment of benefits for the renegotiation of contracts for a new term, the accrual of 10 percent allowances, the provision of payment for travel on vacation, and additional payment for sick leave.

Frankly speaking, many of the benefits were used by unscrupulous citizens for selfish purposes. Individuals came to Sakhalin solely in order to apply for an increased pension. So, the slaughterer Tuvba, having worked on Sakhalin for less than a year, after registering a pension in the amount of 768 rubles, left for the mainland. A certain Zubkov, who worked at one of the island mines for several months, was assigned a pension of 1500 rubles, after which he left for Krasnodar.

In November 1955, in order to eliminate labor turnover and consolidate personnel for permanent residence on Sakhalin, from January 1, 1956, it was decided to introduce new benefits, namely:

1. Payment of a one-time non-refundable allowance for economic establishment in the amount of 5 thousand rubles for an employee and 1 thousand rubles for each family member;
2. Pay monthly allowances in the amount of 25 percent after 5 years of work, after 10 years - 50 percent;
3. Allow the combination of vacations for no more than 2 years with the payment of travel for those in need of treatment in sanatoriums and other medical institutions;
4. Upon reaching the age of 50 and having a work experience of 20 years, appoint a lifetime pension in the amount of 50 percent of the basic rate and pay a pension regardless of whether these persons work or not;
5. Workers and employees who have expressed a desire to acquire a house or apartment in personal ownership are given a 50 percent discount on the estimated cost of the building;
6. Reduction of rent for those living in Japanese-built houses from 1.32 rubles to 50 kopecks per 1 sq. m.;
7. Free delivery of 20 chicks per family;
8. Reduction of retail prices for coal from 98 to 66 rubles per ton;
9. Reducing the duration of additional leave to 12 working days.

Of the old benefits remained: increased salaries and tariff rates (40 percent more than in the Donetsk coal basin), preferential calculation of seniority.

In addition to these benefits, the size of the loan for the purchase of livestock was increased from 3 to 6 thousand rubles, the size of the loan for individual housing construction was increased from 7 to 20 thousand rubles. with repayment within 10 years, for children of Sakhalin residents benefits were established for admission to universities and technical schools of the Far East, by enrolling the latter after passing exams, regardless of competition.

On February 10, 1960, the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR "On the Regulation of Benefits for Persons Working in the Far North and in Places Equated to the Far North" was issued, which introduced a number of additional restrictions on benefits. Thus, allowances were now to be accrued every two years, and their number was limited to five for areas equated to the regions of the Far North, besides, they were charged for earnings up to 3000 (after 1961 - up to 300) rubles. For those who got a job before March 1, 1960, one year of work experience was calculated for 2, for those who were hired after March 1, one year of work was counted as 1.5. According to the same Decree, piece-rate bonus wages were replaced by time-based wages, which led to equalization in incomes. As a result, real wages have fallen significantly, exceeding the national level by only 16 percent.

"Caring for the welfare of the working people of Sakhalin" has led to a sharp increase in labor turnover, increased migration trends, and a decrease in the number of people wishing to work on the island. The coal industry, in which working conditions were the most difficult, was one of the first to experience all the "charms" of these innovations. If in 1959 6853 people were admitted to the enterprises of the plant, then in 1960 the number of those admitted decreased to 5792 people, and the number of those who left, in 1959 it was 6070 people, in 1960 increased to 7191.

It was necessary to take emergency measures in order to retain qualified personnel of workers and engineering and technical workers at the enterprises of Sakhalinugol. The management of the plant tried to find a way out in improving housing and cultural conditions. In accordance with the instruction of the Ministry of Finance of the USSR No. 30 of January 28, 1956, in 1957 the administration of Sakhalinugol formed the enterprise fund to improve the cultural and living conditions of employees and improve production. For 1957, 8618 thousand rubles were deducted to this fund from the planned and excess profits. Due to this, at the end of the 50s, the construction of social and cultural facilities was increased in the mining villages of the island: hospitals, outpatient clinics, nurseries, kindergartens, schools, shops, bakeries, canteens, baths and laundries. So, in 1958-1960 29 new social and cultural facilities were built at the mines: 3 kindergartens were put into operation, a polyclinic was built in the village of Sinegorsk and hospitals in Shakhtersk and at mine No. 10/13, a dispensary was built at the Dolinskaya mine. And also - 9 shops, schools, etc. However, in February 1960, at the VIII Sakhalin Regional Party Conference, the head of the Sakhalinugol plant, P.S. Burshtein noted, that loans for the construction of institutions of social and cultural life in 1960 compared with 1959 were reduced by 22 million rubles As a result, the pace of construction of social and cultural facilities in the system of the plant decreased sharply.

The management of Sakhalinugol paid insufficient attention to education and health issues. So, on January 1, 1962, the plant had 28 kindergartens with a contingent of 2279 children. However, only 4 of them were typical for 100 seats. The rest were accommodated in unsuitable premises, and half of the kindergartens did not meet normal sanitary conditions.

Medical care at a number of mines was also poor. For example, there were no surgeons at mine No. 10/13 (Tikhmenevskaya), and there were no doctors at the Oktyabrsky mine at all, and patients were received by a paramedic. A number of mines did not have dentists and therapists. It should be borne in mind that the plant chronically did not carry out the development of capital investments in education and health care (85 percent).

Consumer services for workers in mining villages were also unsatisfactory. In the overwhelming majority of mining settlements there were no workshops for consumer services, in

some villages there were not even hairdressers and miners, as well as members of their families, had to travel to the city. By the way, in many mining villages there was no bus service. So, the workers of the mines "Dolinskaya" and "Mgachi" had to walk 4-5 kilometers from the place of work to the village.

In the 50-60 years, the situation with housing continued to be very difficult at the enterprises of the plant.

Table XXXVII

Living space on the balance sheet of the Sakhalinugol plant in 1955-1964 and the total number of residents.

Year	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964
Area (sq. m.)	393207	400206	365914	349188	341584	346134	350547	444800	347305	350679
Lives (people)	70510	72876	59392	54293	52947	49469	52164	51700	50423	48990
There is a sq. m. for 1 person	5,57	5,49	6,1	6,4	6,45	6,99	6,7	6,6	6,88	7,1

By the beginning of the 60s, there was an average of 6.7 sq. m. in houses and 6.5 sq. m. in dormitories, which was the minimum sanitary norm. The situation was especially unsatisfactory in the mines that were previously subordinate to the Aleksandrovskugol trust. For example, at the mine "Arkovo" per 1 living accounted for 4.9 sq. m., at the Oktyabrsky mine - 5.8 sq. m. It should be noted that 29 percent or 99.8 thousand sq. m. of living space was in houses of lightweight construction (Japanese type). Up to 50 per cent of this housing was dilapidated and had to be written off. However, the plan for the development of funds for the overhaul of housing was fulfilled by 93.8 percent - out of 1715 thousand rubles, only 1609 thousand were spent.

The construction of housing and communal facilities by the Sakhalinshakhtostroy trust was carried out poorly. For 1957-1958 he did not build about 20 thousand square meters of housing in the mines against the plan. In subsequent years, the situation has not changed significantly.

Table XXXVIII

Capital construction of housing in the system of the Sakhalinugol plant (sq. m.).

Year	Housing Capital Plan	Built and put into operation	%
1958	41000	27051	47,5
1959	26000	23538	91,1
1960	24500	23039	95,0
1961	23900	12867	53,8
1962	19000	12974	68,2
1963	17500	13195	75,4

The case could have been helped by the commissioning of individual residential buildings, for the construction of which state loans were allocated, but there was also a significant lag. So, in 1957 it was planned to put into operation 360 houses of individual development, in fact, 140 houses or 39 percent of the planned were commissioned. In 1958, the selection committee accepted only 137 houses of individual development, and in 1959, out of 221 houses, only 67 were put into operation!

The overhaul of residential buildings was also poorly conducted. Moreover, the most unsatisfactory work was carried out in those mines where the situation with housing was most unfavorable. Thus, in the mines of the Uglegorskugol trust, the overhaul of the housing stock was completed by 67 percent, in the Oktyabrskaya mine - by 31.2 percent, Makaryevka - 54.5 percent, Arkovo - 15.3 percent, Mgachi - 26.3 percent.

A big drawback was the lack of the necessary internal improvement of housing. So, in 1963, out of 347305 sq. m. of living space belonging to the plant, 120624 sq. m. was equipped with water supply, 58396 sq. m. with sewerage, and 89339 sq. m. of housing with central heating. In addition, the dormitories of a number of mines lacked the necessary equipment (bedside tables, chairs), and there was no proper sanitary order (linen was changed irregularly, the premises were poorly cleaned, the territory of the dormitories was littered).

At a number of mines, uncomfortable living conditions for young professionals continued to remain. These included the Shebunino mines, No. 5/6, No. 1/2, No. 6, No. 16/17, No. 7. In these mines, most of the specialists lived in unequipped Japanese-type houses, cold, without amenities.

Thus, in the second half of the 50s - the first half of the 60s, a "managerial revolution" took place in the country, during which the Sakhalinugol plant from the subordination system of the Ministry of the Coal Industry of the USSR came under the jurisdiction of the Sakhalin Council of National Economy, which could not but affect the decision-making processes for the island coal industry. During this period, the process of modernization of the coal industry of the Sakhalin Oblast began, a number of mines were reconstructed, some of the most unprofitable coal enterprises were closed, open-pit coal mining was launched, and the use of new high-performance mining equipment, metal support, etc. production rates. However, in general, the coal industry of Sakhalin was highly unprofitable, which was facilitated by difficult mining and geological conditions, inefficient use of equipment supplied to enterprises, outstripping wage growth, and the lack of proper economic incentives for industry workers.

PARAGRAPH 3 SAKHALIN COAL INDUSTRY IN THE SECOND HALF OF THE 60'S - THE FIRST HALF OF THE 80'S.

In October 1964, a "velvet revolution" took place in the Soviet Union - the Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU relieved N.S. Khrushchev from his duties as first secretary of the Communist Party of the USSR "in connection with retirement." A new political period has begun in the country, which in modern historical science has been called the "era of stagnation". However, stagnation in political life did not mean stagnation in economic development, at least in the first years of the reign of the new General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Leonid Brezhnev.

In 1965, the country was "shaken" by another economic reform, the initiator of which was the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR A.N. Kosygin. It began with a new administrative centralization, the abolition of the economic councils and the restoration of the central industrial ministries. Among others, the Ministry of Coal Industry was restored. On November 12, 1965, the Council of Ministers of the USSR adopted a resolution "On the organization of the Ministry of the Coal Industry of the USSR". Boris Fedorovich Bratchenko was appointed Minister of the Coal Industry of the USSR. Since 1966, the Sakhalinugol plant became subordinate to the ministry.

On the fourth of October, 1965, the government issued the Decree "On Improving the Planning and Stimulation of the Production Economy". The package of government documents created the impression that the country's leaders seriously intend to expand the autonomy of industrial enterprises.

The essence of the reform was as follows: reduction of planned indicators brought to the enterprise; introduction of afirm, profit-independent payment for the use of production assets by enterprises, i.e. its kind of introduction of a tax in kind in industry; financing of industrial-construction not by issuing non-refundable subsidies, but by issuing loans; preventing changes in plans without the consent of enterprises.

In order to stimulate the initiative of enterprises, it was decided that part of the income received by the enterprise would remain at its disposal. Its value was determined according to strict standards in order to prevent the directors of enterprises from making a profit in any way, and the ministries from withdrawing more than they should. It was also decided to introduce funds to stimulate production: a fund for material incentives; Social and Cultural Welfare Fund; Production Development Fund...

However, incentive funds could not properly stimulate the labor force: the bonuses intended for workers were only 3 percent of wages and, of course, could not stimulate anyone. Therefore, at the enterprises of the Sakhalinugol plant, as well as at many others, various forms of moral incentives for workers were widely used, namely: conferring honorary titles, ceremonial presentation of certificates of shock workers of communist labor, honoring the foremost, veterans, entering the winners of socialist competition on the Board of Honor and in the Book of Honor, presentation of certificates of honor, memorable addresses. According to the deputy head of the department of labor organization and wages of the plant, A. Abakumov, all this was supposed to "educate the miners with a sense of pride in their profession."

As for the social fund, its use was hampered by the fact that the plan did not provide for the provision of building materials. In addition, they did not receive much money. For example, at the Sakhalinugol plant in 1966, deductions for this item amounted to 469,1 thousand rubles, in 1967 - 619 thousand rubles, in 1968 - 604,1, in 1969 - 888,6, in 1970 - 120,3 thousand rubles . Thus, The economic reform took on a purely cosmetic character. Moreover, in the early 70s, a departure began even from those "conquests" that were achieved during the Kosygin reform.

On June 1, 1974, the Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 544 "On Certain Measures to Further Improve Industrial Management" was issued, on the basis of which, on September 20, 1975, the Minister of the Coal Industry of the USSR issued Order No. 381, according to which, from October 1, 1975, the Sakhalinugol Combine was reorganized into the Sakhalinugol Production Association.

According to the officials, the main features of this restructuring were to be that the plant from a management body, with administrative and technical functions, turned into a center of economic, technical and administrative management and was endowed with all rights, duties and resources. Through the association, the management of material and technical supply, capital construction, railway technological transport, road transport, energy supply, industrial communications, housing and communal services was centralized.

In fact, coal mining enterprises on Sakhalin (as well as in other basins) in 1976 lost the status of state-owned enterprises and were transformed into production units. As a result, they did not even have the few rights of economic independence that they received as a result of the 1965 reform.

At that time, the reform was assessed as progressive, allowing, on the basis of the concentration of resources, centralization of management functions, to increase the efficiency of work, the social standard of living of miners. This, however, did not happen. The reform of 1976 did not give the envisaged results, only strengthening the petty guardianship of enterprises by the apparatus of the association. Gradually, dependent moods began to grow at enterprises. Individual mine managers began to seek to shift their mistakes to the functional services and leaders of the association. The desire of the employees of the production association to manage the production processes suppressed the initiative of specialists in the field.

It must be said that the versatility, the constant multiplication of issues, the increasing flow of information and reporting led to a greater differentiation of the responsibilities of employees and services of the apparatus. In practice, this increased the number of office staff.

It should be borne in mind that the administrative apparatus of Sakhalinugol did not fully cope with its duties even before the transformation of the plant into a production association. In 1969, at a meeting of the bureau of the Sakhalin Regional Committee of the CPSU, a report was heard on the state of work of the management personnel of the Sakhalinugol plant, which stated that "the plant's management does not sufficiently educate employees for initiative and efficiency, conscientious performance of duty, etc."

It is obvious that the management of the enterprise did not listen too carefully to the criticism voiced and did not take the measures necessary to remedy the situation. You can verify this by reading the transcript of the meeting of the bureau of the Sakhalin Regional Committee of the CPSU, held in August 1983, where it was noted that "in the Sakhalinugol production association, the solution of many production issues is carried out by purely administrative methods, employees rely only on the force of orders and orders."

In order to reduce the cost of the administrative and managerial apparatus in the country's coal industry, back in 1971, by the Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, trusts were abolished, recognized as an extra link between mines and combines. By order of the Ministry of Coal Industry of August 6, 1971, the last Sakhalin coal trust "Uglegorskugol" was liquidated.

The economic effect was achieved: in 1968-1971 the amount for the maintenance of the administrative and managerial apparatus of the plant decreased by more than 2 million rubles.

On July 19, 1984, the Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 764 "On Measures to Improve, Reduce the Cost and Reduce the Number of the Management Apparatus" was published. On its basis, on August 6, 1984, Order No. 308 of the Ministry of Coal Industry of the USSR followed with the same name, which stated: "from January 1, 1985, to reduce the number of employees of the administrative apparatus, their wage fund by at least 5 percent ...".

In the 60s, the national economy of the USSR entered a period that can be described as a period of sharp growth in the scale of social production. In the conditions of predominantly extensive development, this meant an increase in the need for primary production resources, including natural ones. In this situation, to a certain extent, interest in accelerating the development of natural resources of the Far East in general and the Sakhalin Region in particular has increased. It is known that at that time the share of extractive industries in the Far East accounted for 23 percent of the gross industrial output of the region (the average for the USSR was 7,9 percent), which was the highest figure in the country. However, the coal industry of the Far East in terms of its development lagged behind the growth in the demand of the Far Eastern region for energy fuel, and the shortage of fuel was compensated by the import of expensive petroleum products and coal from Siberia and Transbaikalia from the central regions of the USSR. Thus, the primary task was to increase coal production in the Far East (including Sakhalin).

It should be noted that although the Sakhalinugol plant was not one of the leading plants in the country in terms of industrial production, at the same time, as a result of the high quality of Sakhalin coal in terms of sales (in wholesale prices), it surpassed such plants as Tulaugol, Krasnoyarsk Coal Mill, Voroshilovgradugol, Ekibastuzugol, Primorskugol, Sredazugol and a number of others. In the 60-80 years of the twentieth century, the coal industry of Sakhalin provided not only the needs of the region for coal, but also played a significant role in its supplies to other regions of the Far East, primarily to Kamchatka and the Magadan region.

However, increasing coal production in the mines and open-pit mines of Sakhalin was a very difficult task. The mining and geological conditions for the development of the island's coal deposits were complex and, in general, were rather unfavorable for operational work. The existing fund of coal mining and coal processing enterprises was characterized by low capacity and required significant capital investments for modernization and technical re-equipment in accordance with

modern requirements, because the existing technology in the coal industry of the region was outdated and slowed down the process of intensification of production.

The retirement of capacities of mines and open-pit mines in connection with the development of reserves, the low pace of reconstruction of enterprises associated with the lack of a developed construction industry, the lag in exploration work at the fields under development - all these factors restrained the growth of coal production.

The main directions of further increase in coal production during the years of "stagnation" were: 1. radical reconstruction of mines; 2. construction of new coal mining enterprises, sites and horizons, increase in open-pit coal mining; 3. Improvement of technological processes.

The main task facing the management of the production association was the reconstruction of coal mines. Former General Director of Sakhalinugol G.A. Revnivykh notes that not everything went smoothly in matters of reconstruction of coal mining enterprises. There was a lack of capital investment, there was not a sufficient mine-building base, and the lack of a specialized mine-design organization was acutely felt.

The Sakhalin regional party organization in its assessments of the state of reconstruction of the island's mines was more sharp. Thus, at the 11th plenum of the Sakhalin Regional Party Committee on January 14, 1970, it was noted that "an intolerable situation has developed on the island with the reconstruction and technical re-equipment of coal industry enterprises. For 20 years, the Yuzhno-Sakhalinskaya, Gornozavodskaya and No. 4 mines have been reconstructed. During this time, less than 50 percent of their estimated cost has been mastered ...

On the twelfth of May 1972, the bureau of the regional committee of the CPSU adopted a resolution "On serious shortcomings in the reconstruction of enterprises of the coal industry of the region." In particular, it was said that in 1971 the capital investment plan for the plant was fulfilled only by 90 percent, underdeveloped for production facilities 2412 thousand rubles. In 1971, it did not put into operation 5 objects with a total value of 2047 thousand rubles.

In the middle of 1973, the bureau of the regional committee noted that in 1971-1972 the Sakhalinugol plant and the Sakhalinstroy association spent only 68 percent of the allocated capital investments for the reconstruction of mines. In some of the mines to be reconstructed, the situation was simply catastrophic. For example, 4857 thousand rubles were allocated for the reconstruction of the Dolinskaya mine for 8 years (1966-1974), and the builders mastered only 1774 thousand rubles. or 36 percent of the funds received.

At the beginning of the 80s, investments directed to reconstruction were also poorly developed. For 3 years of 11 five-year plans, only 55 percent of the capital investment limit was spent on the reconstruction of the Dolinskaya and Udarnovskaya mines.

Nevertheless, in 1970-1980 the reconstruction of the mines "Gornozavodskaya", "Uglegorskaya", "Yuzhno-Sakhalinskaya", CEP "Shakhterskaya" took place, albeit with great difficulty, but still the reconstruction of the mines "Dolinskaya" and "Udarnovskaya" was underway, the Ministry of Coal Industry and the State Planning Committee of the USSR resolved the issue of the reconstruction of the mines "Tikhmenevskaya", "Boshnyakovo", "Shebunino" and the CEMM "Shakhterskie".

It must be said that the reconstruction of the mines was under the personal control of the first secretary of the Sakhalin Regional Committee of the CPSU P.A. Leonov. As the head of the regional party organization, a deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, he repeatedly visited the Ministry of the Coal Industry and the State Planning Committee of the USSR, sought to increase investment, including the development of the construction base. As a result, in the 70s, the Vakhrushevsky and Shakhterskoye mine-building departments of Sakhalinugol were created, and a branch of the Dalgiproshakht design institute was organized.

The results of the reconstruction were not slow to affect. If in the early 70s in the Sakhalinugol plant out of 15 mines 6 were with an annual load of up to 150 thousand tons of coal, then by 1980

there was only one such mine left in Sakhalinugol, and even that was subject to reconstruction, the rest moved to higher categories.

In addition to reconstruction, new mining horizons, many industrial and social facilities on the surface of mines were built at the Gornozavodskaya, Shebunino, Boshnyakovo, Dolinskaya, Yuzhno-Sakhalinskaya mines. At the same time, the repair and mechanical plant of the Sakhalinugol plant in Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, several workshops of the Central Mechanical Workshops, and a car depot under the transport department were built.

In the 60-70s in the Sakhalin region began a radical turn to the safest and most productive open method of coal mining. Open-pit coal mining was started at the sites of the Mgachi, Makaryevka, Tikhmenevskaya, Udarnovskaya, Uglegorskaya, Boshnyakovo, Gornozavodskaya, and Shebunino mines.

Nevertheless, the open-pit method on the island mined a percentage of less coal than the average for the USSR, as can be seen from the table below:

TABLE XXXIX

The percentage of open-pit coal mining in the USSR and the Sakhalin region in 1960-1979

Year	Open-pit coal mining in the USSR (as a percentage of total production)	Open-pit coal mining in the Sakhalin Oblast (as a percentage of total production)
1960	20,7	16,5
1965	24,3	N/A
1970	26,7	20,5
1975	32,2	25,3
1979	36,0	28,0

It should be said that on Sakhalin there were not only energy and coking coals. In the early 60s, Sakhalin geologists, on the basis of conclusions drawn from the study of research and consideration of geological materials left over from the Japanese, came to the conclusion that in the extreme south of Sakhalin (near the village of Novikvo) there is a small coal deposit that contains industrial reserves of the element germanium. Samples of coal were sent to Moscow, and the All-Union Scientific Research Coal Chemical Institute gave them a very good characteristic.

The extraction of this rare earth element, used in the electronics industry, was a very important task for the country's economy. By the beginning of the 60s, the only open-pit mine where germanium coal was mined was in the Chita region, but as a result of a landslide, coal mining there became impossible. Thus, there were only two deposits left on the Eurasian continent where germanium-containing coal could be mined: the Novikovo district of the Sakhalin region and the Ruhr region (Germany). And since the extraction of germanium-containing coals on Sakhalin was not carried out, the Ruhr became a de facto monopolist in the production of these products, which could not but affect its price. To avoid purchasing this rare earth element abroad, The Soviet government decided to start mining germanium-containing coal in Novikovo.

In pursuance of the order of the Council of Ministers of the USSR of May 15, 1964 No. 894-R, resolutions of the Supreme Council of National Economy of the USSR of May 12, 1964 No. 39-9 and the Council of Ministers of the RSFSR of May 27, 1964 No. 640-76 "On the organization of mining and processing of germanium-bearing coals and shales of the Novikovsky lignite deposit in the Sakhalin region", the commissioning of the 1st stage of the open-pit mine with a capacity of 100 thousand tons was planned in the 3rd quarter of 1965, and already in the 4th quarter of 1965, the extraction of the first 25 thousand tons of coal was to be ensured, for the export of which they began to build the Novikovo-Korsakov highway. But the open-pit mine, by the way, is the only one in all

CMEA countries, was put into operation only in 1967. The project to build a power plant in the Korsakov area to burn germanium-bearing coal and produce pure germanium was rejected. The mined coal began to be sent for processing to Lysychansk.

The increase in production capacity in coal mines made it possible to increase open-pit coal production from 18.2 percent of total production in 1966 to 30.2 percent in 1982. However, the growth of open-pit coal mining took place against the backdrop of a constant lag behind the design schedule. At the quarries of the Lermontov Mine Administration, there were cases when the number of loading and vehicles did not correspond to each other. For example, there are excavators in the open-pit mine - there are no cars. Or vice versa. All this did not contribute to the increase in open-pit coal mining.

In the era of "stagnation" in the mines and open-pit mines of the region, the improvement of technological processes continued. In 1973, a switchboard development system was introduced at the underground section of the Lermontov Mine Administration, which made it possible to increase coal production by 1.5 times and increase labor productivity by 43 percent. The concentration of mining operations was intensively carried out - the development of a group of seams, the simultaneous introduction of development systems by main drifts, an increase in the length of excavation blocks, an increase in the load on the horizon, crossroads, * the excavation block and on the mine as a whole. Thus, at the mines "Gornozavodskaya", "Yuzhno-Sakhalinskaya", "Dolinskaya", "Udarnovskaya", "Uglegorskaya", "Mgachi", the length of the excavation blocks, stopes was increased, the sections were combined, which contributed to a significant increase in the concentration of mining operations.

It should be said that the concentration of mining operations, carried out in the association in 1965-1975, made it possible to increase the speed of movement of the stope cleaning line by 20.8 percent while increasing its length by 30.8 percent and the load on the face by 46.9 percent. The number of stopes decreased by 24.8 percent. As a result of the measures taken, labor productivity doubled, the cost of coal in comparable prices significantly decreased, and the Dolinskaya, Udarnovskaya, and Boshnyakovo mines entered profitable operation.

In order to further concentrate production in the first half of the 70s, 4 Sakhalin mines were merged into two, 34 sites were liquidated, and 370 employees were laid off. The total savings from the measures taken amounted to more than 1 million rubles. At the same time, the enterprises of the association had the lowest rates of use of the cleaning fund in the coal industry; They were 1,5-2 times lower than the allies.

An analysis of the economic activity of the production association, conducted by the candidate of economic sciences U. Derevyanko showed that in mines that fully mastered production capacity, the cost of production was 40 percent lower, the labor productivity of the mining worker was 120 percent higher, the level of return on assets was 145 percent higher compared to mines whose production capacities were mastered only by 50 percent.

The reconstruction of old and the construction of new mines, the expansion of open-pit coal mining and the emergence of new coal quarries, the improvement of technological processes contributed to an increase in the production of Sakhalin coal. From 1965 to 1979 it increased from 4713 thousand tons to 5804.6 thousand tons The data given in Appendix No. 4 show that in the period from 1965 to 1984 the association produced over 103 million tons of coal - about 35,5 percent of the total coal production on Sakhalin in the period from 1853 to 2002.

It must be said that in addition to miners, employees of the Far Eastern Geological Exploration Service played an important role in increasing coal production, who were faced with the task of providing mining enterprises with explored coal reserves. For these purposes, in the 70s, the Sakhalin Coal Exploration Expedition of the Dalvostok Coal Exploration Trust of the Ministry of the Coal Industry of the USSR was created on the island. In the 60s and 70s, geologists carried out colossal amounts of geological exploration, which allowed the Sakhalin miners to significantly raise the level of production. Among the coal geologists who have made a great contribution to the

development of the coal resource base of Sakhalin are such names as L.F. Azhgirevich, B.V. Butakov, P.P. Demchenko, V.P. Derkachenko, S.M. Dikun, D.P. Zhizhin, V.P. Klyuev, L.P. Kustova, N.P. Ryzhkov and many others.

However, admiring the successes was premature. Having given a sharp increase in the 70s, in the early 80s, Sakhalinugol enterprises began to rapidly reduce production. For example, in 1984, the mines of the plant did not deliver 770 thousand tons of coal to the plan, as a result of which fuel had to be imported to the island from the mainland. In total, in 1980-1984 miners owed consumers over 1100 thousand tons of coal.

What was the reason for the decline in production? The journalist of the newspaper "Soviet Sakhalin" V. Sorochan put forward the following version of what is happening:

"Anyone, even a more or less competent mining engineer, knows that the reserves of coal ready for excavation need to be constantly replenished. This is an axiom. But in the Sakhalinugol association, it was consigned to oblivion, they lived with current worries - and this is the result.

For example, in 1984, compared with 1975, coal production at the Gornozavodskaya mine decreased by more than 2 times. The situation began to improve only in 1985, when a new horizon began to give returns. Due to the untimely reproduction of reserves, products were also missed at the Uglegorskaya mine, the situation here was brightened up due to active work in open areas. There was a fear that this list could soon be replenished by the Dolinskaya mine. In 1984, only 607,000 tons were mined here, fulfilling the plan by only 66 percent.

But are only the mines to blame for this situation? - the journalist asked. Of course not. The problem was that there was no construction organization in the region that would take on a contract for mining operations, namely, the construction of new horizons. Even Sakhalinshakhtostroy did not dare to take such a step. Therefore, the mines were forced to build new horizons on their own. And, of course, there were not enough forces, as a result of which the deadlines for the delivery of new capacities were delayed. So, with a great delay, there was an opening of new horizons at the mines "Gornozavodskaya", "Uglegorskaya", "Dolinskaya".

The management of the production association tried to solve this problem by appealing to the Ministry of Coal Industry of the USSR with a request to create a specialized organization on Sakhalin for the construction of new mining sites, but the solution of the issue was put "under the cloth", because, according to Moscow officials, there was no special need for such a contractor on the island. All requests from Sakhalin residents were answered by the answer: "Cope on your own."

However, the General Director of the Sakhalinugol Production Association G.A. Revnivykh did not agree with this point of view of the journalist and told his version of what happened.

In August 1981, the island was hit by a powerful typhoon "Phyllis", which resulted in flooding in almost the entire south of Sakhalin. Most of the Sakhalin mines and open-pit mines suffered from the disaster: many mining areas under development were flooded. At the Lermontov open-pit mine, a landslide demolished 5 million cubic meters of overburden - half of the total volume of opening work. The Shebunino, Gornozavodskaya, Makarovskaya, Yuzhno-Sakhalinskaya mines were completely flooded with water, and the Dolinskaya mines were partially flooded.

As a result, the region faced the threat of lack of fuel in the heating season of 1981/82 Delivery of the latter from the mainland in significant quantities was simply impossible.

In order not to lead the region to "freezing", the leadership of the Sakhalin Regional Committee of the CPSU and the senior employees of Sakhalinugol decided to "throw into battle" areas for coal mining that were just being prepared for production, and were to be put into operation only after 1-2 years.

Thus, Sakhalin residents spent the winter in warm rooms and without restrictions on the supply of electricity. But the miners, having begun the development of mining sites, laid a time bomb under themselves, which "exploded" in 1984, when the reserves of coal ready for excavation in the region turned out to be much less than planned, because for the above reasons the front of coal exploration was crumpled.

The improvement of mining operations and the further development of production largely depended on scientific developments. In the 70s, research laboratories of the Union Technological Institutes were established on the island.

Only in 1981, as a result of the introduction of scientific and technical work by the laboratory of KuzNIUI, the production association obtained an economic effect in the amount of 540.4 thousand rubles. These works included the provision of scientific and technical assistance in the introduction of shield units on steep formations and mechanized complexes on shallow layers, the improvement and introduction of supports of increased bearing capacity for preparatory workings.

The provision of scientific and technical support to the enterprises of Sakhalinugol was also carried out by divisions of NIIOGR, VostNII, KuzNII-Coal Processing. For example, the NIIOGR sector carried out the development of highly efficient technology and the organization of mining and transportation operations at open-pit mines. The VostNII sector has carried out a set of works to improve the level of safety at the enterprises of the association. The Siberian Metallurgical Institute has carried out work on finding a deserted technology for excavating thick layers in the mines of Sakhalin. The Leningrad Mining Institute assisted in the use of an explosion-hydraulic method of softening the rocks of the roof of the layers. The Far Eastern Polytechnic Institute has substantiated the possibility of excavating coal reserves under reservoirs at the Shebunino mine. In 1983, under an economic agreement with the Karaganda Polytechnic Institute, the latter carried out work on the introduction of hydroelevator cleaning of water collectors and sumps* in mines.

Information and computer technology greatly helped to carry out scientific developments. If in the 50-60 years of the twentieth century, cybernetics in the USSR was considered pseudoscience, then in the 70s the first electronic computers began to be produced at Soviet radio-electronic factories.

On the basis of the order of the Minister of the Coal Industry of the USSR No. 273 of July 25, 1980, on December 1 of the same year, an information and computing center (ITC) with a staff of 60 people was created in the Sakhalinugol association. From December 1980 to March 1981, the employees of the center carried out work on the preparation of premises and the commissioning of two EC-1022 computers. In 1983, the following sets of tasks were developed and implemented by the ITC: accounting for the movement of workers in the main professions to unite; processing of information on the main TEPs of the association's work; accounting for the availability of equipment and materials; accounting and quality control of shipped coals; accounting and analysis of the use of fixed assets, analysis of occupational injuries, etc.

In order to provide economic support to the enterprises of the Soviet mining industry, in 1967 the Government of the USSR issued an order to increase wholesale purchase prices for raw materials. It should be noted that the increase in wholesale prices had a very positive effect on the coal industry and initially allowed it to become generally profitable. From the table below, it can be seen that if before 1967 the plant annually ended its financial activities with millions of losses, Since 1968, he began to receive millions in profits.

TABLE XL

PROFIT AND LOSS ACCOUNT OF THE SAKHALINUGOL PLANT IN 1965-1975 (in thousand rubles).

Damages	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975
From implementation	25455	27094	19310	4309	997	2337	133	786	241	1735	224
Natural disasters		340	17		246	-	6	13	59	53	86
Debts	-	-	-	1	1	1	-	9	-	-	-
Bad debts	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	8	1	2	-
Theft	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

Housing and communal services activities	426	431	578	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Past years	19	2	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Other	635	420	344	322	226	248	433	194	340	340	185
Total	26535	28287	20251	4633	1470	2586	572	1010	641	2130	495
Profit from sales	4491	4762	7275	8535	8673	6637	12695	15479	13202	14317	20445
Repayment of bad debts	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-
Penalties and fines	-	6	51	199	197	202	228	524	558	670	412
Other	-	-	2	12	13	96	33	6	18	23	15
Total	4491	4769	7328	8746	8883	6935	12956	16011	13778	15010	20872
Profit balance (+) losses (-)	-22044	-23518	-12923	+4113	+7413	+4349	+12384	+15001	+13137	+12880	+20377

Thus, from 1968 to 1975 the balance of profits of the Sakhalinugol plant amounted to 89654 thousand rubles. However, subsequently, a change in the structure of coal production and a deterioration in its quality, an increase in mining costs led to a significant decrease in the average price of coal sold and sharply reduced profitability, which by the mid-70s no longer provided normal working conditions. Economists have repeatedly raised the question of the need to change wholesale coal prices in such a way that they reflect the rise in cost and lower selling prices due to the deterioration in the quality of coal. In addition, the new prices had to take into account the costs of industrial science, the cost of social insurance, the cost of vocational training, etc.

But the party and government bodies of the USSR, keen on playing games of economic reform, could not take such a step, which would mean a radical revision of the main economic indicators of the country's national economy. As a result, at the end of the 70s, the unprofitability of many coal basins of the USSR (including the Sakhalin basin) increased sharply (see the diagram in Appendix No. 5), and one of the main components of this growth was an increase in the cost of extracted energy raw materials. The cost of extracting one ton of Sakhalin coal increased from 17 rubles 24 kopecks in 1965 to 33 rubles 20 kopecks in 1984 (for more details, see the table in Appendix No. 6).

To reduce the cost of coal mining, special attention had to be paid to the technical re-equipment of the industry. So, in 1968, cleaning work at the Sakhalin mines was mechanized only by 42 percent, which was almost 2 times lower than the average level achieved in the country.

It is known that due to the high disturbance of the Sakhalin coal deposits, preparatory (tunneling) work in the total volume of mining operations occupied a significant proportion. Suffice it to say that sinking accounted for about a fifth of all underground coal mining. Therefore, in the 60-80s, the employees of Sakhalinugol persistently worked to increase the level of mechanization of these works, the introduction of new tunneling machines, scrapers, as well as tunneling machines as the safest and most productive means of mechanization. As a result, in the 70s the level of combine penetration on Sakhalin reached 35 percent of its total volume.

Improvement and increase in the level of mechanization of cleaning works, that is, work on coal mining directly in longwalls, was proposed in the early 70s due to the wider use of narrow-cut combines.* As a result, if in the mid-60s there were no such machines at the plant's enterprises, then in 1972-1973 there were already 10 of them at the Dolinskaya, Udarnovskaya, Uglegorskaya, Boshnyakovo mines.

During the period from 1966 to 1972 the volume of combine production at the Sakhalin mines increased from 298 to 732.2 thousand tons, that is, 2.5 times. And the excavation of coal by narrow-cut combines for the same period increased almost 20 times! So, at the Dolinskaya mine, with the introduction of combines, the cost of live labor for the extraction of 1 ton of coal has significantly decreased. The productivity of the worker increased from 167 to 280 tons per month. The cost of sales decreased by 1.13 rubles.

The pioneers of narrow-cut excavation were the brigades of A.I. Teslik from the Dolinskaya mine and N.A. Serdinov from the Uglegorskaya mine, who achieved indicators not lower than the all-Union ones.

The fate of Nikolai Andreevich Serdinov, who became a miner in 1952, is interesting.

"Military service on Sakhalin was coming to an end," he told a correspondent of a regional newspaper, "when we, several soldiers, were persuaded to become miners.

He was appointed foreman of the Komsomol youth brigade of tunnellers. Soon, a 6-month course for coal miner drivers was opened at the mine. Nicholas took a vacation for 3 years at his own expense and went to study. He graduated from the courses successfully and since then has worked as a foreman of miners of the stope.

Serdinov's brigade was the first to master a narrow-cut combine at the Uglegorskaya mine. In a short time, a number of improvements were introduced: an additional irrigation system was installed at the Ural-2M, shields were made for the main conveyor to reduce coal spillage. Initially, the productivity of the combine reached 20.2 thousand tons per month with a standard of 11 thousand tons, and in March 1974, the team of N.A. Serdinov mined 32 thousand tons of coal with the Ural-2M combine.

The efficiency of narrow-cut harvesters is clearly seen in the example of the Dolinskaya, Uglegorskaya, Udarnovskaya mines, where the load on the longwall was 1.5-3 times, and labor productivity was 2 times higher than that of the Makaryevka, Makarovskaya, Tikhmenevskaya mines, where narrow-cut harvesters were not used.

The next step towards the mechanization of cleaning operations was the use of mechanized complexes.* In the first quarter of 1975, for the first time on Sakhalin Island, the Dolinskaya mine introduced a mechanized treatment complex II-OKP-10, which completely excludes the use of manual labor in coal mining. The program for the implementation of the complex was led by miners from the Intaugol association, employees of the Ministry of Coal Industry, and designers of the PechorNII-project. They also conducted theoretical and Practical exercises on the management of support sections.

Journalist Lyudmila Saprygina, who visited the mine, describes the work of this complex as follows:

*"Pressing the button - and the augers * of the combine, waving their teeth, begin to bite into the layer. A loud noise shakes the lava and a black mass fell on the trays of the conveyor. Thick coal dust, like a foggy pillowcase, enveloped the face, but the irrigation equipment was turned on, and it became light again. Step by step, slowly moving up to the ventilation drift, the harvester removed chips sixty centimeters thick, and then, with the help of hydraulic jacks, the workers moved the metal fasteners. As if powerful hands with wide iron palms rested on the roof. This was one of the main advantages of the complex: instead of wooden fasteners, on which a lot of wood was spent, metal ones came. And this means: now you do not need to manually hammer the racks. With the help of the handle of the hydraulic jack, the hydraulic support can be lowered, raised, moved to the side*.

The following figures indicate what a high economic effect was achieved when working with the complex in comparison with the same type of combine, but with individual support: within 1.5 months from the moment the complex was put into operation, coal production was increased to 1000 or more tons per day. The brigade of P.P. Obukhov, the first to begin to develop the complex, fulfilled its socialist obligations ahead of schedule, extracting 316 thousand tons of fuel.

The introduction of the complex allowed the Dolinskaya mine to significantly exceed the coal mining plan: P. Obukhov's team set a new record for Sakhalin miners - 2067 tons of coal per day from one face, and the average daily load on the longwall reached 1010 tons, although in similar conditions, working only on a combine, no more than 500 tons were mined. Labor productivity increased by 23.9 percent, the cost of extracted fuel decreased by 2 rubles 36 kopecks, and the annual economic effect from the introduction of the complex amounted to about 2 million rubles. Thus, the Dolinskaya mine has achieved the highest labor productivity and the lowest cost of extracted fuel.

Soon after the installation of the complex, rationalization proposals appeared to improve its operation. During the operation of the loader, it was suddenly discovered that the metal insert quickly wears out on the bends of the pans*. Deputy Brigadier Alexei Mikhailovich Zemlyakov suggested that a small layer of stalinite be deposited at this place after conventional welding, and the parts subject to rapid wear and tear increased their service life for a long time. Changing the hydraulic circuit for controlling augers and jacks reduced the loss of machine time and gave an economic effect of 25 thousand rubles. For achieving the best performance among the leading teams of the country, 10 people from the brigade of P. Obukhov received medals of the Exhibition of Economic Achievements, and the foreman himself was awarded the Gold Medal.

Following Dolinskaya, other Sakhalin mines began to develop this progressive type of coal mining, and by the end of the 70s. 7 such complexes worked in the coal industry of the island. On Sakhalin, the first longwalls appeared, extracting 1000 or more tons of coal per day, thus, the production association began to reach the all-Union and world level.

In the 11th Five-Year Plan (1981-1985), the use of high-performance mining equipment at the mines of the production association increased even more, the number of longwalls equipped with mechanized complexes increased, as a result of which the share of mechanized coal mining increased by 5.7 percent, combine sinking of mine workings - by 2.1 percent.

However, at a number of Sakhalinugol enterprises, the technical level of coal mining production remained low, and the labor intensity of work remained high. The surface of many mines was a mess. Here, the means of mechanization were slowly introduced, facilitating labor. Therefore, the proportion of workers employed on the surface at the enterprises of the plant was several times higher compared to other coal basins of the country.

Serious shortcomings in the use of equipment were allowed at the Boshnyakovo and Uglegorskaya mines. The experience of advanced mechanized brigades was introduced here very slowly. Not enough attention was paid to the concentration of production, especially on preparatory work. The mines contained an unreasonably large number of tunneling crews, many of which were small in composition and did not have the necessary material and technical support.

As a result, the transfer of preparatory faces to standard technological schemes was restrained, tunneling mining equipment was not fully loaded, and the task of sinking preparatory workings was not fulfilled. The pipelining of coal transportation, the introduction of metal fastening in stopes, and the mechanization of labor-intensive work on the surface were poorly carried out.

It should also be borne in mind that the production equipment available at the enterprises of Sakhalinugol was not always used as efficiently as possible. So, in 1972, narrow-cut shearers worked only 83 percent of the planned time, as a result of which their standard productivity was not achieved, in 1973 out of 21 shearers only 11 worked, out of 14 narrow-cut harvesters in 1974, an average of 8 machines worked. The main reason for the poor use of mining equipment is the systematic lag in the preparation of the front for the operation of shearers and tunneling machines, loading machines and other mechanisms, their excessive downtime in repair, accidents and breakdowns, organizational and technical problems.

For example, in 1973, at the Udarnovskaya mine, the loading machine stood waiting to be sent to the ore repair plant for 2 months, the Ural-2M combine "waited" for 40 days for the preparation of the longwall, and the 1K-101 combine after working out the longwall for 5 months did not have a front of work.

The leaders of Sakhalinugol tried with all their might to increase the efficiency of the use of mining machines and mechanisms, but they did it poorly. In 1983, the bureau of the regional committee of the CPSU noted that "in many mines, with a shortage of workers in basic professions, mining equipment is inefficiently operated. High-performance mechanized complexes are idle for a long time, often fail. Currently, they are used by 57 percent with a standard of 73 percent. The downtime of the complexes during installation and dismantling works during the transition from one longwall to another is twice the standard time. Equipment maintenance is poorly carried out. Repair

personnel are often loaded with unusual work. The utilization rate of shearers in 1983 was 0.44 against the plan of 0.65. The accident rate of machines and mechanisms is high. As a result, "every third team engaged in coal mining and excavation does not cope with the established tasks."

At the bureau of the regional committee, it was also noted that "throughout the association, about one third of the total volume of coal is mined in a non-mechanized way, only in every fifth face a combine or plow is used. Tasks for the extraction of coal from complex-mechanized longwalls, combine penetration, coal enrichment in heavy environments are not carried out ...

The technical backwardness of the mines, a large proportion of manual labor were one of the reasons for the high accident rate. In 1971-1973 alone, 78 accidents were committed at the plant's enterprises, of which 48 were blockages of longwalls, and the total amount of damage from accidents amounted to 250 thousand rubles. So, on New Year's days in 1970 in the Lermontov Mine Administration, as a result of drunkenness of the service personnel, the newly built hot water boiler was completely disabled. This was one of the main reasons for the delay in the commissioning of the processing plant.

The increase in accidents, in turn, caused a high level of occupational injuries. There was also an increase in the incidence of coal miners.

These facts did not please the leadership of the Sakhalin Regional Committee of the CPSU, which, in search of "switchmen", decided to "strictly warn the general director of the plant G.A. Revnivykh, ... that if the management of the plant does not take decisive measures to prevent injuries, it will be brought to strict party responsibility.

In the early 70s, mines achieved positive results in reducing occupational injuries. Between 1971 and 1973, it fell by 25 percent and the incidence of workers fell by 4.6 percent. Nevertheless, the number of occupational injuries at coal mining enterprises remained quite high. Thus, in 1973 and the first quarter of 1974, 479 accidents occurred at the plant, including 14 fatalities. A particularly unfavorable situation with labor protection has developed at the mines "Makarovskaya", "Boshnyakovo", "Yuzhno-Sakhalinskaya", "Udarnovskaya", "Gornozavodskaya".

Knowing full well that industrial accidents have a negative impact on the credibility of the enterprise, and ultimately on the authority of its head, some managers tried to hide cases of injuries from the public. For example, in 1969, at the ore repair plant of the Sakhalinugol plant, a systematic concealment of the facts of industrial injuries from state reporting was revealed. The head of section No. 4, Zakharov, concealed 5 such cases, destroying disability certificates and making fictitious entries in the timesheet that the workers worked all the days when they were "on sick leave". A report was sent to the statistical authorities of the region, which indicated only 12 cases of occupational injuries with a loss of 382 days of disability, while in fact 41 accidents occurred at the plant with a disability of 665 working days.

During the years of "stagnation", the leaders of the party and government of the Soviet Union paid great attention to safety issues. On the thirtieth of November 1966, the Central Committee of the CPSU adopted the Resolution "On Strengthening the Attention of Party, Economic and Trade Union Bodies to Labor Protection and Safety in Industry, Construction and Transport", on December 28, 1979, the Resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU "On the Implementation by Ministries and Departments, Party, Soviet and Trade Union Bodies of the Resolutions of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR to Ensure Safe and Healthy Working Conditions at Coal Industry Enterprises" was issued.

Despite the numerous resolutions, orders and instructions adopted, gross violations of the rules of safe work continued to take place at the mines and open-pit mines of Sakhalinugol by many workers and engineering personnel. In 1973 alone, about 9,000 cases of safety violations were committed at the plant. At a number of mines, workers did not receive the necessary instruction, they did not know the technique, methods and techniques of work. A particularly unfavorable situation with safety and labor protection has developed at the mines "Gornozavodskaya", "Makarovskaya", "Mgachi", "Yuzhno-Sakhalinskaya" and "Dolinskaya".

As a result, in 1973, the regional prosecutor A.N. Smirnov submitted a note to the regional party committee "On the unsatisfactory implementation of laws and regulations on labor protection and safety at the enterprises of the Sakhalinugol plant".

In the minutes of the bureau of the regional committee of the CPSU for 1975, it was noted that the economic managers and trade union committees of a number of mines and open-pit mines did not exercise strict control over compliance with safety and mining regulations, did not attach due importance to the fight against domestic injuries.

Subsequently, the situation on the security front not only did not improve, but even worsened. In 1979, the Gosgortekhnadzor authorities established over 11,000 violations of safety regulations. Of the 96 measures of the association's comprehensive plan to improve occupational health and safety in 1979, only 60 were implemented.

This is not to say that the management of Sakhalinugol did nothing to reduce injuries and improve the safety of miners. Increasing the level of mechanization in mining operations and, consequently, reducing the most dangerous blasting operations, has already yielded positive results. In addition, the improvement of schemes for opening mine fields, excavation blocks, transport, conveyors and other measures were carried out, first of all, from the point of view of improving labor safety.

All mines were equipped with underground medical centers for first aid, gasoline lamps for methane control were replaced by modern interferometers, each dead-end face was equipped with a system of constant methane monitoring and automatic shutdown of electrical equipment in case of exceeding the permissible gas concentration. At each mine, a unified system of organizational and technical measures aimed at improving the safety of work was introduced. In the early 70s, a research laboratory of the All-Union Institute for Work Safety of the VostNII was established on Sakhalin.

A lot of work was carried out at the mines to ensure reliable ventilation of mine workings, to exclude cases of methane accumulation in the working space, to create objective and reliable control over the gas regime underground. In 1973, more efficient main fan units were built at the Shebunino, Uglegorskaya, and Boshnyakovo mines, which made it possible to increase the reliability of ventilation of mine workings.

At the Uglegorskaya and Udarnovskaya mines, preliminary degassing of seams was used. At most mines, automatic gas protection systems and telemetry monitoring of the operation of local ventilation fans were put into operation. Effective methods of combating coal and rock dust were also used - combines and machines were equipped with dust suppression equipment, preliminary moistening of seams was used.

One of the measures to improve the safety of work in mines was the introduction of automatic control of machines and mechanisms, improving the transportation of coal to the surface. To localize underground fires and explosions of coal dust, the Sakhalin mines (one of the first in the Union) began to use water barriers. Outdated barriers made of inert dust, which caused silicosis and other pulmonary diseases in miners, are a thing of the past.

In a short time, all main ventilation units in the mines were transferred to automatic control. At the end of the 70s, work began on the construction of a lifting complex at the Yuzhno-Sakhalinskaya mine, which ensures the transportation of coal from the existing horizon directly to the loading bunkers on the surface. Similar work was started at the Udarnovskaya, Makarovskaya, and Tikhmenevskaya mines.

Of no small importance in the 70-80s was the issue of fastening mine workings. At that time, the use of anchor support was very profitable, from an economic point of view. Anchors are metal or wooden rods, individual for specific conditions of length, which bind fractured roof rocks. The cost of 1 meter of preparatory workings, fixed with anchors, was 5 rubles lower than when fastening with wood. One of the first to use this type of support was the Uglegorskaya and Makaryevka mines, and both of them achieved good economic performance.

In the mid-70s, flexible floors began to be used in the development of longwalls. The first in the production association to use this method was a team of miners of the stope, Vladimir Ivanovich Slyusarev from the Tikhmenevskaya mine. The use of flexible roof support made it possible to increase the collection of coal from lava by 50-60 percent.

Of great importance for the normal operation of mines and open-pit mines was the timely provision of the enterprise with raw materials and materials, fuel and energy. Interruptions in supply caused irregularity of work or disruption of the production program. Often, this was caused by untimely or poor-quality preparation of applications for materials and equipment. For example, in 1972, the Uglegorskaya mine lacked certain assortments of timber due to incorrect preparation of applications for timber, although its total quantity in the warehouse was higher than the established norms.

But often the opposite situation occurred: supplier enterprises either delayed deliveries, or simply undersupplied part of the products stipulated in the contract. In addition, wooden racks for the mines of Sakhalinugol came in a larger size than required by the passport. As a result, the complexity of the work increased, the mood of the workers fell (who wants to carry heavy logs), plus extra cubic meters of wood appeared in the reporting sheets. Timber industry enterprises, sending their products to the mines, counted it in cubic meters. And cubic meters are "molded" faster from thick logs. So the loggers sent the miners "pot-bellied" wood.

However, it's good that they sent it. In other years, due to the lack of forest, it was just right for the miners to substitute their own backs under the roof. Thus, in his speech at the 14th regional party conference, the general director of the Sakhalinugol plant, G.A. Revnivykh noted that due to the shortage of ore resistance by the Sakhalinles plant, the Mgachi and Telnovskaya mines were in difficult conditions throughout the winter of 1973/74. There were also direct abuses. So, there were managers of warehouses who, for various material benefits, signed inflated data on the supply of timber products, distorted information about Range. Of course, the management of the plant tried in every possible way to fight these illegal phenomena.

It is appropriate to note that the enterprises of the plant began to make wider use of the sanctions provided for by law to suppliers who do not fulfill contractual obligations.

Due to the negligence of the region's motor transport enterprises, the plant experienced big problems with the delivery of goods to the mines. To transport the materials arriving at the warehouses, coal miners often had to send their own transport, truck cranes and crews of loaders.

An analysis of the economic activity of coal mining enterprises of the Sakhalin region, conducted in the 70s by U. Derevyanko, showed that many of them stored excessive, unused equipment, which led to an overrun of depreciation charges. A similar situation was observed at many enterprises of the USSR, therefore, on September 10, 1970, the Decree of the Central Committee of the CPSU "On Strengthening the Responsibility of the Heads of Ministries, Departments, Enterprises and Construction Sites for the Timely Commissioning of Technological Equipment" was published in the press. After reviewing this resolution, the regional party bodies began work to identify organizations that had the most such equipment. The Sakhalin Regional Party Organization did not stand aside. In October 1970, the Sakhalin Bureau of the Regional Committee of the CPSU noted that "especially a lot of inactive equipment is located in the Sakhalinneft association (2,9 million rubles), the Sakhalinugol plant (1,5 million rubles)."

For example, since 1967, two coal centrifuges worth 40,000 rubles each have not been used at the Dolinskaya mine, and at mine No. 1/2 in 1970, unused expensive metal fastening racks were scrapped. Otherwise, these facts cannot be characterized as mismanagement.

However, despite the "draconian" decrees of the party and the government, the amount of unused equipment in the mines of the plant did not decrease. For example, in 1972, the deductions of the Gornozavodskaya mine for the depreciation of unused equipment amounted to 84 thousand rubles, the Shebunino mine - 27, Yuzhno-Sakhalinskaya - 39, Udarnovskaya - 26 thousand rubles.

In 1983, the bureau of the regional committee noted that "at the enterprises of the Sakhalinugol production association, excess reserves of uninstalled mining equipment are growing."

One of the most important reserves for reducing the cost of extracted products was the rational use of material and labor resources, the implementation of the economy regime in large and small. It must be said that some mines violated this principle of management, allowing overspending of materials and spare parts.

In the 60-70s at the enterprises of Sakhalinugol continued to take place postscripts and thefts. For example, at the ore repair plant, in order to increase the material interest of the team in the implementation of the plan and ensure the profitability of production, the plant management had at its disposal the fund of the enterprise and the fund of the master. An audit conducted in 1970 found that a number of craftsmen forged workers' signatures in the statements, and transferred the amounts of bonuses issued for personal gain. So, in June 1969, a group of workers (18 people) were awarded red shirts and berets. To do this, each worker was asked to sign the statement in receipt of 20 rubles. However, the cost of the gift was 8-9 rubles The rest of the difference (more than 200 rubles) the master put in his pocket, while the workers did not grumble, promised to buy them more "pants". As of April 20, 1970, the verification commission revealed more than 130 cases of correction of amounts in the statements, forgery of signatures of workers in the amount of 1600 rubles.

It should be noted that individual managers of the plant were paid bonuses in excess of the permissible maximum amounts. In February 1970, the director of the plant, Kaminsky, received 92 rubles from the company's fund, the chief economist Bobrovsky - 134 rubles, the chief accountant Belotserkovsky - 144 rubles. It is absolutely incomprehensible how a typist, the head of the office, the driver of a passenger car, who received awards for the development of new technology ... "Introduce carbon dioxide welding."

Of course, the perpetrators of embezzlement and postscripts "bore strict responsibility", but as they say, a bad example is contagious. In 1982, audits carried out at the enterprises of the production association revealed the facts of additions of unfulfilled volumes of work, illegal payment of wages due to improper application of prices, tariff rates, etc.

The issue of improving the organization and increasing labor productivity was very relevant at the enterprises of Sakhalinugol. By 1970, 70 percent of all workers in the mines and open-pit mines of the plant performed work by hand. Despite the attempts of the heads of coal mining enterprises to reduce the share of manual labor through the introduction of mechanization, in 1983 heavy unproductive labor continued to prevail in many labor-intensive technological operations in the island's coal industry. His share was especially large in the mines "Gornozavodskaya", "Boshnyakovo", "Mgachi", "Tikhmenevskaya". Due to the low organization of labor, significant losses of working time were allowed. Chronometric observations carried out at enterprises showed that the coefficient of use of working time during the shift is 60-70 percent, and therefore the actual loads on the equipment of cleaning and preparatory work were much lower than the standard. In 1973 alone, the loss of working time at the plant amounted to more than 120 thousand man-hours. Of course, all this could not but affect the decline in labor productivity. For example, in 1968, more than half of all underground crews systematically did not fulfill the planned tasks for coal mining and excavation of preparatory workings.

Since 1969, the methodology for determining labor productivity has changed in the country's coal industry: workers employed in sawmilling and electricity generation were included in the total number of workers in the extraction of fuel. This has reduced the level of labor productivity.

In 1971, the extraction of one thousand tons of Sakhalin coal spent the labor of 319 people working on the surface, which was much higher than the average Union indicators. However, there were objective reasons for this: imperfection and great deterioration of technological complexes on the surface of most enterprises; their remoteness from repair bases, power plants, and railways; the need to service mining villages on their own, etc.

A large number of workers were engaged in surface work. So, in 1971, 32 percent of the total number of workers worked on the surface of the mines. It was necessary to radically reduce the complexity of surface work. However, the task set in 1971 to reduce labor intensity in the plant as a whole was fulfilled by only 36 percent. Moreover, at the mines "Mgachi", "Makarovskaya", "Arkovo" and "Udarnovskaya" the complexity of work has even increased.

Low labor productivity was observed not only directly in mines and open-pit mines, but also in auxiliary enterprises. Thus, 3 times more workers were employed in the repair of mine machines and mechanisms in the Sakhalin coal basin than on average in the USSR, in timber warehouses and fuel loading - 2 times, in coal haulage - 3 times, in production and economic services - 3 times. Thus, if in certain production areas as a result of improving the production technology, Labor productivity increased by 1.5-2 times, then in general it was quite low for the production association.

They tried to increase the productivity of labor with the help of tried and tested socialist competition. At the XXV Congress of the CPSU, it was stated that "competition has a profound impact on economic practice, on the socio-political life of the country, on the moral atmosphere", and in the new Constitution of the USSR adopted in 1977, socialist competition was called a number of factors using which the state ensures the growth of labor productivity, increasing production efficiency and quality of work, dynamic, systematic and professional development of the national economy.

In the 70s, on the initiative of the first secretary of the regional committee of the CPSU P.A. Leonov in the coal industry of Sakhalin, a movement of brigades was born that exceeded the all-Union load standards. If in the early 70s the miners of Sakhalin did not dream of this, then in 1977-1978 there were already more than 2 dozen such brigades. The significance of this phenomenon is evidenced by the following example: the Yuzhno-Sakhalinskaya mine produced 350 thousand tons of coal per year, the Shebunino mine - 300 thousand tons, each of which employed about 1200 people. And two complex-mechanized brigades - P.P. Obukhov and A.P. Sychaeva from the Udarnovskaya mine, in which only 120 people worked - mined more than 600 thousand tons of coal per year.

A significant event, testifying to the possibility of high-performance use of mining equipment in the specific conditions of the Sakhalin coal deposits, was the outstanding achievement of the team of the integrated tunneling team of Arkady Yakovlevich Shaldybin from the Udarnovskaya mine. In March-April 1965, for 31 working days, Shaldybin's brigade with the help of the PK-3M combine passed through 1273 meters of coal, blocking by 38 meters the All-Union record for sinking mine workings on this combine, achieved by Khmelev's brigade from the Polysaevskaya-2 mine. The monthly production target was exceeded by 6814 tons, savings were achieved in the amount of 11768 rubles.

This victory was not easy for the Pitmen. The fact is that the intensive work of the combine was accompanied by the abundant formation of coal dust. Even additional irrigation did not have time to suppress it. And polluted air is the enemy of health. Something had to be done.

A way out was found - they took respirators to the face. And, like fighters in gas masks, they began to work in them. The penetration rate was increased. On average, 66 meters of workings were put into operation per day.

At the end of August 1965, surveying roulette recorded a new All-Union record of penetration - 1601 meters of workings. For a month, underground speeders produced 19262 tons of fuel, and cash savings amounted to 19372 rubles. 12 of the most distinguished members of the Shaldybin brigade were awarded orders and medals of the USSR. Among them are A.A. Novoseltsev, E.A. Kirillov, P.F. Polozhentsev.

In 1975, a team of miners of the stope N.A. Serdinov from the Uglegorskaya mine took the initiative to increase the average daily production of coal from the mechanized face and brought this figure to 850 tons, which is almost 3,2 times higher than the average daily load on the face at the Sakhalinugol plant.

A high rate of excavation was achieved by a team from the Boshnyakovo mine, led by A.N. Vanifatov. The average monthly penetration rate of the PK-3M combine was 260 meters with a standard of 220 meters. During the year, this team went through more than 3.1 km of mine workings.

The initiative of the brigades of A.Y. Shaldybyn, M.K. Smolentsev, P.P. Obukhov and A.P. Sychaev was picked up by the brigades of B.S. Chechin from the Yuzhno-Sakhalinskaya mine, N.I. Latyshev from the Uglegorskaya mine, N.I. Khrunin from the Boshnyakovo mine, V.I. Krainev and G.E. Vorons from the Dolinskaya mine, G.I. Antonov from the Gornozavodskaya mine, N.A. Dvornikov from the Shebunino mine, A.V. Khmarsky from the Mgachi mine, as well as excavator drivers of the Lermontov mine management V.I. Klinkov and N.F. Goncharov, crews of drivers of the Vakhrushev motor depot A.L. Voronchikhin and A.D. Korkin, a team of the mining mine department A.F. Zobkov and many others.

For excellent performance in work and overfulfillment of planned targets, many of the miners of the region were awarded high government awards. Thus, the high title of Hero of Socialist Labor was awarded to the foreman of the miners of the stope S.E. Kaygorodov, the foremen of the tunnellers - A.Y. Shaldybin, I.G. Shkor, M.K. Smolentsev, the foreman of the miners of the stope V.F. Solovyov.

Here in front of you, reader, is a photograph of Semyon Evlampievich Kaygorodov. He was born in 1913 in Blagoveshchensk, at the age of 16 he began to work. He tried many professions: he worked as a lumberjack and rafter in the Birsk timber industry, then as a handyman and loader. From 1942 to 1946 he served in the Soviet Army. After demobilization, he arrived to work in the coal industry of the Sakhalin region, at mine No. 10/13 of the Poronaisky district. In a short time, he acquired the profession of a fastener and a pile breaker, and since 1953 he headed a team of pile breakers. He proved to be a good organizer, a technically competent miner, and constantly introduced advanced labor methods into production. In April 1958, following the initiative of the Donetsk miner N. Mamai, Kaygorodov's brigade undertook to give 500 kg of coal in excess of the norm for each exit and save 0.2 rubles on the extraction of each ton. For good performance achieved in socialist competition in April 1959, the Kaygorodov brigade was awarded the title of collective of communist labor, and the foreman himself was awarded the title of Hero of Socialist Labor for high production success.

The fate of another noble Sakhalin miner, Ivan Grigorievich Shkor, was interesting. He was born in 1927 in the village of Ploskoye, Nosovsky district, Chernihiv region, grew up in the countryside, among hereditary grain growers. During the summer holidays, Ivan, together with his peers, threw himself into "adult" affairs: he harvested hay, carried sheaves of mowed rye to the collective farm current, sorted grain. In 1941, after graduating from incomplete high school, he went to work at the collective farm "Chervona Iskra". When his father went to war, Ivan stayed for the eldest in the house ... By that time, there were few people left on the collective farm, most of the men had gone into the army. Therefore, when it came to the foreman, the choice fell on Ivan ...

In 1944, Shkor was enlisted in the Soviet Army, where he served until 1953. In 1948 he was transferred to the Far East, and then, on the second of December 1948, fate threw him to Boshnyakovo for logging.

During his service on Sakhalin, he liked this island region, extraordinary in its beauty. After demobilization, Shkor went to get a job in mine No. 16/17 of the Uglegorskugol trust. In the office of the mine, he was bluntly told:

– We don't have enough people. Work up to the neck. So if you have ever dealt with the development of mineral resources ...
– "No," he replied, "I didn't. He worked on a collective farm, was at the front at the end of the war, was on an extra term.
– I don't even know what to do. The fact is that then you will have to walk in students for some time.

– And I didn't count on anything else," Ivan calmly remarked. - It is important for me to understand whether this work is for me or not. If for me, I will acquire a specialty.

Shkor worked for a year as an underground communications fitter. The case, of course, is interesting, but the restless, energetic Ivan was pulled underground, where the heated struggle for coal was waged every day . In September 1954, he switched to tunneling. I knew that the work was going to be difficult, but I wanted to test myself.

At that time there was still such a position - "a second-hand drifter". Like a henchman. It took only a month for the regular miner Stepanov for his new, stubborn student to master the profession well. Soon Shkor received the "first hand".

In April 1956, Ivan Grigorievich headed the tunneling brigade. At that time, preparatory workings were punched through the coal seam. The detonated fuel was unloaded manually. By introducing the S-153 coal loading machine, Shkora's brigade brought the tunneling line to 190 linear meters of workings. However, the S-153 was imperfect and unproductive. It used to happen that as soon as it gets into the water, it gets stuck. Therefore, soon the brigade began to use a new machine - UP-3, on which they set a regional record - 290 meters of penetration. The car itself has since been affectionately dubbed "Masha".

On solemn days, Ivan Grigorievich wore a uniform tunic, on the lapel of which the Star of the Hero shone, the medal "For Valiant Labor in Commemoration of the 100th Anniversary of the Birth of V.I. Lenin", the signs "Miner's Glory" of I and II degrees. And every time he looked at these awards, he remembered his first steps into adulthood. He has something to be proud of. The road he cut down, It wasn't easy.

One of the Heroes is Mikhail Konstantinovich Smolentsev. His biography is an ordinary biography of children of the war years. During the war, his father died near Kharkov. The mother was left alone with 5 children, the eldest of whom was six-year-old Mikhail. Thanks to my grandfather, who took little Misha to his fishing cooperative, located on the Volga near Astrakhan. After the war, Mikhail came to Sakhalin and went fishing.

At that time, a mining school was opened in Gornozavodsk. He went there, wanted to test himself in the unknown. In 1954 he began working at the mine. He continued his studies at night school, then at a technical school.

In 1961, Smolentsev was entrusted with the leadership of an integrated brigade. Creative search, interest in technical innovations, the study of advanced labor methods used in the mines of the country, helped Mikhail Konstantinovich to constantly increase labor productivity in the team, to achieve high results in work. Smolentsev was known not only as a good foreman, but also as an active innovator. Only during the years of the VIII five-year plan, they submitted and introduced into production 6 rationalization proposals, which made it possible to improve working conditions and save 4.5 thousand rubles.

For the first time on Sakhalin, Smolentsev's team used a scraper unit for excavation, which made it possible to increase the average monthly penetration rate by 1,5 times and improve labor safety. With a standard of 80 meters, in 1968 the rate of penetration was 131 meters.

The introduction of the scraper unit allowed the mine to reduce the number of mining crews from 20 to 11. At the same time, the excavation of mine workings has not decreased.

The creative and highly productive work of the foreman was highly appreciated by the Motherland. On Mikhail's chest gleams the medal "For Valiant Labor in Commemoration of the 100th Anniversary of the Birth of V.I. Lenin", the sign "Miner's Glory", in 1971 he was awarded the title "Honored Miner of the RSFSR".

In the galaxy of the most notable workers of Sakhalinugol is Viktor Fateevich Solovyov. He was born in 1920 in the village of Golovino, Vereshchaginsky district, Perm region. In 1937 he graduated from the FZU and worked for more than 3 years as an electrician at a plant in Perm. During the war he served in the army. In 1945, he liberated the southern part of Sakhalin from the Japanese invaders.

Solovyov was among those who in 1946 restored the Dolinskaya mine, established production and at the same time learned the difficult craft of a miner. Initially, he was put to work as a recoiler, but soon the mine management noticed the skill in the man, the miner's vein and sent him to a more responsible area - to the face. The main tools then were a jackhammer, an ax and a shovel. Natural diligence, and front-line training helped out. But few people saw at what price the excess tons were given to him. Only at home did the young miner feel fatigue spreading like a heavy wave through his body. From working with a jackhammer, my fingers stiffened ... However, Solovyov understood how in the difficult post-war years the country needed coal and therefore again went down to the face and cut his difficult coal seam, cut with even greater perseverance.

Perseverance, as you know, breeds success. If in 1947 the monthly output of Viktor Fateevich was only 100 tons, then in the next it was increased by 50 tons. In 1953, he brought it to 280 tons. During the period from 1954 to 1960 production increased to 400 tons.

The high results of the advanced miner did not go unnoticed. He was assigned to lead the brigade. In this responsible position, Viktor Fateevich proved to be a skillful organizer of production. His team was the first on the island to master the mechanized planting of the roof, the control of the roof on the layers of inclined fall by complete collapse of the rock and the treatment of the layers with long lavas. The introduction of these advanced techniques made it possible to significantly increase labor productivity, save about 40 thousand rubles per year. Solovyov's brigade introduced fireless planting of lavas, abolished the repair team. As a result, every year the Solovyovites exceeded the planned targets for coal mining. The government saw the work of the foreman as the main merit in this. V.F. Solovyov was awarded the medal "For Labor Distinction", the Order of the Red Banner of Labor, he is a full holder of the badge "Miner's Glory". He was awarded the titles of "Honorary Miner" and "Best Miner of the Soviet Union". And as the highest distinction - the Gold Star "Hammer and Sickle".

After retiring, Viktor Fateevich continued to work as a miner at the stope for many years. The son of Viktor Fateevich, Sergey, went his father's way. For many years he worked as a mechanic at the second section of the Dolinskaya mine.

Between 1966 and 1997, more than 20 Sakhalin miners were awarded the title of Honored Miner of the RSFSR. Among them are K.P. Kopylchenko, A.N. Vakarin, N.A. Serdinov, I.I. Davidovich, E.I. Tarasyuk, N.F. Serdyukov, S.K. Fedyaev, V.I. Yashchenko, N.S. Protasov, S.K. Tsukanov, G.A. Revnivykh, S.V. Dulsky...

This long list contains the name of Ivan Iosifovich Davidovich. He began his career as a tractor driver at the Red Banner peat enterprise and did not even dream of a mining career ... Like all the guys, I went to serve in the army. Although the army service was not easy, but how many new and interesting things young people learned for themselves in the army. Once, during the lesson, the political officer of the unit told the young fighters about the riches of the underground bowels of Sakhalin, that the Far East needs Sakhalin oil and coal. Many of those present at this conversation then decided to go to Sakhalin, to help the country develop and put at the service of the people the untold riches of the island's bowels. Among them was Vanya Davidovich ...

And in 1955, a good-natured, whirlwind guy appeared at mine No. 15. They put him to work as a breed cleaner. He worked hard, looked closely at the techniques of experienced miners, tried to master mining skills. Soon he became a member of the Komsomol youth brigade, and two years later he became a brigadier. At that time, new rock loading machines began to arrive at the mine, but they did not know how to work on them ... Ivan was the first in the mine to master the EPM-I rock loading machine, but how many of them still had to be mastered ...

In the mid-60s, the team of I. Davidovich for the first time achieved a record rate of sinking of crossbars * on hard rocks with the help of PPM-4M rock loading machines. For example, in 1965, with a standard of 60 running meters per month, the brigade averaged 89 meters.

The party and the government highly appreciated the labor exploits of Ivan Iosifovich Davidovich in the struggle for the early fulfillment of production plans. In 1966 he was awarded the Order of Lenin, and in August 1969 he was awarded the title of "Honored Miner of the RSFSR".

But there are people in the mining environment who did not perform heroic deeds. However, their work, modest and everyday, is worthy of the highest praise. Of course, it is impossible to fit all the names of the miners into this book. But still, when you leaf through the binders of Sakhalin regional and district newspapers, the eye involuntarily stops at publications about them, ordinary workers of the island's coal enterprises.

One of them is miner Sergei Grigorievich Enyutin. His life was not easy. In 1926, in the small Siberian village of Semiluzhki, little Sergei was left an orphan. He inherited a simple household: a cat, a dog and a gun. For more than a year, Sergei was a peasant, and then he gave up on everything and went to work at the mine.

Old miners remember that there used to be such a position - an assistant to the slaughterer. He was a jack of all trades, he had to be able to work in the face, pull the forest, replace the switchman, the horseman. S. Enyutin also had to go through this difficult school. He got a job in a strange family, where he rented a corner. Such tenants in the village were called "freeloaders". And yet, the young miner met in his life not only difficulties. The miners replaced his loved ones and his home...

After the end of World War II, Sergey heard that mining specialists were in great need on distant Sakhalin. It was not easy to leave the habitable place, but the eternal craving of the Russian people for the new - for new places, people, work - took its toll.

On Sakhalin, Sergey was sent to the Dolinskaya mine. At first he worked as a tunneller, then as an assistant to the head of the section, and then as the head of the site. Here Sergey Grigorievich found a wide range of applications of his rich mining experience. He raised more than one hundred tunnellers. However, the years take their toll, and S. Enyutin retired, but his sons, Victor and Alexander, remained in the mines of the region.

Meager newspaper lines reveal to us another name - Mikhail Vdovin. In 1949, he came to the Dolinskaya mine. But unlike Sergei Enyutin, Mikhail did not possess a mining profession. However, there was no special science then, there was no time. Six-month courses, a little theory, the rest is practice. As soon as he got acquainted with the mine workings, M. Vdovin had already begun to work as a fastener.

Not everyone went to the fasteners at that time. Repair and restoration work was considered very dangerous. And rightly so. If you begin to restore the support, the rock will flow from above. And there is a dome above you. Yes, such that the light of the lamp does not reach its top.

Narrow, wood-fixed workings quickly aged, blockage followed blockage. Fasteners often had to work in difficult conditions. And it is no coincidence that the following words are said about the miners-fasteners performing important responsible work:

In their deeds, the heroic spirit reigns.
Look - they really are from a Russian fairy tale.
Everyone has "a star burning in his forehead",
Helmets gleam like the helmets of the knights.
Fasteners, and in short - "krepelya" -
The basis of all this underground construction.
At first the earth rests upon their hands,
Then - on the racks.

Gradually, Mikhail gained experience. He perfectly studied his specialty, and then for many years he taught beginners a complex and responsible business - the repair and restoration of mine workings. The merits of the leader of production are many. An honorary miner, a shock worker of

communist labor, the best in his profession, an excellent student of socialist competition - these are the honorary titles awarded to Mikhail for his impeccable work.

The fate of one of the oldest workers of the Udarnovskaya mine, Vasily Ivanovich Gavrik, who from early childhood dreamed of becoming a miner, was somewhat different. As a young man, he came to the mine of the Artemugol trust.

"I want to be a miner," he said to the head of the mining site. He looked at the young, thin boy incredulously and asked:

- Have you been to the mine?
- No.

A mining foreman approached.

"I know this guy," he said, and asked. "Send him to my shift.

For the rest of his life, Vasily remembered the first day of work underground. He looked around fearfully, shuddered at the crackling of racks and a fallen piece of rock. After the war, he moved to Sakhalin. He mastered many professions over the years of work in the mine. He was a rollbacker, and a lumber, and a fireman, and a fastener, and a slaughterer. During his life, he chopped more than one train of coal and gave it to the mountain. More than a dozen people have been trained in the mining profession. Shortly before his retirement, V.I. Gavrik was appointed deputy head of underground transport of mine No. 1/2. For many years of conscientious work, he was awarded the Order of Lenin.

Another Sakhalin miner is Vasily Ivanovich Vcherashnyuk. After graduating from the Dolinskaya Mining School, he worked as a lumberjack, then as an electric locomotive driver at the Dolinskaya mine. But then, as they say, it was a test of strength. Soon he asked to go underground.

The "baptism of fire" was not long in coming. Mikhalchyshyn's brigade, in which Vasily worked, was working out the 31st lava. As soon as they began to remove the coal, the lava began to reap. The front pillars broke like matches. There was something to be confused about. At such moments, one panicked exclamation is enough to spoil the whole thing. But there was no panic.

Brigadier Mikhalchyshyn, Yesterday, and after them other workers took places along the wall of the face. The task was understood perfectly. It is necessary to fix the mined space next to the conveyor, not to allow the lava to "sit down". People acted without fuss and at a pace, although behind there was almost a whole watch, and aching in the shoulders, and at times the legs simply refuse to go. But the main thing was done - the accident was prevented!

When mining combines began to arrive at the mine, Vasily Ivanovich was already in charge of the link. And the link in everything should be the first. Vasily enrolled in the courses of combine operators, successfully graduated from them and began to manage the Ural-2M combine, subsequently mastered the 2K-52, KSH-3M combines. At the mine, they could not fail to notice the perseverance and diligence with which the young miner treated the work. This predetermined the trust placed in him. Vasily Ivanovich was repeatedly elected a deputy of the Regional Council of Working People's Deputies, later became a Knight of the Order of the Red Banner of Labor and the Badge of Honor.

For more than 30 years, the innovator and inventor Alexei Makarovich Druzev worked at the Dolinskaya mine. What drives the thought of an innovator? Usually dissatisfaction. For example, there is mechanization on the site and it allows you to cope with the plan, but the reserves are not fully exhausted. A lot can be improved. So the innovator thinks what to redo. There are a lot of similar ideas on the account of Alexei Makarovich. He submitted and introduced into production a total of 180 rationalization proposals with an economic effect of 120 thousand rubles. The State Committee for Inventions and Discoveries recognized two of Druzev's innovations as inventions: a ditch cleaning machine and a manual hoist.

But Georgy Grigorievich Samalyukov never thought about Sakhalin. However, fate - the lady is very capricious, you never know what will throw out in the next moment!

For the first time, Georgy descended into the lava at the Leninskaya mine in the city of Novoshakhtinsk. He, then a graduate of a vocational school, began to pave his miner's path. We went down into the lava, the old foreman, patting the boy on the shoulder, said:

- The mine, Zhora, captures a person. Anyone who has ever plunged into its bowels will be drawn here all his life.

For 15 years, Georgy Grigorievich mined anthracite at this mine. But somehow a letter came from Sakhalin. The nephew Valentin Eremin boasted that the mines here are no worse than the mainland ones, invited him to come, visit, look at the mines ... Since 1972, G. Samalyukov became a miner of the stope at the Uglegorskaya mine, worked in the team of N. Serdinov. Outwardly, he was no different from others, did not grab stars from the sky, tried to stay in the shadows. But if the reader saw how he worked, he would immediately distinguish him from others. In 1976, on the occasion of the Miner's Day, he was awarded the title of "Honorary Miner".

For more than a quarter of a century, Mikhail Georgievich Esin worked in the mines and open-pit mines of the country. A Donbass boy, he had just graduated from the FZU when the war began. He was evacuated to the Urals, went to work at the mine. He did not spare himself in his work. Coal was for him something like shells, grenades and cartridges, because he helped the country defeat the enemy. Pretty soon, Mikhail became an assistant excavator driver, then a machinist.

In 1952, he, as one of the best specialists, was seconded to Sakhalin to mount walking excavators. I went willingly. Esin was sent to work at the Lermontov Mine Administration. When the installation of the units was completed, Mikhail was offered:

- Maybe you will stay, Georgievich?

He himself thought about it. He really liked the new quarry. There was also a case for his wife, Polina Ivanovna, who became the head of the chemical laboratory.

- My husband mines coal, and I kind of control the quality of his work. The percentage of ash content in the fuel will be overestimated - it will not be good for Mikhail, even though he is a relative.

... An excavator crushes the stone with a grinding noise. Mudstone, loosened by explosions, is malleable. Here is a huge metal handful pouring rock into the back of a dump truck. Two buckets - and the car leaves. In its place, another dump truck rolls up under the boom of the excavator. And from the window of the excavator, Mikhail Georgievich waves his hand to his comrades ...

Speaking about the workers of the Sakhalin mines, it would be unfair not to mention that not only men, but also the "weaker sex" worked underground, swallowing coal dust on a par with everyone.

A young specialist Claudia Kalinovskaya graduated from the Donetsk Industrial Institute in 1952 and was sent to the Sakhalinugol plant.

- Were you an excellent student at the institute? - asked her deputy head of the personnel department.

The girl nodded her head affirmatively.

- Well, that's good. We need competent, efficient specialists. Do you want to stay at the plant?

-No. If you can, send it to the mine," Klava asked.

A few days later, the girl worked as a district surveyor* of mine No. 1/2.

A young miner, who first got into the mine, is oppressed by the unusual situation underground. Making his way through narrow drifts with the faint flicker of a miner's light bulb, he listens apprehensively to the crackling of the mine racks. The surveyor K. Kalinovskaya did not have this feeling. From the first days, the girl appeared in the lavas and faces boldly, without any fear, and this did not escape the attention of experienced miners.

- And we have nothing as a surveyor. Brave wonder, don't look so fragile in appearance, they said among themselves.

Successfully went to the young surveyor. Klava perfectly knew the mining tools that she had to use during her work: a theodolite, a level, a bussol for shooting longwalls and secondary workings,

angle meters. The old miners were amazed at the speed and skill with which the surveyor made measurements of mine workings, with what accuracy she put them on the plan ...

Despite the fact that many heroes and leaders worked in the mines and open-pit mines of the island, the personnel problem at coal mining enterprises continued to be quite acute, and to a greater extent the turnover of labor was observed among engineering and technical workers. For example, in 1978-1979 alone, 40 percent of directors, about 80 percent of chief engineers of mines and open-pit mines were replaced in the production association, 3 directors and 5 chief engineers were dismissed from work for violation of discipline and safety. At the same time, mining engineers headed only 35 percent of the mining sites of the mines. But the party organs were more concerned about the fact that "many cleaning and tunneling crews were headed by non-party people," and "in most mines the party stratum among ordinary workers is low."

The central party and Soviet authorities preferred to solve the personnel issue using the proven "carrot and stick" method. On June 8, 1967, the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR No. 882 "On the Expansion of Benefits for Persons Living in the Far North and Equivalent Areas" was published in the central and local press, according to which allowances to Sakhalin residents began to accrue after 6-12 months in the amount of 50-80 percent of the basic salary. The retirement age for men was reduced to 55 years, and for women to 50 (for miners it was much lower). The decree provided for the reduction of the term of employment contracts from 5 to 3 years, payment for travel on vacation every 3 years.

Following the "carrot" came the turn of the "stick". On September 2, 1978, the Resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR "On Measures to Improve the Work of the Coal Industry" was adopted, which provided that persons who graduated from vocational schools and were sent to work in the coal and shale industry were required to work in production associations, enterprises and organizations of the coal and shale industry for at least 3 years.

To retain workers at coal mining enterprises, much attention was paid to cultural and consumer services. In each administrative and household plant, medical offices for prevention and medical recovery were equipped, at each mine - greenhouses and greenhouses, livestock subsidiary farms for workers.

In the first half of the 70s, 12 children's institutions for 1600 places, 4 houses of culture, gyms in the villages of Bykov and Boshnyakovo, in Shakhtersk and Lermontov Mine Administration, 5 schools, a hospital in Gornozavodsk were built for the miners of the island and their families. In the association "Sakhalinugol" there were 7 pioneer camps - the best in the region. In 5 of them, summer buildings were heated by the heat of special boiler houses, which allowed the camps to work not in two, but in three shifts. All the children of the miners were provided with vouchers to pioneer camps almost free of charge. Employees of the association maintained their health in 3 of their own dispensaries, to a much greater extent than workers in other industries, were provided with vouchers to the best sanatoriums of the USSR.

In the 60-80s, mechanized delivery of people to the place of work and to the surface began to be carried out, at the Dolinskaya and Gornozavodskaya mines, workers began to receive hot meals directly underground. Subsequently, such a service was received by employees of almost all Sakhalin coal mining enterprises (except for the Arkovo mine).

Wages also increased. In 1972, the Resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR "On Raising the Minimum Wage for Workers and Employees with a Simultaneous Increase in Tariff Rates and Official Salaries of Middle-Paid Categories of Workers Employed in the Production Sectors of the National Economy" was adopted. In accordance with this decree, the workers of the coal industry of the island received a significant increase in earnings - the wage fund increased by 8 million rubles a year.

In addition to wages for workers in the coal industry, a number of preferential surcharges and benefits were introduced. The Decree of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of

Ministers of the USSR "On Measures to Improve the Work of the Coal Industry", adopted on September 2, 1978, provided that persons transferred to the reserve from the ranks of the Armed Forces of the USSR, and persons arriving on Komsomol vouchers who have concluded a contract for 3 years to work at the enterprises of the shale and coal industry, are paid a one-time allowance for economic establishment in the amount of 1000 rubles. The payment was to be made at the expense of the fund for material incentives for production associations.

In addition, since 1979, in the production associations of the coal industry for workers and employees, the payment of a one-time remuneration for seniority has been introduced, depending on the length of continuous work. With continuous work experience from 1 to 3 years - a coefficient of 0.6 (from the official salary or tariff rate) was used, from 3 to 5 years - 0.8; from 5 to 10 years - 1.0; from 10 to 15 years old - 1.2; over 15 years - 1.5. However, the maximum amount of one-time remuneration in all regions of the USSR should not exceed 450 rubles per year.

As in previous years, employees of coal enterprises in the Sakhalin Oblast experienced an acute shortage of housing. On July 8, 1967, the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR, by their Decree, obliged the ministries and departments of the USSR to take measures to accelerate the construction of residential buildings in the Far Eastern Territory, bringing to 1975 the provision of housing of at least 8 sq. m. per 1 person. However, in the Sakhalin mines, almost half of the housing was in disrepair, at the same time, the ministry from year to year reduced investment in housing construction without any special reason. So, in 1970, only 2.9 million rubles were allocated for housing construction, 1.5 times less than in 1969. Between 1966 and 1970, 15,000 square meters less housing was commissioned than in the previous five years. In addition, the management of Sakhalinugol poorly carried out the functions of the customer, untimely providing construction sites with design estimates and financing, and the Sakhalin Grazhdanproekt Institute and the Sakhalin branch of Daltisiz slowly developed design estimates for the construction of residential buildings in Gornozavodsk and Shebunino in 1972. The latter circumstance is not difficult to understand. It is known that these organizations had a good construction base in the south of the island, which was not on the periphery. They willingly built houses in Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk and the suburbs and looked for all sorts of loopholes that allowed them to evade construction in Gornozavodsk, Shebunino, Tikhmenevo, Shakhtersk.

As a result, in 1973, one resident of the mine "Gornozavodskaya" accounted for 7.3 sq. m., at the mine "Shebunino" - 7.1 sq. m., at "Mgachi" - 7 sq. m. At the mine "Udarnovskaya" frame and prefabricated panel houses accounted for 58% of the housing stock, and at "Shebunino" - 73%, and these were mainly houses built in 1948-1955. On average, 62 percent of housing was equipped with running water at the plant.

To resolve the housing problem, in the Decree of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR of September 2, 1978 "On Measures to Improve the Work of the Coal Industry", there was a clause according to which production associations were invited to "expand as widely as possible in towns and cities (except for regional centers) the construction of residential buildings by economic means by enterprises and organizations of the coal industry with the labor fate of workers and employees, as well as to carry out the construction of individual residential buildings by the developers themselves. The initial payment of the developer's own funds was set at 20 percent of the estimated cost of building the house.

It should be noted that mining families were very reluctant to take loans for housing construction. This is explained by the fact that many workers planned to leave Sakhalin after the expiration of the contract. Your own house could serve as a kind of "cementing material", because it is much more difficult to part with a house than with a hostel.

Nevertheless, the Decree of September 2, 1978 contributed to a partial alleviation of the severity of the housing problem. By 1981, the total living area of the departmental housing stock of Sakhalinugol was 644648 sq. m., and on average there were more than 14 sq. m. per living person (See Appendix No. 7).

Unfortunately, the quality of many living quarters left much to be desired. In November 1984, at a meeting of the bureau of the regional committee of the CPSU, it was noted that at the enterprises of the coal industry, the demolition of barracks and the resettlement of citizens living in them to comfortable residential buildings were being carried out at an extremely slow pace. As of January 1, 1983, the production association had 113.3 thousand square meters of barracks. In 1983, 3.6 thousand square meters of barracks were liquidated, with a task of 27.7 thousand square meters. For 9 months of 1984, only 13 percent of the barracks from the annual task were demolished.

In addition, numerous facts of re-settlement of barracks, as well as improvement of living conditions for persons living in comfortable apartments, were allowed.

The situation with regard to the medical care of miners has improved somewhat. Thus, in 1970-1974, the incidence of temporary disability among miners decreased by 31.4 percent. However, the Sakhalinugol plant was still among the plants and production associations of the country with a high incidence of miners. In 1974, there were 1106 days of disability per 100 workers. The incidence was especially high at the Shebunino, Yuzhno-Sakhalinskaya, Arkovo, and Udarnovskaya mines.

In many mines and open-pit mines, measures to combat colds were unsatisfactorily carried out, temperature and ventilation regimes were grossly violated. The dust content in the faces often exceeded the maximum permissible norms, there were facts of transporting workers on uninsulated transport. Loss of working time from colds alone accounted for 25 to 45 percent of all disability losses.

At some enterprises, dedusting, washing and drying of work clothes were poorly carried out. In 1975, seven mines did not have fotaria,* 12 mines did not have inhalations. The provision of hot meals and good quality drinking water to miners in the workplace was slowly improving.

Some managers were not engaged in the employment of workers for whom work in underground conditions was contraindicated for health reasons. So, at the Yuzhno-Sakhalinskaya mine, out of 23 workers in need of transfer, only three were employed. The regional health department made serious shortcomings in the medical care of miners. Little attention was paid to the examination of temporary disability, the quality of medical care, dispensary observation and preventive examinations were poorly delivered.

Thus, the attempts of the central party and government bodies to reform the economy of the USSR did not have much success. The extensive development of the Soviet economy caused the need for primary resources, which forced the development of extractive industries. During this period, Sakhalin managed not only to meet its own needs for coal, but also began to actively supply it to other regions of the Asia-Pacific region. The increase in coal production was achieved both due to the concentration of mining operations and the introduction of narrow-cut combines and technological complexes, which made it possible to increase labor productivity, and extensively - the commissioning of new mining sites and horizons. To increase coal production, science was attracted: a wide network of laboratories of the Union Technological Institutes appeared on the island, and the introduction of electronic computers into production cycles began. They did not forget about the workers, intensive housing construction was carried out in the mining villages, new departmental schools, kindergartens, canteens, administrative and household plants were put into operation, the wages of miners grew, and new benefits were introduced. At the same time, the island is still remained a raw material appendage of the mainland. No coal processing industries and enterprises, with the exception of coal processing plants, were built on Sakhalin and were not designed for construction. Coal was intended for heating homes, power plants, and for export outside the region.

PARAGRAPH 4 ATTEMPTS TO REFORM THE INDUSTRY DURING PERESTROIKA (1985-1991)

In the spring of 1985, a relatively young politician M.S. Gorbachev came to power in the country. With his arrival, the country was shaken by a number of socio-economic and political reforms. Gorbachev's reforms began under three slogans: "perestroika", "glasnost", "acceleration". Perestroika was understood as the reconstruction of the entire building of Soviet society.

Of course, as a member of the Politburo for many years, Gorbachev knew better than anyone about the crisis in the Soviet economy. Having come to power, he surrounded himself with a number of economists, sociologists and political scientists, in the forefront of which were such well-known scientists as academicians L. Abalkin, A. Aganbegyan, T. Zaslavskaya and others. It was no longer a question of "cosmetic" repairs of the economic system, but of radically changing the conditions of production and methods of managing the economy.

At the XXVII Congress of the CPSU held in February-March 1986, Gorbachev noted that "the primary task in the economic development of the country is to resolutely reverse the unfavorable trends in the development of the economy, to open up space for the initiative and creativity of the masses." To do this, it was supposed to "resolutely expand the boundaries of the independence of associations and enterprises, raise their responsibility for achieving the highest final results," for which it was necessary to "transfer enterprises to genuine self-financing, self-sufficiency and self-financing".

The "Law on State Enterprise", adopted on June 30, 1987, was designed to ensure the transition of the Soviet economy to new principles: self-financing and self-financing.

Gradually, enterprises were able to freely plan their activities, relying on figures coming from the Ministries, but considering them as advisory. Enterprises received the right to establish direct "horizontal" ties with other enterprises - instead of resorting to the mediation of the State Planning Committee and the State Supply Committee of the USSR.

Thanks to this law, the Sakhalinugol Production Association consistently began to switch to work at the expense of its own and credit funds. His rights in matters of management, planning and material incentives were significantly expanded. However, there were no fundamental changes in "papermaking". The flow of directives from the Ministry of Coal Industry did not decrease. In turn, the association flooded the enterprises under its jurisdiction with various orders and circulars. In addition, mines and open-pit mines as the main coal mining enterprises were not legal entities. They did not have their own current account, did not bear direct responsibility to the bank for the results of management.

It should also be borne in mind that the bureaucratization of ministries immediately began to circumvent the provisions of the "Law on State Enterprise", as it did not want to give up its positions and abandon its former prerogatives. In addition, the state remained the main customer in the industry. It also set prices and tax rates, centrally allocated material resources. Due to the lack of wholesale trade, enterprises have not been able to choose their suppliers. The introduction of "state acceptance" led to an actual reduction in the earnings of millions of workers, since the revealed discrepancy between the products of the "quality standards" deprived them of the bonuses previously accrued.

The economic transformations that have begun in the country have exacerbated the crisis in all sectors of the country's national economy. In the coal industry, this was reflected in the incomplete development of capital investments, aging and deterioration of the structure of production capacities, and the low technical level of mining equipment.

Until 1988, in the USSR as a whole and in the RSFSR in particular, an extensive increase in coal production continued, without moving its centers to more profitable deposits. At the same time, the performance indicators of the industry had negative trends. As a result, in 1989-1991, the volume of coal production in the RSFSR began to decline (from 401.5 million tons to 345.3 million tons per year).

A decrease in coal production was also observed in the Sakhalin Region. If in 1986 5080707 tons of coal were mined at the enterprises of Sakhalinugol, then in 1991 - only 4359200 tons. (See Annex No. 8). Thus, production losses amounted to 721507 tons of coal. An increasing number of coal mining enterprises of the association could not cope with the implementation of the production plan. So, if in 1988 out of 14 coal mining enterprises 5 mines did not fulfill the production plan, then in 1990 and 1991 out of 14 enterprises, 9 mines did not fulfill the production plan.

The reasons for the failure to fulfill the coal mining plan in the second half of the 80s were the high accident rate of mining equipment, spontaneous combustion of coals, etc.

In 1985, the plan for preparatory workings was fulfilled by 98 percent, and stripping by 84.8 percent. The main reasons for the underperformance were the understaffing of auxiliary workers, the distraction of tunnellers to extraneous work, and the lack of drivers of heavy vehicles. However, the introduction of self-supporting methods of work initially brought positive results. So, in 1988, with the plan for carrying out preparatory workings, 68740 meters were actually passed - 72875 meters.

But already in the early 90s, positive changes were replaced by negative results. In 1991, the plan for carrying out preparatory workings was fulfilled by 91.5 percent, and for opening and preparing work - only by 82 percent. The main reasons for non-compliance were:

1. Interruptions in the provision of mines with materials, spare parts, shortages of equipment (combines and rock loaders), which led to an increase in accidents, downtime, aging of the fleet of machines, and an increase in the time spent in repair.
2. Understaffing of auxiliary workers.
3. The meeting of inadequate geological disturbances, which led to an increase in the complexity of the work.

In the second half of the 80s, serious attention continued to be paid to the protection and rational use of natural resources. It should be said that the association began to deal with these issues only since 1978. During the period 1978-1987 at the enterprises of Sakhalinugol, treatment facilities were put into operation, which reduced the discharge of wastewater by 10 million cubic meters.

In the mid-80s, the construction of a water sludge facility began at the processing plant of the Dolinskaya mine, which was supposed to stop the discharge of polluted water into the Naiba River. Much has been done for land reclamation. Thus, in 1986, the plan for the reclamation of disturbed lands was fulfilled by 384 percent. With a plan of 30 hectares, 115.4 hectares of land were actually reclaimed. In total, in the XII five-year plan, it was planned to spend 5.5 million rubles on environmental protection measures.

Since 1985, the introduction of progressive forms of organization and remuneration began in the mines and open-pit mines of the Sakhalin Region. For example, back in 1985, the miners of the Lermontov Mine Administration created a comprehensive end-to-end self-supporting team of bulldozer drivers. Small teams began to be transformed into enlarged ones. At the end of 1986, out of 32 mining brigades of the association, 19 collectives switched to a single outfit, 14 collectives concluded with the administration of enterprises contract for work. By the middle of 1987, 132 brigades were transferred to such a progressive form of labor organization as brigade self-financing in the production association.

But it should be noted that the process of mastering new methods of management at the coal mining enterprises of Sakhalin did not progress easily. Thus, self-financing provided for bonuses for saving material resources and reusing materials. However, at the Shebunino, Yuzhno-Sakhalinskaya and some other mines, brigades were not paid bonuses for saving material resources. As a result, on the one hand, a new form of work was introduced, and on the other hand, its effectiveness was nullified by yesterday's instruction, which prohibited this kind of material incentives.

New methods and forms of management have affected the amount of profits and losses. So, if in 1985 the losses of the production association "Sakhalinugol" amounted to 45359 thousand rubles, then in 1986 they decreased to 3064 thousand rubles, and in 1988 - to 2085 thousand rubles At the

same time, the profit of "Sakhalinugol" was in 1986 26826 thousand rubles, in 1988 increased to 56376 thousand rubles, and in 1990 - to 84303 thousand rubles.

The figures show that Sakhalinugol's profits were quite significant, but how were they distributed? In October 1987 , V. Kudryavtsev, an employee of the Fuel and Energy Department of the Sakhalin Regional Executive Committee, published an article in the newspaper Sovetsky Sakhalin entitled "The First Step", in which he noted that since the beginning of 1987, the country's coal industry has "established stable standards for the formation of wage funds, material incentives, socio-cultural events and housing construction, production development, which are closely linked to the growth rates of labor productivity and the end result." However, the standards for the use of profits were approved by the state in the following shares: 53.6 kopecks were deducted from 1 ruble of profit to the state budget, 16.2 kopecks for material incentives; for the development of production - 2.2 (**!**); for the needs of social and cultural life - 5.8; for the maintenance of kindergartens - 9; for housing and communal services - 13.2 kopecks. Thus, only a little more than two percent of the profit was directed to the development of production. As a result, the mining park was aging, production assets were practically not updated, which radically affected the cost of mined coal.

From 1985 to 1991 the production cost of mining a ton of coal increased from 33.95 to 93.51 rubles, that is, almost 3 times. (See Annex No. 9). How did the production association manage not only to survive, but also to make a profit? The fact is that Sakhalinugol, like many other enterprises, continued to use state subsidies, which only allowed 10 thousand enterprises to avoid bankruptcy and dismissal of overgrown personnel. At the expense of state subsidies, the difference between the cost price and the selling price was covered. For example, in 1990, the average selling price of Sakhalin coal was equal to 25.48 rubles. For mines, the average cost was 46.40 rubles, and the selling price was 27.27 rubles. Only open-pit mining was profitable on the island. So, in 1990, the cost of coal at the Sakhalin open-pit mines was 19,30 rubles, and the selling price was 21,28 rubles.

However, already in the early 80s it became clear that the commercial coal reserves at the existing open-pit mines are very limited and will be fully developed at the end of the century. The reduction, and then the complete cessation of open-pit mining, promised a significant increase in the already high cost.

In this regard, the great hopes of the Sakhalin coal miners were associated with the Solntsevskoye coal deposit discovered in the Uglegorsk district. By 1981, significant coal reserves had been explored there (projected reserves were more than 2,4 billion tons). Moreover, this coal can be mined in an open way. However, in order to take coal from the Solntsevskoye deposit, it was necessary to receive from the state 242 million rubles. capital investments for industrial construction. In addition, about the same amount was required for non-industrial construction associated with the development of this field. And, finally, the construction of the Ilyinsk-Uglegorsk railway or a new port in the Uglegorsk district required another 250-300 million rubles. its rise in price. Thus, in order to start extracting cheap coal from the Solntsevskoye deposit, it was necessary to find 700-750 million rubles to begin with. in prices of the mid-80s.

Japanese entrepreneurs became interested in the Solntsevskoye coal deposit, who offered the Soviet side investments for its development. However, the Minister of the Coal Industry of the USSR rejected these proposals, stating that "we will not go into bondage to the Japanese." The management of Sakhalinugol proposed another solution to the Solntsevo problem: the construction of a powerful power plant in the Solntsevo area, which would not only close the Sakhalin GRES and Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk CHPP-I, but also export a significant share of the electricity produced to the islands of the Japanese archipelago. However, there were no funds for such a grandiose project during the perestroika period.

Nevertheless, work at the Solntsevskoye field has begun. They were conducted by the Miner's Mine Construction Department. Initially, an open work site was created, which was on the balance sheet of the Uglegorskaya mine, and only in 1988 an independent enterprise appeared at the Solntsevsky coal mine, which mined about 100 thousand tons of coal per year.

At the same time, funds were found for the reconstruction of a number of mines. The fact is that maintaining the capacity of underground mines at the same level was also impossible without significant investment. Only capital construction required at least 60 million rubles. annually in prices of the mid-80s.

The high cost of Sakhalin coal was a heavy burden on the entire island economy. It led to a significant increase in the cost of electricity and heat, led to an increase in the cost of almost all products produced in the region.

The decrease in production and the increase in the cost of Sakhalin coal served as a reason for reducing its supplies to the mainland. From 1985 to 1991, the volume of supplies decreased from 738 to 596 thousand tons.

TABLE XLI

DISTRIBUTION OF COAL IN 1985-1991 (in thousand tons).

Coalsupply	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991
Magadan	60,8	67	65,5	59,2	60,7	58,6	54,6
Kamchatka	391	398	444,2	413,5	438	391,3	336,6
Khabarovsk	224	142,8	98,3	97,9	94,5	108,6	95,5
PrimorRegion	27	19,6	0	0	0	0	0
Chita	34,9	41,8	39,8	40	30	23,7	47,7
VOSO	0	0	43,8	40,5	48,6	41,4	26,4
Export	0	0	0	0	37,2	36,2	35,4
Total Export	737,7	669,2	691,6	651,1	709	659,8	596,2
Sakhalin	3769,6	3816,5	3456,5	3552	3332,9	3356,3	3019,2

During the years of perestroika, the material and technical supply of coal mining enterprises in the Sakhalin Oblast deteriorated significantly. For example, in 1991, Sakhalinlesprom refused to supply 16,000 cubic meters of fastening timber to the Sakhalin Coal Association, preferring to take it abroad.

Having lost hope of improving the supply at the expense of state organizations, the employees of the association turned their attention to the numerous cooperatives that arose in the late 80s, which at that time began to take contracts for work for state organizations. It would seem that this circumstance should only be rejoiced. But, alas, many of the cooperators turned out to be extremely unscrupulous people. For example, in 1990, the Sakhalinugol association refused to pay more than two dozen cooperatives for work (more than 300 thousand rubles), defining these volumes as postscripts and deception. Moreover, only two cooperatives filed a complaint with arbitration, one of them withdrew his claim during the consideration of the case, and the second was denied it.

In 1985-1991 at the Sakhalin mines and open-pit mines, much attention continued to be paid to improving the level of safety. Already in 1986, all the mines of Sakhalinugol were equipped with automatic gas protection of the Methane complex, provided with the necessary amount of air, and the costs of implementing the measures of the comprehensive plan for improving working conditions and sanitary measures amounted to 7711,8 thousand rubles.

However, due to low labor and production discipline, gross violations of safety standards and requirements, and a low level of engineering safety in 1989, 12 accidents of categories I and II occurred at the enterprises of Sakhalinugol and 5 cases of fatal industrial injuries were registered.

The high accident rate of machines and mechanisms, untimely material and technical supply of faces, shortages of necessary materials caused significant downtime of workers. Thus, in 1985,

downtime at the mines of the association amounted to 10.6 percent, as a result of which 344.7 thousand tons of coal were lost. In 1990, 380,000 tons of coal were lost due to downtime. The required expenditure of working time in the mines amounted to 87.1 percent. At the open-pit mines, the loss of working time amounted to 21.8 percent, due to which 393.7 thousand cubic meters of rock mass were lost. The leadership of the association also called the reasons: problems with mechanisms, problems in transport, violation of labor discipline.

As a result, labor productivity in the production association has significantly decreased, as illustrated in the table below.

TABLE XLII

LABOR PRODUCTIVITY IN MINES AND OPEN-PIT MINES SAKHALINUGOL PRODUCTION ASSOCIATION IN 1985-1991

	1985		1986		1987		1988		1989		1990		1991	
Average monthly productivity of a mining worker	Plan	Fact	Plan	Fact	Plan	Fact	Plan	Fact	Plan	Fact	Plan	Fact	Plan	Fact
In mines (tons)	33,9	33,2	34,8	32,7	33,9	32,9	32,6	31,9	32,2	30,0	31,5	29,9	28,0	24,1
On open-pit mines (tons)	132,7	128,7	134,4	140,4	117,0	133,6	120,7	135,0	120,8	137,4	120,8	135,3	109,9	123,6
By merge	40,3	39,5	41,3	39,8	40,1	40,2	39,6	40,1	39,2	38,9	38,8	38,7	34,7	32,8
Production per 1 worker (in rubles)	7636	7714	7847	7868	7721	8011	7666	8216	7670	8218	7770	8042	11193	27712

According to the table, from 1985 to 1991 the average monthly labor productivity in the association decreased from 39.5 to 32.8 tons.

It must be said that since 1987, with the expansion of economic rights and independence of enterprises, strict control over the ratio of labor productivity growth and wages has been eliminated. And at many enterprises, wages have significantly outstripped the growth of production. As a result, cash incomes grew faster than the production of goods. So, after 1989, as a result of costly decisions taken by the Council of Ministers of the USSR after the miners' strikes of 1989, the level of miners' wages increased sharply - from 373 rubles / month. in 1989 to 451 rubles / month. in 1991. On Sakhalin, taking into account allowances and the district coefficient, the average monthly salary in the coal industry was even higher.

However, the social situation of workers in the island coal industry during the years of perestroika remained difficult. In 1986, the Minister of the Coal Industry of the USSR M.I. Shchadov paid a visit to Sakhalin. After driving through the coal-mining areas of the island, the minister, in his own words, "... I saw how far behind the social sphere was here." In 1987, he told reporters that the ministry would take measures to increase the volume of housing construction and social and cultural life. In the same year, a joint resolution was adopted by the bureau of the regional committee, the regional executive committee and the board of the Ministry of Coal Industry of the USSR, providing for the widespread development of the mining towns and villages of the island.

But the bright prospects for the development of settlements near the Sakhalin mines were available only on paper. Take, for example, the following fact: on January 28, 1987, the Sakhoblispolkom issued Resolution No. 27 "On the resettlement of citizens from dilapidated houses on the balance sheet of the Sakhalinugol Production Association in the city of Makarov." However, the Makarov District Executive Committee and the Sakhalinugol Association simply ignored this resolution. And where was the miners' families to relocate, if in 1986-1988 only 52,9 percent of the planned housing was built on Sakhalin. Meanwhile, it was necessary to relocate people urgently,

because at the end of the 80s, almost 20 percent of housing in the mining villages of Sakhalin was barracks or dilapidated houses.

During the years of perestroika in the mining settlements, as well as throughout the country, the supply of vegetables and fruits, goods of daily necessity deteriorated. The supply of medicines to health care institutions and their equipping with medical equipment was unsatisfactory. The overhaul of administrative and household plants at the Makarovskaya and Tikhmenevskaya mines was carried out at an extremely slow pace, the allocated investments were disbursed unsatisfactorily. The issues of water supply in the cities of Shakhtersk and Gornozavodsk, the villages of Shebunino, Sinegorsk, Vakhrushevo, Telnovsk, Boshnyakovo, etc., were slowly resolved.

Mine workers and employees were systematically employed on weekends and overtime, and in violation of article 63 of the Labor Code, workers were engaged in overtime work without the permission of the trade union. So, in March 1985, 120 people were involved in weekend work at the Yuzhno-Sakhalinskaya mine without the permission of the trade union. At the Gornozavodskaya mine, out of 20809 hours of overtime work performed in 1984, the trade union committee gave permission for only 1163 hours, which was less than 6 percent of the total.

It should be noted that overtime work was hidden from reporting, as a result of which statistical reporting on the use of working time was distorted, and payment for overtime work and for work on weekends was made in a single amount. For example, on February 24, 1985, driver Nozdrin worked 14 hours at the Dolinskaya mine, and bulldozer driver Khomenko worked 15 hours. In March 1985, the driver of the Miner's Construction Department, V.V. Kovalev, worked the whole month for 11-12 hours, seven days a week.

Issues of compliance with labor legislation regulating the use of labor of workers and employees under the age of 18 were unsatisfactorily resolved. Often they were hired without a medical examination, were involved in work on weekends, as well as overtime. For example, at the Uglegorskaya mine, teenagers V.F. Sviridov, V.A. Khagurov, Kim Im Sob were repeatedly involved in overtime work.

In the first years of perestroika, labor discipline was low, cases of concealment of absenteeism were allowed, and losses of working time increased. For example, in the first quarter of 1985, losses from absenteeism increased by 11 percent compared to the same period in 1984. In general, there was an increase in staff turnover in the association, which especially intensified in the late 80s and early 90s, as illustrated in the following table:

TABLE XLIII

MOVEMENT OF LABOR AT THE ENTERPRISES OF THE PRODUCTION ASSOCIATION "SAKHALINUGOL" IN 1985-1991

Year	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991
Arrived at work (people)	3167	2400	2677	2489	2218	3329	4145
Departure from the mines (people)	2775	2399	2463	2681	4150	3737	4146
Absenteeism (people)	2072	1532	1560	1508	1390	1780	1648
Man-days lost	8482	5142	4595	4558	4450	6568	6678

By the beginning of the 90s, the situation of workers in the Sakhalin coal industry was in many respects much worse than in other regions of the country. In May 1989, on the initiative of the workers of the Yuzhno-Sakhalinskaya, Dolinskaya, Telnovskaya, Shebunino and other mines, a number of demands were put forward to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the Council of Ministers of the USSR, the Ministry of the Coal Industry of the USSR and the Sakhalinugol association. The miners of a number of regions of the Soviet Union did the same. While Moscow officials were

discussing the documents received, the patience of the coal miners was coming to an end, and eventually they decided to take extreme measures ...

On the tenth of July 1989, a strike of miners of the Kuzbass coal basin began. Soon the strike was picked up by the miners of Vorkuta, Karaganda, Dnepropetrovsk, Rostov-on-Don ...

Although the workers of the coal mining enterprises of the Sakhalin Oblast did not take part in the strike, on July 24, 1989 they sent a telegram to the People's Deputies of the USSR Gaer, Kapustin, Zhdakaev, Guliy and the Minister of the Coal Industry of the USSR Shchadov with a list of the following demands:

1. Remove restrictions on the accrual of interest allowances and the district coefficient for earnings over 300 rubles.
2. Preserve the benefits of Sakhalin when paying pensions to pensioners living on the island.
3. To increase the output of workers in the coal industry of the Sakhalin region is similar to the miners of Kuzbass, without taking into account regional characteristics.
4. Pay for travel on vacation annually at actual costs.
5. To provide a real opportunity for cooperative housing construction on the mainland for persons who have worked on Sakhalin for more than 10 years or to receive a state apartment there upon reaching retirement age.

To stabilize the situation, the party and state authorities of the USSR decided to make concessions to the miners. On July 17 and 18, 1989, a number of decisions of the Council of Ministers of the USSR were adopted, which assumed:

1. Provide coal enterprises with economic and legal independence.
2. Grant the right, from August 1, 1989, to sell products manufactured in excess of the concluded contracts at negotiated prices both domestically and abroad.
3. To instruct the State Committee for Prices and the Ministry of Coal Industry of the USSR to provide for an increase in coal prices in accordance with actual costs in the draft on the reform of wholesale prices.
4. Since August 1, 1989, coal industry enterprises have independently established production rates, prices and service standards.
5. To introduce from July 1, 1989 for workers in the coal industry payment for night and evening shifts, respectively, 40 and 20 percent of the hourly tariff rate (salary).
6. Not later than the second quarter of 1990, establish a single day off - Sunday.
7. Payment of employees for the time of moving them through the mine from the shaft to the place of work and back is set in the amount of the tariff rate (salary).
8. Recommend at the expense of the material incentive fund to pay lump-sum benefits, establish additional leaves, etc.
9. Review and shorten all current safety instructions, etc.

However, many of these "good intentions" were advisory in nature and, ultimately, were never implemented.

Although in 1989 the miners of the island refrained from strikes, but on July 11, 1990, the first strike of the miners of Sakhalin took place. As a result of its implementation, the losses amounted to: 9693 tons of coal, 145 thousand rubles of wages, 112.7 thousand rubles of profit, FES, FPM, FSR - 58.6 thousand rubles.

On March 26, 1991, on the eve of the famous April Fool's "Pavlovsk" reform, workers in the region's coal industry held another strike, putting forward the following demands:

1. To negotiate with the government of the USSR on the conclusion of a general model agreement for employees of mining enterprises of the USSR.
2. Adopt a law on the indexation of wages in accordance with price increases.
3. Reduce the taxation of corporate profits to 20 percent.

4. Leave the income tax at 13 percent.
5. Abolish the 5 percent sales tax.

Thus, the strike movement of Soviet miners testified that the situation in the national economy of the USSR during the years of perestroika worsened, the standard of living of the population decreased. By 1989, the rate of production growth had reached zero, marking a 10 percent decline in the first half of 1991.

At the XXVIII Congress of the CPSU, held in July 1990, the causes of the crisis in the Soviet economy were named: "the alienation of the worker from property and management, the psychology of egalitarianism and dependency, monopolism and the lack of market evaluation of labor results ...".

It should be borne in mind that the strikes of the country's miners at that time provoked the call of B.N. Yeltsin "Take as much power as you take away, as much as you need." In the same period, the Government of the RSFSR did not come up with anything better than to increase the tariffs (consider the salary) of miners in Russia by 10 times without being linked to labor productivity. To the great joy of the miners, but, as it turned out later, to the catastrophic consequences for the entire Ministry of Coal Industry of the RSFSR.

At the Sakhalin mines, local pseudo-democrats practically paralyzed the management of enterprises by engineering and technical workers. By voting on business trips of mines, their new directors were elected, the size of key economic indicators was determined - production rates, service standards.

Thus, by the beginning of the 90s, as a result of a powerful strike movement of miners and concessions from the Russian Government in the form of an increase in the duration of vacations, the abolition of production standards and the introduction of social benefits to miners, all technical and economic indicators of the work of coal enterprises sharply decreased.

CHAPTER SEVEN

RESTRUCTURING OF THE SAKHALIN COAL INDUSTRY - MYTHS AND REALITY.

The famous events of August 1991 served as an impetus for the long-standing crisis in relations between the "fraternal" republics that were part of the USSR. In December 1991, the Soviet Union was liquidated, and on its basis the Commonwealth of Independent States was formed. With the collapse of the USSR, economic ties between enterprises of the former Soviet republics were broken. The Russian coal industry was especially painfully survived by the "departure" of Ukraine and Kazakhstan: the main coal engineering plants were lost.

Changes in the administrative and political structure led to changes in the economic development of Russia. Analysis conducted by V.V. Popov on the state of the Russian economy in 1992-1994 allows us to judge that during this period the economy of Russia, like other CIS countries, was in a worse condition than most countries of Eastern Europe and the Baltic States, not to mention China. Russia's reforms have followed a "third path" that is distinct from both shock therapy and China's gradual transition. Instant (rather than gradual) price liberalization, introduction of convertibility of the national currency, attempts at rapid structural reforms (privatization) and, of course, a democratic political regime - all this makes Russian reforms related to the Eastern European and Baltic models, while the persistence of low prices for fuel and energy, open and hidden subsidies for many enterprises and entire industries, low unemployment allow us to draw parallels with China.

The costs of Russia's "third way" turned out to be very high - the decline in production in Russia turned out to be much higher than in China and in most countries of Eastern Europe and the Baltic states. While in the countries of Eastern Europe, which most consistently carried out radical reforms, the decline in production lasted 2-3 years and amounted to 25-30% per year, in Russia, as the analysis shows, the volume of industrial output for 2 years (from 1992 to 1994) decreased by 70%. The share of unprofitable enterprises in industry in 1994 was 21%, having increased by 3 times compared to the level of 1992.

At the beginning of the 90s, the transition to a market economy began in the coal industry of Russia. The objective reasons for this were the extremely cumbersome structure of production associations and their low economic efficiency. By this time, the situation in the country's coal industry was already catastrophic: more than half of the mines had a service life of more than 40 years and only 18 mines had a service life of up to 20 years; 109 mines (46 per cent) had not been reconstructed for a long time; the mine fund was dominated by enterprises of small capacity - more than half of them by 600 or less thousand tons per year; Two-thirds of the mines were classified as hazardous for gas and coal dust, every second - for spontaneous combustion of coal.

By the Decree of the Government of the USSR of February 28, 1991, the Ministry of Fuel and Energy of the Russian Federation was formed, in the structure of which there was a management body for the coal industry - the Committee, and then the Department of the Coal Industry. On June 12, 1991, the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR adopted the Law *"On the Privatization of State and Municipal Enterprises in the Russian Federation"*, according to which the first enterprises were corporatized in the coal industry: 6 mines, 3 open-pit mines, one processing plant and 2 machine-building plants.

On October 11, 1991, the Decree of the Council of Ministers of the RSFSR No. 528 "*On the formation of the Russian State Corporation of the Coal Industry"* was adopted. The corporation "Coal of Russia" includes 90 associations, enterprises and organizations. At the first constituent

meeting, **Valery Evgenievich Zaidenvarg** was elected Chairman of the Board of the Coal of Russia Corporation. The Russian State Corporation of the Coal Industry "Coal of Russia" became the legal successor of the Ministry of Coal Industry of the USSR. The activities of the Ministry of Coal Industry of the USSR ended in November 1991.

On November 28, 1991, the Decree of the President of the RSFSR No. 242 *"On the Reorganization of the Central Bodies of State Administration of the RSFSR"* was issued, in accordance with which the Ministry of Fuel and Energy of the Russian Federation was formed. Anatoly **Fedorovich Dyakov** was appointed the first Minister.

On December 3, 1991, for the first time in the history of Russia, the Sectoral Tariff Agreement on the Coal Industry was concluded between Rosuglesoyuz, the Ministry of Fuel and Energy of the Russian Federation and the Government of the RSFSR. On the same day, the Decree of the President of the RSFSR No. 297 "*On Measures to Liberalize Prices"* (from January 2, 1992) was adopted.

In 1992, Russia began to introduce a liberal-monetarist model of market reform, which was implemented for a number of years. The liberal-monetarist model proceeds from the fact that the formation of the market is a spontaneous process: it is necessary to liberalize the economy, and the relations of its subjects will begin to be effectively regulatedunder the influence of the "invisible hand of the market". Therefore, the emphasis is on deregulation, the removal of restrictions on the use of market mechanisms inherent in the state-owned (centrally controlled and planned and distributive) economy is emphasized. The priority task is considered to be financial stabilization achieved by restrictive monetary and financial (in terms of public spending) policies in order to reduce the money supply (effective demand). The economic role of the state is minimized both in relation to the sphere of economic management (especially at the micro level) and in terms of owning ownership of the means of production, in connection with which mass privatization is accelerated. To ensure a deficit-free state budget and Countering inflation is sharply reduced, and then all forms of budget support for enterprises are eliminated. Relations in the economy are built on the principle of natural selection: the death of the weak is good, because it clears the field of action for those who have successfully adapted to the conditions of themarket.

However, the first years of reforms showed that the reformers' hopes for a self-organizing beginning of any market turned out to be, at least, an exaggeration. The coal industry, the typical brainchild of the old system, reacted particularly hard to the changes. Designed to work in completely different conditions, when coal was the bread of industry (and bread was always dated), it simply could not be effective in the new conditions. The management of coal mining enterprises, accustomed to constant state replenishment, was not ready, and did not seek to switch to market rails.

The liberalization of prices in the Russian economy, carried out in early 1992, did not affect coal prices, which continued to be regulated by the state. At the same time, the cost of mining and transporting coal has increased sharply due to the liberalization of prices for industrial and technical products, rising prices for material and technical resources, electricity and railway tariffs. In the industry, there were wholesale prices for coal, at which buyers paid, and estimated prices, which were set by coal enterprises at the level of costs, taking into account the rate of profitability and paid from consumer funds in the amount of the wholesale price and from budget subsidies.

Thus, a situation arose when consumers received cheap coal, at stable state prices, and prices for industrial and technical products consumed by coal miners increased tenfold, for individual materials - hundreds of times. In this regard, the unprofitability of the industry increased sharply and was increasingly not covered by subsidies from the federal budget. By the end of the first half of 1993, on average, about 23 percent of the cost of its production was covered by consumers, and about 77 percent by budget subsidies. In 1993, the subsidized burden of the coal industry from the federal budget amounted to 1.4 percent of GDP, or more than 5 percent of all budget expenditures.

The presence of such a large-scale burden lying on the shoulders of the state threatened not only the coal industry, but also the state of the Russian economy as a whole.

On February 11, 1993, the State Committee of the Russian Federation for State Property Management issued a decree *"On the Establishment of the State Enterprise* Russian Coal Company". The same order approved the Charter of the State Enterprise - the Russian Coal Company (SE Rosugol), the functions of which were transferred to the commercial management of federally owned blocks of shares of joint-stock companies. By order of the Council On March 15, 1993, **Yuri Nikolaevich Malyshev** was appointed General Director of the State Enterprise "Rosugol". The company's management includes well-known scientists and experienced production workers: Zaydenvarg V.E., Salamatin A.G., Yanovsky A.B., Nikishichev B.G. and others.

In July 1993, the Government abolished state control over coal prices. It was a decisive step, which in those conditions hardly had an alternative. However, there was no genuine transition to market mechanisms for setting prices for coal products and free competition in the coal industry.

The transition to free prices for six months increased the debt of coal consumers by 7 times, and the growth of railway tariffs for the same time tripled the debts of coal miners to railway workers. The continued outstripping growth in prices for the material and technical resources consumed by the industry with a decrease in effective demand for coal products led to an increase in negative trends - a decrease in the amount of funds invested in the development of coal enterprises, and then to delays in the payment of wages.

As a result, the number of unprofitable enterprises in the country's coal industry has increased by more than 2 times. (See table).

TABLE XLIV

THE SHARE OF UNPROFITABLE ENTERPRISES BY INDUSTRY IN RUSSIA

(as a percentage of the total number of enterprises)

Branch	**1992**	**1993**	**1994**	**1995**	**1996**
Electricity	6,6	5,2	7,5	13,6	20,9
Fuel	14,1	21,0	34,9	32,1	38,8
Oil	8,0	10,4	15,8	24,5	18,7
Oil refining	-	-	2,7	1,9	13,7
Gas	17,9	27,6	30,8	10,7	13,3
Coal	***20,8***	***30,5***	***49,4***	***44,9***	***53,9***
Metallurgy	2,8	2,2	9,6	13,0	31,0
Non-ferrous metallurgy	3,6	6,6	22,8	35,5	65,4
Chemical & Petrochemical	2,2	2,5	12,9	16,3	38,4
Mechanical Engineering and Metalworking	4,9	5,2	20,6	24,5	40,4
Forestry, woodworking And pulp and paper	5,1	11,4	36,0	38,0	65,1
Building materials industry	10,4	9,2	24,0	27,3	46,5
Easy	12,8	12,3	30,5	41,9	60,5
Food	5,6	5,8	17,3	19,2	37,8
In general, the industry	7,2	7,8	22,6	26,4	43,5

As a result, social tensions in the coal regions have worsened. At the same time, coal capacities continued to be maintained, as well as the number of workers, and coal production declined. The utilization of production capacities amounted to 60-70 percent, which accordingly required additional funds to maintain them, since fixed costs remained at the same level.

Thus, for the coal mining enterprises of the Sakhalin Oblast there was a decrease in production capacity from 4.4 million tons in 1992 to 3.0 million tons in 1997.

XLV TABLE

USE OF PRODUCTION CAPACITIES FOR COAL MINING ENTERPRISES OF THE SAKHALIN REGION (in percentage)

Years	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
Coal mines	89,7	74	94	94	69,9	69,8	62,2	50,9	44
Sections	100	100	105	105	100	78,4	78,8	75,7	67,3
Coal	78,3	65,8	93,6	92	60,1	61,7	55,4	35,2	26,1
Brown coal	100	87,5	94,7	95	82,2	71,5	70,1	74,4	69,2
Coal processing at processing plants	91,7	81,2	83,1	61,7	71,7	60,1	58,9	42,9	42,4

Accordingly, coal production also decreased: from 4.5 million tons in 1992 to 2.3 million tons in 1998 (See Appendix No. 10).

It should be noted that by the beginning of the 90s the coal industry of Sakhalin was the most backward and unprofitable. Difficult mining and geological conditions determined the high injury rate and high unit costs for coal mining. Most of the mines were characterized by significant physical and moral depreciation of fixed assets, which led to a decline in production, a reduction in production, and a crisis state of most coal mining enterprises. The remaining funds at the disposal of enterprises were insufficient for reconstruction and technical re-equipment, as a result of which the renewal rate of fixed assets was only 5.9 percent. It is quite natural that market reforms finally "knocked down" the Sakhalin coal miners.

After the "liberalization of prices" in 1992, the balance sheet profit of the Sakhalinugol production association decreased by 66% from the level of 1991. As a result of inflation and the Government's tough financial policy, which led to the complete loss of Sakhalinugol's own working capital and large amounts of mutual non-payments, the financial situation of the association became critical by 1994. In 1993, the association's debts amounted to 32.6 billion rubles. This debt was caused by the systematically untimely transfer of subsidies for coal by the Ministry of Fuel and Energy, as well as the large debts of consumers to pay for coal products. As of January 1, 1994, Sakhalinugol received less than 15 billion rubles, of which 8 billion from consumers and 7 billion from the subsidy budget.

Previously, the coal industry received several types of subsidies from the state budget: from centralized financing of capital construction to repayment of the difference between the cost and the real price of coal. In the mid-90s, the principles of state support remained the same, but only the amount of funding decreased from year to year. The volume of state subsidies to the coal industry of Sakhalin is illustrated in the table below:

TABLE XLVI

State subsidies to enterprises of Sakhalinugol for 1993-1998

Year	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
The amount of the state subsidy (in thousands of $)	55,9	65,2	32,3	33,5	13,9	3,3

Under these conditions, solutions were required to ensure the survival of the coal industry. The need for urgent measures of a national nature to resolve the situation in the coal industry by 1993 became quite obvious. However, the essence of the market completely excluded the possibility of using the methods of command-administrative economy. The task of the Government was further complicated by the fact that, in addition to carrying out serious economic reforms, it was necessary to rebuild the psychology of both coal managers, who were not prepared for the most part to work in market conditions, and workers in mines and open-pit mines, who could receive even a minimum wage only from the funds they earned from the sale of coal. And yet, despite numerous problems and difficulties, it was necessary to begin restructuring the country's coal industry.

Restructuring is the reform of the coal industry, its transfer to the rails of a market economy. It was necessary to solve several extremely complex tasks at the same time: to close dangerous and unprofitable mines, to re-equip promising ones with modern technology, to begin construction of new coal mining enterprises that are not inferior to the best world standards. At the same time, it was necessary to bring the social sphere of the coal regions out of the crisis and avoid mass unemployment among miners. It was also necessary to drastically reduce all non-core industries in the industry, corporatize and prepare territorial coal mining associations for work in market conditions. All this required very large funds, a clear legislative framework and coordination of actions of federal, regional and sectoral bodies. It was necessary to solve a serious problem in the development of domestic coal engineering, since more than 60% of all its capacities remained in Ukraine and Kazakhstan.

It must be said that almost all countries traditionally engaged in coal mining have gone through the restructuring of their coal industries. The need to restructure the coal industry in the main coal-mining countries of the world arose in the early 60s due to the increase in oil and gas production, as well as electricity generation at nuclear power plants and the increasing competition of these types of energy resources in relation to coal. The demand for coal began to decline steadily. The turning point for the coal industries of Western Europe was 1958, when structural changes in energy consumption coincided with a decline in overall business activity in these states. This gave rise to the coal crisis - the share of coal in the energy sector of these countries decreased significantly: in 1950 it was 80, and in 1958 - 65 percent.

In each country, restructuring had its own characteristics, but several main common features can be distinguished: privatization of individual enterprises capable of producing competitive market products in favorable market conditions; creation of powerful profitable industries with high labor productivity; gradual and planned reduction in the number of inefficient mines and open-pit mines with the solution of economic and social problems.

The Netherlands and Belgium were the first to begin restructuring their coal industries. As a result, the process of structural adjustment led to the complete curtailment of coal mining in the Netherlands, where it ceased in 1974. Belgium fully implemented the coal mining cessation program in 1992.

The restructuring of the coal industry in Great Britain, Germany, France and other EEC countries, carried out in the 1980s and 1990s, reduced subsidies from the state budgets, increased production capacity, and increased the economic efficiency of coal mining. The restructuring made it possible to increase production efficiency, increase labor productivity, and abandon state support.

Almost all over the world, the restructuring of the coal industry was carried out with the active participation of the state. The state in the United States was the least involved in the process of restructuring the coal industry. This was due to the traditionally low degree of involvement of the

state in solving social problems in private enterprises and, at the same time, the equally traditionally high territorial and professional mobility of the population. The situation is different in Western Europe. There, the state took serious measures of a social nature. The process of closing coal enterprises and reducing the number of employees in Western European countries was subsidized from state budgets. Such subsidies have been provided for more than 30 years and have been mainly aimed at social protection of redundant workers, the creation of new jobs for the employment of redundant miners and other workers, and the solution of technical and environmental problems associated with the liquidation of unprofitable coal enterprises.

So, in England, dismissed miners were paid such benefits that allowed them not to work for a long time. The state allocated preferential loans to those entrepreneurs who created new industries in the mining areas. As a result, if initially the unemployment rate in these regions was two-thirds higher than the national average, then later it fell sharply and is now almost the same as in the UK as a whole. Personal initiative was strongly encouraged. Social organizations helped in finding a job, but if the miner himself found a new place and applied for resignation from an unprofitable mine, he was paid a lump sum allowance equal to his annual salary (12 thousand pounds). On average, the state spent $20,000 per miner.

In Germany, a different tactic was chosen - there traditional mines and miners working on them were given the opportunity to "live out in the reserve" - by allocating very substantial state subsidies to maintain the "status quo" in existing coal mines until the majority of the miners employed there retire. France began to develop non-traditional industries in the coal regions. One example is the Blanci Coal District. Ten years ago, mines and open-pit mines worked there. Now the mines are closed, the structures on the surface are completely eliminated. There is a lake on the site of a closed open-pit mine, and a park on the site of a former mining village. One incision works; Those who will reach retirement age in 2000-2005 work there, after which it will also be closed. In the new industrial zone there is a hosiery and furniture factory, factories of office furniture, air conditioners, prefabricated houses, cardboard boxes, telephones and telephone exchanges, plastics, compressed air containers, and a commercial center. Blancy is one of the few districts in France where the number of jobs exceeds the number of workers.

In the German state of Hesse, on the site of old coal mines and waste heaps, a huge recreation area was created - clean lakes with beaches and fishing, parks, and a whole entertainment industry. People go there to rest from neighboring Belgium, Holland and France. Fairy tale? No. Just a reasonable state approach to the problem of restructuring the coal industry.

One way or another, the global trend towards reforming the coal industry was clearly identified already in the middle of the century - even in those countries where coal production did not decrease (in the USA it increased from 370 to 850 million tons of coal), employment in the coal industry fell radically (in the USA it fell from 230 to 130 thousand people, in France - from 320 to 16 thousand people, in England, from 500,000 to 63,000, in Germany, from 400,000 to 100,000, etc.). (See Appendix No. 11).

Focusing on the experience of Western countries, in 1993 Russia developed and began to implement a program of socio-economic development and restructuring of coal-mining areas. Its main goal was to ensure the stability of the coal industry and increase its efficiency, to ensure social protection of dismissed workers and residents of settlements of liquidated city-forming mines and open-pit mines, to create favorable conditions for the self-development of coal mining enterprises, to form their competitiveness, to improve working conditions and safety in the coal industry, socio-economic and environmental improvement of coal mining regions.

The main principles of restructuring were as follows:

- free prices for coal and coal products;
- selective state support for mines and open-pit mines;
- corporatization of coal industry enterprises;
- transformation of former production associations into profitable joint-stock companies.

A distinctive feature of the government's restructuring program was the inclusion in the reform plan of measures for the social protection of residents of coal regions. The government assumed all obligations to ensure the payment of wage arrears to all dismissed miners, additional pensions for miners, and provision of former coal miners with ration coal. In addition, the program included the creation of new jobs, professional retraining of miners and assistance in their resettlement from those regions where it is impractical to create jobs. Thus, under the restructuring program, miners released when mines closed received far more benefits than workers in any other industry.

If the main stages of the restructuring of the coal industry in Western Europe lasted for 30-35 years, then in Russia it was planned to carry out this work in 12-15 years. As conceived by the developers, the restructuring of the industry was to include three stages:

Stage 1 - reorganization (1993-1996) - implementation of anti-crisis measures, restructuring of the industry and its adaptation to market demand for coal, closure of especially unprofitable mines and open-pit mines.

Stage 2 - transitional (1997-2000) - completion of structural reforms, commissioning of legislative and economic mechanisms for adapting the Russian coal industry to world economic relations and creation of conditions for qualitative renewal of the industry on the basis of investment target programs.

Stage 3 - final (after 2000) - increasing production capacity, ensuring the stable operation of the coal industry, deep processing of coal, introduction of new technologies.

The restructuring began with the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of December 30, 1992 "On Transformation into Joint-Stock Companies and Privatization of Associations, Enterprises and Organizations of the Coal Industry" and the Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation of July 27, 1993 No. 727 "On Measures of State Support for Coal Industry Enterprises and the Excise Tax Rate on Coal".

The most important goal of the restructuring was to create a competitive environment for private profitable coal companies capable of self-development in the long term. In this regard, the privatization of coal companies is the core process that constitutes the content of the restructuring. However, privatization was not a political postulate. It was needed to involve strategic investors in management and attract investment in the development of coal companies. The projected growth in demand for coal in the future should have been provided not by the efforts of the Government and the allocation of budget investments in the coal industry, but by coal companies mainly at the expense of non-state investments. The emergence of a real owner in the coal industry was automatically supposed to solve several problems at once: attracting serious private investment to the industry, creating a competitive environment in the coal market.

Therefore, at the first stage of restructuring, corporatization of coal enterprises was carried out, and then the process of privatization began - the sale of federal blocks of shares. In 1994, coal mining enterprises and production associations, as well as coal engineering plants and mine-building plants were corporatized. At the same time, controlling stakes in coal mining enterprises were fixed in federal ownership for three years.

The changes also affected the Sakhalin Region. On June 17, 1994, the Sakhalinugol Production Association was officially transformed into a joint-stock company. 65 percent of its shares became federal property, 25 percent was distributed among employees, and 10 percent was put up for sale.

In the mid-90s, the privatization process was in full swing. By 1998, the predominant forms of ownership of coal enterprises on Sakhalin were mixed and private, which accounted for 48.1 and 51.3 percent of production, respectively. The share of municipal enterprises accounted for only 0.6 percent. Detailed data on the number of coal enterprises and their forms of ownership are given in the table:

TABLE XLVII

NUMBER OF ENTERPRISES BY FORM OF OWNERSHIP BY DISTRICTS OF THE SAKHALIN REGION (1998).

Areas	Number of enterprises	Forms of ownership		
		Municipal	Mixed	Private
Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk	2	–	1	1
Aleksandrovsk-Sakhalinsky	5	1	4	–
Makarovsky	2	1	–	1
Smirnykhovsky	1	–	1	–
Poronaisky	3	–	3	–
Tymovsky	1	–	1	–
Dolinsky	2	–	1	1
Nevelsky	4	–	2	2
Tomarinsky	3	1	2	–
Uglegorsky	12	–	6	6
Korsakovsky	1	–	–	1
Total in the region	36	3	21	12

Another important goal of the first period of restructuring was to rid the coal industry of particularly unprofitable mines and open-pit mines, non-core industries, namely auxiliary enterprises serving the main production (including motor transport, repair and mechanical, construction and other enterprises), social facilities (residential buildings, boiler houses and heating networks, preschool institutions, trade enterprises, canteens, other catering facilities, health centers and other medical institutions, dispensaries, recreation centers, sports complexes, houses of culture, clubs, pioneer camps, dormitories, subsidiary farms).

In accordance with the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 1702 of December 30, 1992 "On the transformation into joint-stock companies and privatization of associations, enterprises and organizations of the coal industry", the housing stock, housing maintenance and repair and construction enterprises for its maintenance, as well as engineering infrastructure facilities that are on the balance sheet of the transformed production associations and enterprises, were subject to transfer to municipal ownership. However, the process In the period 1993-1995, the transfer of housing stock and social and cultural facilities from associations and enterprises of the coal industry was very slow: many heads of administrations of territories, regions, cities and districts refused to accept housing stock and socio-cultural and communal facilities into municipal ownership, citing the lack of funds for their maintenance. For example, in 1996, the federal government to support the social sphere of coal enterprises in the Poronay district, out of 1 billion 154 thousand rubles. was allocated only 700 million rubles. And yet in the second half of the 90s, the transfer of housing stock from the balance of coal enterprises to the jurisdiction of local authorities was completed, thereby coal enterprises were freed from their unusual functions and expenses.

Thus, in 1993-1996 the coal industry was shaken by the most painful stage of restructuring. During this period, coal mining at 134 Russian coal enterprises was stopped. The closure of these unprofitable industries made it possible to allocate large funds to support the healthy core of the Russian coal industry.

However, the process of adaptation of coal enterprises to the market turned out to be more difficult than previously thought. Many factors had an impact: the lack of experience of managers in the new economic conditions, the lack of understanding by shareholders of their rights and obligations, the expectation of government subsidies and immediate large investments. In addition, the crisis in the country's economy, the disruption of old economic mechanisms, a decrease in the

need for coal, especially in metallurgy due to the conversion of the military industry, led to a significant decrease in demand for coal and, accordingly, a drop in production.

For general economic and legal reasons, large private investors were in no hurry to invest in the Russian coal industry, and the state funds necessary for the restructuring were allocated in an extremely insufficient amount and irregularly.

The main troubles of the Sakhalin miners began in the spring of 1993, when, trying to prevent the outflow of personnel, the management of Sakhalinugol decided to deviate from tariff rates, raise wages without real reinforcement of money. Even then, it was clear that even if the plan was mandatory, a delay in the payment of wages by an average of 2.5 months was inevitable. But the production plan was not fulfilled everywhere. For example, at the Lermontov open-pit mine, wage rates were increased by 40 percent, while the plan for coal mining was fulfilled by only 70 percent. As a result, in 1994 the overrun of the wage fund for the association amounted to more than 15 billion rubles, and in 1995 - 60 billion rubles. In 1995 alone, the balance sheet losses of Sakhalinugol JSC amounted to 101,9 billion rubles.

Not receiving deliberately inflated wages on time, the miners began to work worse. In 1994, the labor productivity of Sakhalin miners fell by 40 percent compared to the level of 1990.

Table XLVIII

LABOR PRODUCTIVITY (AVERAGE) IN THE MINES OF SAKHALIN IN RELATION TO 1991.

Year	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
performance	100%	101	94	68	74,4	87,5	93,7	161,2

As a result, coal production decreased from 4157 thousand tons in 1993 to 2847 thousand tons in 1994, which further widened the gap between real and accrued incomes. As a result, less money was spent on the purchase of materials and equipment, the development of production. In general, in 1994, the delay in wages for Sakhalinugol was 4 months. There was only one way out of the impasse - the maximum possible reduction in the cost of coal. But this option was not used either. The absurdity of the situation also lay in the fact that, receiving their "big" salary in a few months, the miners had significantly smaller amounts due to inflation.

By 1995, most of the mines of Sakhalinugol had sharply reduced the number of workers in the main specialties (tunneling and bottomhole groups). For example, at the Shebunino mine, the payroll of workers at the stope was 89 people, and only 23 came to work. Many workers were forced to work in auxiliary areas. Although the work there was easier, and there was less control, the wages were lower. This led to a significant reduction in production volumes, as well as to an increase in production costs, since the number of auxiliary workers remained the same. However, none of the directors took steps to reduce the number of surface workers.

This situation has greatly complicated the financial situation of the industry. Therefore, in the spring of 1995, the management of Sakhalinugol decided to stop the work of unprofitable mines for the summer period, leaving one stope on them. Most of the workers were placed on leave without pay. However, this half-measure did not solve the problem, but only drove it deeper.

By the mid-90s, the situation began to deteriorate rapidly, which manifested itself in an avalanche-like increase in the number of cases of non-payment of wages. Months of delays in the payment of earned money caused a massive strike movement among workers in the coal industry. Here are just some excerpts from the "strike epic" of the Sakhalin miners.

On November 1, 1994, the first shift at the Mgachi mine did not go down to the face, the shipment of coal from the Lermontovsky mine was stopped. There was only one demand of the miners - the payment of wages.

On November 22, 1994, Governor E.A. Krasnoyarov held a meeting with representatives from the staff of coal enterprises, where he stated that an extraordinary commission was being created in the region to bring the coal industry out of the crisis. It was planned to develop a schedule of settlements with each mine, for which the administration intended to take bank loans. In turn, the miners offered the regional administration to pay them by December 1. Otherwise, they threatened to go on strike indefinitely. Money They were found, but stability in the coal industry never came.

On April 3, 1995, 48 miners of the Gornozavodskaya mine, having worked a shift, refused to rise to the surface, demanding immediate repayment of wage arrears starting in December 1994.

On April 26, 1995 , representatives of miners' collectives picketed the building of the regional administration, putting forward demands: to collect debts, pay salaries, stop importing coal from outside the region.

May 1995 32 miners of the Telnovskaya mine went down to the face and went on a hunger strike, which lasted more than 7 days. Overgrown, with sunken eyes, a week existing on sweet tea and vitamins, these people made a depressing impression on eyewitnesses.

August 7, 1995 The strike of the miners of Boshnyakovo began. 28 people from among the workers of the II and III shifts refused to rise to the surface, demanding immediate repayment of wage arrears for April-July.

On September 12, 1995, the mines and open-pit mines of Sakhalinugol JSC stopped shipping coal to consumers, demanding the repayment of wage arrears. Once again, a protocol of mutual agreements was signed between the miners and the regional administration, according to which the administration pledged to transfer 20 billion rubles to the miners by September 20. on the debts of Sakhalinenergo.

In total, in 1995, Sakhalin miners held 8 strikes, which had an extremely negative impact on the main activities of the Sakhalinugol joint-stock company.

The peak of strikes occurred in 1996 - they were recorded at 23 mines in the region. 8.6 thousand people were involved in them, and the loss of working time amounted to 30929 man-days. In 1997, strikes were held at 8 mines, with a decrease in the number of participants to 2.5 thousand. However, the loss of working time increased by 15133 man-days, that is, the strikes were longer. Thus, 637 people of the Uglegorskaya mine, having started a strike in the first decade of April, completed it in mid-June.

Thus, increased wages, debts of power engineers, the crisis of non-payments were the sum of factors as a result of which miners had to receive their hard-earned money every month "with a fight". The issuance of wages at many enterprises of the region began to be equated with a great holiday. And the great event, as it should be according to the Russian tradition, it is customary to wash properly. T. Belousova, who visited the Mgachi mine in August 1995, describes the passions that broke out after receiving the money:

"*Just a few hours ago, the quiet, seemingly sleeping Mgacha "highways" suddenly revived, filled with walking men of various degrees of intoxication. Someone could no longer move independently and hung like a dead whip on the hands of more persistent drinking companions, someone in a drunken rage rushed along the broken road on a motorcycle ...*

At night, the 3rd and 4th shifts walked underground. The next day the bacchanalia continued. The worker, distraught from drinking, ran, shaking his fists, through the administrative offices in search of the chief engineer ... Drunken women roamed the streets of the village, in some places on the roadsides, the most unpretentious revelers who did not find the strength to reach their native doors inspected their last dreams ...

As a result, labor and technological discipline fell, which was simply unacceptable for the especially dangerous conditions of the Sakhalin mines. So, in 1994, 2 people died at Sakhalin coal enterprises, in 1995 - 4. At the same time, a sharp decline in coal production led to a reduction in the number of accidents. If in 1994 there were 9 accidents at the island's coal mining enterprises, then in 1995 there were only 3.

It should be borne in mind that not all miners spent their earnings on drinking. For example, the workers of the Novikovsky open-pit mine, having received the money, decided to use it not to pay wages, but to ... Technique. As a result, the quarry managed to purchase 4 heavy-duty BelAZ trucks.

The management of the joint-stock company tried to overcome the crisis of non-payments in several ways. One of them was the sale of coal abroad. A lot of coal was ordered by Kamchatka and Magadan, with which the JSC worked on a prepaid basis. Moreover, these consumers, unlike Sakhalin residents, paid coal miners on time.

Another way was to obtain investment for the development of coal enterprises. In the mid-90s, negotiations were held with the Australian group Burns on the creation of a joint venture Interugol at the Mgachi mine. The essence of the project was the construction of an enrichment module for the production of coal, competitive in the world market. Both sides - Australian and Russian - were to have equal shares of ownership. Washed coal was planned to be sold to Japan. Unfortunately, the flooding and subsequent closure of the Mgachi mine made further negotiations on this issue meaningless.

In the mid-90s, the cost of extracted fuel increased sharply at the enterprises of Sakhalinugol. For example, in September 1994, the cost of coal at the Gornozavodskaya mine was one of the highest in the region - about 800 thousand rubles per ton. At the same time, the wholesale selling price was about 200 thousand rubles per ton. As a result, each mined ton brought the company 600 thousand rubles of direct losses. Only for 9 months of 1994, this mine brought the joint-stock company 10 billion rubles in losses.

The increase in the cost of coal was reflected in energy tariffs, which was one of the factors behind the increase in the cost of production of local industry, which became uncompetitive in the world and domestic markets, which in turn caused a reduction in budget revenues.

On March 29, 1995, at an interdepartmental commission in Moscow, it was decided to close the Telnovskaya mine, and a little later a similar decision was made in relation to another Sakhalin mine, Tikhmenevskaya. But these enterprises were city-forming: in addition to miners, workers of non-core industries lived in the villages of Telnovsk and Tikhmenevo, who, like miners, remained out of work after the closure of the mines. In this regard, the question arose: what to do with the residents? Initially, it was planned to relocate all the inhabitants of these villages to other parts of the island. However, the proposal of the employees of Sakhalinugol to include social protection of all workers in the village of Telnovsky in the expenditure part of the project, Rosugol officials categorically rejected, stating that they would deal exclusively with the resettlement of miners' families. As a result, a big trouble came to 242 families of residents of the village, who did not belong to the workers of the mine. They, in fact, were doomed to slow extinction, because neither federal nor local authorities allocated funds for their resettlement. However, it was not so easy for the families of the miners to leave. When the mines were closed, Russian legislation provided for the provision of housing for persons of retirement age and those with 10 years of underground work experience. According to the departmental provision of Rosugol, people who lived in dilapidated housing were also resettled, but the population of the private sector did not fall under the resettlement. For example, in Telnovsk, 43 families lived in the private sector, almost all of them had worked in the mine all their lives.

In the end, the residents of the village of Telnovsky, out of patience, appealed to the regional authorities with an open letter:

"In connection with the liquidation of the Telnovskaya mine in 1995, conditions for existence were created in the village. There is no drinking water, no ambulance, no pharmacy, no communications, no transport. There is no fuel. The district administration is not able to maintain the village ...

It must be said that in the mid-90s, many economists noted that the Federal Program for the Restructuring of the Coal Mining Industry, being transferred to the Sakhalin soil, was not fully

implemented and one-sidedly, with a focus on the interests of the monopoly structure of Sakhalinugol JSC. In this regard, the federal budget funds allocated for the diversification of the socio-economic infrastructure of settlements that have arisen on the site of now unprofitable mines were not used for their intended purpose, which led to the extinction of mining villages, which was in no way justified either from an economic or demographic point of view.

Numerous "mistakes" made in the course of restructuring activities in 1993-1995 forced the regional authorities in October 1996 to adopt the Regional Program for the Socio-Economic Development and Restructuring of the Sakhalin Coal Industry. Outwardly, it looked quite pretty: providing pre-dismissal consultations, professional retraining of miners, supporting miners in opening private businesses, promoting the creation of new jobs, facilitating the resettlement of miners from those regions where it is economically unprofitable to create jobs. The closure of unprofitable coal mines was supposed to be carried out gradually: in 1997 it was planned to close 2 mines - "Boshnyakovo" and "Shebunino", in 1998 - "Gornozavodskaya" and in 1999 - "Makarovskaya".

For the employment of dismissed miners, it was planned to create 6 sites of open work, as well as 14 workshops for the processing of forestry, dairy, fish and vegetable products, as well as for the production of building materials. In addition, the Program provided for the closure of unpromising settlements and the resettlement of people to other areas or to the mainland.

However, what our Fatherland can be proud of is the conscientious preparation of impracticable programs. In addition, the drafters of the program assumed a phased development of the course of events in the liquidation of coal mines and villages. And the process turned out to be a landslide.

The problems grew like a snowball. By the beginning of 1997, the Sakhalinugol joint-stock company owed huge amounts of money to the federal budget and extra-budgetary funds. Debts to banks on loans were growing, and interest rates were growing along with debts. Numerous lawsuits rained down on the heads of shareholders. Unprofitable and profitable enterprises of the coal industry of the region mined 90 and 10 percent of the total production of the joint-stock company, respectively. Subsidies to coal miners fell to ridiculous proportions, as a result of which wage arrears skyrocketed. Sakhalinugol has ceased to receive subsidies for the social sphere, for the implementation of the tariff agreement. As a result, strikes began. By 1997, the situation in the island's coal industry had reached a critical point: the mines began to "crumble" like overripe apples from an apple tree ...

Back in the early 90s, at the dawn of restructuring, experts estimated that with the closure of all Sakhalin mines, the loss of production capacity for coal mining should have amounted to more than 3 million tons. Accordingly, the question arose: where to get coal for power plants and domestic needs after the mines cease to function?

In March 1992, a presentation of the Sakhalin Coal program was held in Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, which was attended by the heads of regional authorities, representatives of the administrations of the Nevelsky, Tymovsky, Smirnykhovsky and Poronaisky districts. The participants noted that the region is in conditions of a steady shortage of coal fuel. The only real way out of the impasse was recognized as the development of coal by open pit mining in suitable areas. According to experts, even under adverse conditions, the minimum annual production capacity should have been 1.2-2.2 million tons.

Based on the conclusions of this meeting, the Governor of the Sakhalin Region V.P. Fedorov in March 1992 signed a decree on the state program of the region for the development of coal deposits by open pit mining.

As a result, on May 28, 1992, CJSC Concern Sakhalinuglerazrez was founded in the region, which included 4 joint-stock companies: Tymovskugol, Poronayskugol, Krasnogorskugol and Smirnykhugol. Coal mining was carried out by the concern in an open way in 8 promising areas. As a rule, enterprises opened where it was easy to find labor and equipment. The acquisition of mining

equipment and vehicles has also begun. As of November 1994, the company had 10 excavators for mining and stripping, about 30 dump trucks of the BelAZ and KrAZ types, and more than 10 bulldozers. For its acquisition and capital construction of open-pit mines, a loan of 24 billion rubles was taken from the Sakhalin FEZ.

As of November 1994, about $ 5 million was invested in the concern, but about $ 10 million was needed to switch to self-financing. But chronic non-payment for the supplied coal has done its job. There was nowhere to take money for further development, and the concern slowly began to fall apart.

Due to the deterioration of the general socio-economic situation in the region, a number of enterprises belonging to the concern were either liquidated or broke away from Sakhalinuglerazrez and switched to "free bread". In 1997-1999, the joint-stock companies Krasnogorskugol and Smirnykhugol were liquidated, and CJSC Poronayskugol and Sosna joint-stock company withdrew from Sakhalinuglerazrez.

By the end of the 90s, the main creditors of the concern appealed to the judicial authorities to enforce the collection of debts from Sakhalinrazrezugol, and as a result, in 2000, the concern was declared bankrupt and liquidated.

In addition to the group's open-pit mines, independent coal enterprises began to appear in the region. So, in 1993, CJSC "Uglegorskugol" (Nikolsky open-pit mine), "Gornyak" LLP (Lopatinsky open-pit mine) were formed, in 1995 CJSC "Razrez Varvarovsky" and the municipal enterprise "Arkovo Mine" were born, in 1996 - JSC "Yuzhsakhugol", which gradually began to increase coal production.

According to the regional restructuring program, the closure of mines was to be accompanied by the creation of open-pit coal mining sites. In 1994-1997, open-pit mining sites were launched in Shebunino, Gornozavodsk, and Tikhmenevo.

Now, it would seem, there were no obstacles to the closure of particularly unprofitable coal enterprises on the island. As a result, the idea of dividing Sakhalinugol into 2 independent companies appeared. One was to include enterprises that could work independently, without outside help. The other would be those who were about to be closed. Gradually, this project began to be implemented.

By the minutes of the interdepartmental balance commission of 13 November 1997 it was proposed to take a decision on the closure of 11 mines before 1 March 1998. However, the power system of the region was created under the coals of certain brands. Thus, the Sakhalin GRES was built under the coals of the Lermontov open-pit mine, the Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk CHPP-I - under the coals of the Bykovskaya and Sinegorskaya mines, a mixture of which with brown coals was used in its furnaces. It is on this fuel that power equipment works most efficiently. Therefore, in 1998, the Sakhalin Regional Administration came to the Ministry of Fuel and Energy with a proposal to create non-state enterprises on the basis of the property of 4 coal mines. The proposal was supported.

In April-June 1998, Sinegorskaya Mine LLC, Bykovugol LLC, Ostrovnaya Mine LLC, Shakhterskoye Mine Management LLC, merged into Sakhalinpodzemugol LLC (SPU) were established. They leased with the right of subsequent redemption mining equipment on the balance sheet of Sakhalinugol JSC. In 1997, the number of production and industrial personnel at 4 mines was 3948 people, while labor productivity was 12 tons / month. In 1999, the number of employees decreased to 2345 people, and labor productivity increased to 27.7 tons / month.

The pricing policy for coal supplied to consumers in the Sakhalin Region provided for the operation of four mines with a profitability of 15 percent. Due to this, it was planned to update fixed assets, pay salaries on time, pay federal and local taxes and make payments to extra-budgetary funds. However, due to the fact that coal prices in 1999 remained at the level of 1998, and inflation was more than 20 percent, profitability became zero. As a result of the current pricing policy, SPU enterprises were forced to live "in debt".

The activities of the mines were complicated by the fact that coal consumers did not pay for it in a timely manner. For example, by January 1, 2001, the debts of power engineers amounted to 31.5

million rubles. As a result, the mines had practically no opportunity to update fixed assets. And if at the time of the creation of enterprises the depreciation of their fixed assets amounted to more than 70 percent, then by 2001 it reached 100 percent. This situation with payment for the supplied coal led to untimely preparation of the cleaning front, and as a result, to a decrease in production volumes. Economists' calculations showed that a decrease in annual production to 350 thousand tons could lead to the collapse of underground coal mining.

In order to improve the financial condition of enterprises, mine managers took measures to find solvent consumers of coal, as a result of which they began to supply their products outside the region. So, in 1999 to Kamchatka was sent about 40 thousand tons of coal, in 2000 - 14 thousand tons For export to Japan in 2000 sent more than 57 thousand tons.

The administration of the Sakhalin region also began to support coal mines. In 2000, 280 thousand dollars were allocated from the regional budget to Bykovugol LLC for the installation of a coal mining complex, 6 million rubles to Shakhterskoye Mine Management LLC for spare parts for the mining complex.

At present, in order to increase coal production, the SPU management plans to organize 2 additional tunneling crews at each mine; to purchase new mining complexes. However, the company does not have money to purchase new equipment. Therefore, Sakhalinpodzemugol LLC is actively negotiating the leasing of mining equipment.

And what happened to the 7 closed mines? Like all Russian reforms, the restructuring of the coal industry took ugly forms, causing a social catastrophe. Since the phased closure of mines, as envisaged by the regional program, did not happen, it was quite natural that plans with financing, employment, resettlement "flew" ... As a result, thousands of miners were left without work, and their families were left without means of subsistence. The number of production and industrial personnel in the coal industry of the Sakhalin region during the years of reforms decreased by 2,5 times (from 15,3 thousand people in 1990 to 6,1 thousand people in 1998). At the same time, in 1993-1998 in the coal industry of Russia, the number of personnel decreased by 497.4 thousand people, or by 54.4 percent. Detailed information on the level of registered unemployment in mining towns and villages of Russia is given in the table:

Table XLIX

THE LEVEL OF REGISTERED UNEMPLOYMENT IN MINING TOWNS, DISTRICTS AND TOWNS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION FOR 1994 - I QUARTER 2000 (in percent).

Name of regions cities, districts, towns	**Registered unemployment rate (percentage)**						
	1994.	1995.	1996.	1997.	1998.	1999.	Q1 2000
Perm region	3,2	2,4	2,4	3,6	1,2	1	0,9
Rostov region	0,8	1,04	0,98	0,93	1,26	0,69	0,7
Tula region	0,88	1,76	3,08	2,13	1,73	1,07	1,06
Kemerovo region	0,88	1,45	2,24	1,9	2,7	1,6	1,6
Chelyabinsk region	2,09	2,98	2,6	2,22	2,2	1,1	1.0
Sakhalin Oblast	**3,2**	**4,3**	**3,2**	**4,2**	**6,1**	**3,9**	**3,9**
Makarovsky district	*12*	*14,7*	*10,6*	*17,6*	*22,4*	*16,5*	*19,6*
Uglegorsk district	*7*	*9,3*	*8,2*	*10,5*	*14,4*	*10,6*	*10*
Poronaisky district	*6*	*6,4*	*4,5*	*6,7*	*9,4*	*5,6*	*6,2*
Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk	-	-	-	-	*1,1*	*0,6*	*0,6*
Sinegorsk	-	-	-	-	*8,6*	*2,2*	*3,3*

Aleksandrovsk-Sakhalinsky	-	-	-	-	*10,8*	*7,9*	*6 ,0*
Dolinsky district	-	-	-	-	*7,5*	*1,9*	*2,1*
Nevelsky district	*1,8*	*2,5*	*1,8*	*2,4*	*3,3*	*1,7*	*1,9*
Komi Republic (Vorkuta)	-	-	-	-	6,29	4,28	4,2
Amur Region	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,5
Magadan Region	-	-	-	-	4,56	4,2	4,5
Novosibirsk region	-	-	-	-	1,43	1	1
Republic of Sakha (Yakutia)	-	-	-	-	2,3	1,1	1
Smolensk region (Safonovo)	-	-	-	-	0,91	0,46	0,6
Tver region	-	-	-	-	1,5		0,8
Sverdlovsk region (Artemovsky)	-	-	-	-	5,32	2,78	3,4
Rep. Bashkortostan (Kumertau)	-	-	-	-	10,3	7,6	7,9
Chukotka Autonomous Okrug	-	-	-	-	4,7	5,3	5,5
Krasnoyarsk Territory (Sharypovo)	-	-	-	-	5,6	3,4	3,3
Chita region	-	-	-	-	3,49	2	1,9
Rep. Buryatia (Selenginsky district)	-	-	-	-	4,48	1	0,8
On average in Russia:	**2**	**3,2**	**3,4**	**2,7**	**2,5**	**1,7**	**1,6**

As a result of the active social policy pursued in 1999, there was a noticeable decrease in tension in the labor markets in the coal mining regions and mining municipalities.

In September 2000, in the newspaper Sovetsky Sakhalin, a certain A. Volkov noted that, despite massive job cuts, almost all the dismissed miners in the region managed to find jobs. For example, in 1998, 2270 miners applied to the employment service. In 2000, only 364 former coal miners were unemployed. However, Mr. Volkov did not say a word about those people who live in mining villages, but are not miners. Are they employed? According to official data, in 1999-2000 the highest unemployment rate in the country was: the villages of Boshnyakovo (16.9%) and Telnovsky (21.3%), Makarovsky (17.9%) and Uglegorsk (10.6%) districts of the Sakhalin region. Thus, a number of mining districts of Sakhalin in terms of unemployment in the country occupied an "honorable" second place, second only to the village of Bukachacha in the Chita region, where unemployment reached 21,4 percent. The situation with unemployment in the Sakhalin region was aggravated by the fact that if in 1998 13,5 million rubles out of 24,9 million were allocated for job creation, then in 1999 - 1,15 million out of 49,5 million rubles received for the implementation of the restructuring program.

In addition to the increase in unemployment, a big problem for the Sakhalin region was the closure of unpromising mining villages and the resettlement of people living in them to other areas of the region or to the mainland. According to the agreement concluded in 1997 by the Sakhalin Regional Administration with the Ministry of Fuel and Energy, the costs of liquidating unpromising mining villages were assigned to the region. But, according to local officials, there was no real possibility of financing the resettlement program in 1997. Only on March 16, 1998, the Sakhalin Governor I. Farkhutdinov issued Decree No. 112, where 9125 thousand rubles were allocated from the regional budget for the resettlement of residents from dying mining villages. On Sakhalin, about 6000 people were subject to resettlement.

As a result of active sanitation measures at the end of the 90s, 5 mining villages of Sakhalin - Mgachi, Boshnyakovo, Gorny, Shebunino, Telnovsky - suffocated and writhed in agony, dying. Some of them were left without electricity, heat, water supply and communications. The bus service to the city has disappeared, trade enterprises, law enforcement and medical institutions, kindergartens and schools have almost completely disappeared.

In order not to be unfounded, we will cite the testimonies of the residents themselves. In 1997, workers of the Shebunino mine appealed to the newspaper Svobodny Sakhalin with an open letter: *"Local authorities and our immediate supervisors do not pay attention to our complaints. When the project on the closure of the mine and the village appeared, representatives of the regional and district administration, Sakhalinugol JSC, came to us. Before the gubernatorial election, I. Farkhutdinov came to the mine, persuaded us to vote for the closure of the mine, promised to pay us wages from the federal budget. But the promises remained promises. People in the village commit suicide. Bread in many families is eaten on holidays ... We are thrown into extinction."*

The workers of the Mgachi mine were also promised that the liquidation of the mine would take place in a civilized manner: there would be resettlement, severance pay would be paid, and a full settlement would be made. However, good intentions remained on paper.

But maybe the miners simply exaggerated their troubles, thereby deciding to attract public attention and, against the backdrop of the scandal, receive a number of additional benefits? To dot the i's, I will cite some excerpts from an article published in Sovetsky Sakhalin by M. Kuzevanova, who visited the village of Shebunino in early 1998: "*The village now resembles a large resettlement camp ... A huge number of men on sleds were transporting firewood ... Many buildings were boarded up. There are families in Shebunino that fed on seaweed all winter. Some people go to Nevelsk to beg for alms... In Shebunino, people voluntarily leave comfortable apartments and move to barracks - to cockroaches and drinking neighbors. Where to get 350 thousand rubles to pay for a 3-room apartment? For three years there has been no bathhouse in the village, the kindergarten has been empty ...* ».

The correspondent of the newspaper "Nevelskie Novosti" in 1997, having visited the mine "Gornozavodskaya", wrote: *"The children of the miners of the mine are forced to go from house to house in search of something edible, to ask passers-by for alms ...".*

A wave of suicides swept through the mining villages. Unable to find understanding and help anywhere, some committed suicide because they could not feed themselves and their families. So, one miner in Shebunino was blown up with the help of a detonator from a stick of dynamite, the other two hanged themselves.

And what about the promised financial support? In 1998, for all the problems of coal miners in the regional budget was provided only 10 million rubles As a result, most of the planned construction of "workshops for the processing of forest, dairy and vegetable products" for the most part remained on paper. Federal support funds from Moscow also came in incomplete. So, in 1997, instead of the promised 80140 million rubles, only 3.3 billion rubles came.

According to the assurances of the central authorities, as well as the Rosugol company, since 1997, funds for social protection for each employee of the coal industry began to be credited to his personal account opened with the Savings Bank or other commercial bank chosen by the employee himself. Thus, the organization did not receive funds for the social protection of its employees to be issued to them through its cash register. To strengthen the social protection of dismissed pensioners - primarily in closed mines, a special non-state pension fund was created in the industry. Through him, a second pension began to be paid, equal in size to the state one. Such pensions began to be received by pensioners of JSC "Kizelugol", "Severovostokugol", "Leninskugol", "Belovugol", "Gukovugol", mines named after Shevyakov, "Vorkutaugol", "Leninskugol", "Tulaugol", "Chelyabinskugol", "Rostovugol", "Sakhalinugol".

These pensions were assigned through the insurance joint-stock company "Geopolis" and the non-state pension fund of coal industry workers "Ugol", created in accordance with the law of the Russian Federation "On Insurance" and the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of September 16, 1992 "On Non-State Pension Funds". The program of social protection of workers in the coal industry within the framework of the sectoral tariff agreement, developed under the leadership of Rosugol, provided for the lifetime payment of additional pensions to miners. However, the employees of Sakhalinugol, to whom these pensions were assigned, say that they are paid

extremely irregularly, and payments amount to only about 100-250 denominated rubles per month. So, speaking of "a second pension equal in size to the state pension," government officials twisted their souls.

Due to the closure of city-forming mines and the transfer of departmental social facilities, which often accounted for up to 90% of all urban social infrastructure facilities, many mining towns and villages found themselves in a crisis situation. It was necessary not only to restructure coal organizations, but also to intensify the economic development of depressed monoangular territories through local development programs in order to create a more diverse and sustainable economic structure.

Until 1996, budget funds to promote the employment of redundant workers and the creation of new jobs were allocated to coal companies to diversify production. These funds, sent together with subsidies to the main production of the coal company, were spent opaquely. Based on the fact that the task of the subsidized coal company is to try to become profitable in the coal business and pay salaries to workers, and not to engage in social protection of the released at the expense of budget funds, the recipients of these funds were changed - funds to promote employment began to be directed to local authorities for local development programs of mining towns aimed at mitigating the situation in local labor markets. They were distributed on specially created supervisory boards, which preliminarily organized competitive selections of draft local development programs in accordance with the developed regulations. The distribution of state support funds by Russian regions and by individual expenditure items is shown in the following table:

TABLE L

Ranking of coal-mining regions by the volume of financing from the state support of "Local Development Programs" for the period 1998-2000

thousand rubles.

№ p / n	Name of recipients	altogether Under contracts	*including:*					
			Consultation	Retraining	Public Works	small business	New jobs	migration
1.	Kemerovo region	377274,7	3147,5	13046,6	88160,4	58363,6	214556,6	0
2.	Perm region	371660	88,2	1886,4	39532,5	4392,4	66508,6	259252
3.	Rostov region	351027,8	618,9	4300,6	92034,2	60446,3	193627,8	0
4.	Komi Republic	312163,6	390	470,5	22428	0	10060	278815,1
5.	Tula region	180499,2	110,2	1506,8	54897,1	10817,9	113167,3	0
6.	**Sakhalin Oblast**	**135825**	**271,3**	**2284,2**	**27579**	**3957,9**	**17617,4**	**84115,2**
7.	Primorsky Krai	101000	480,2	2678,8	23426,4	25649,6	48765,1	0
8.	Republic of Sakha (Yakutia)	71090,7	131,4	1133	14327,5	2972,9	791,2	51734,7
9.	Magadan Region	53350	30	331	0	0	0	52989
10.	Chelyabinsk region	47210	62,1	1574,6	10618,9	1371,4	33583	0
11.	Leningrad region	47000	35	0	2203	2256	42506	0
12.	Chukotka autonomous. district	32000	230	0	0	970,2	0	30799,8

13.	Republic of Bashkortostan	30691	31,7	736,5	5638,6	5648,3	18635,9	0
14.	Sverdlovsk region	21100	168,4	637	4732,6	4782	10780	0
15.	Novosibirsk region	17500	47	416,3	2920	6538,7	7578	0
16.	Krasnoyarsk Territory	17000	59,3	248,7	5125	0	11567	0
17.	Khabarovsk Territory	11000	5	0	750	0	10245	0
18.	Kaluga Region	10300	34,3	200,3	4295	400	5370,4	0
19.	Tver region	8000	30	42,2	2437,8	240	5250	0
20.	Chita region	8000	5	335	2255	4075	1330	0
21.	Smolensk region	7000	2,1	460	3488	0	3049,9	0
22.	Karachay-Cherkessia	7000	0	0	660	840	5500	0
23.	Buryatia	5200	8,1	261,3	932	2498,6	1500	0
24.	Amur Region	4000	5	250	980	1775	990	0
	IN TOTAL IN RUSSIA:	**2226892**	**5990,6**	**32799,8**	**409421**	**197995,7**	**822979,1**	**757705,8**

According to the table, the Sakhalin Oblast is in sixth place in terms of the amount of funds allocated from the federal budget to support restructuring. An analysis of the data contained in the table shows that the bulk of the money received was spent on the resettlement of miners (62%), the organization of public works (20.3%) and the creation of new jobs (13%). To a much lesser extent, money was allocated for the organization of small businesses (2.9%), vocational retraining (1.6%) and the provision of pre-dismissal consultations (0.2%).

And this is despite the fact that in 1998 the regional restructuring program was adjusted in the direction of strengthening the creation and development of enterprises on Sakhalin, new jobs. In particular, it was planned to create jobs for 1370 miners. As a result of its implementation in 1998, a modern sawmill was established on the island in Nevelsk. Considerable financial investments were made in the fishing industry. The state helped to get on their feet the enterprises "Tatar Strait" in the Aleksandrovsk-Sakhalinsky district, "Cape Kuznetsov" in Nevelsk, "Rybak" in the Makarovsky district, "Alkor" in the Dolinsky district, where they also began to recruit unemployed miners.

A fifth of the allocated state support funds went to the organization of socially significant works. An example of a successful investment of money is the Aleksandrovsk-Sakhalinskoye LLC "ASU". In a short time, it managed to reconstruct the heating and water supply networks of the village of Mgachi.

However, a quite reasonable question arises: why does the lion's share of funds go to resettlement and public works, and only a small part to vocational retraining and the creation of new jobs? The answer to it is given in the documents of the Ministry of Fuel and Energy, which clearly states that at least 70 percent of the allocated funds should be directed to facilitate resettlement, at least 25 percent to the organization of public works. Thus, only 5 percent of the funds could be directed to vocational retraining, assistance to small businesses, etc. As a result, in 1998-2000 only 384 miners received new specialties. True, all of them were immediately employed. For example, the Makarov Forest Company was happy to hire miners who had retrained as bulldozers and fellers. As for the issue of supporting small businesses, only 13 former miners opened their own business on Sakhalin.

However, the Ministry of Fuel and Energy was not arbitrary in the distribution of funds, but acted on the basis of the Decree of the Government of Russia No. 1026 of September 3, 1998 "On Amendments and Additions to the Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation of December 3, 1997 No. 1523".

On the basis of this government decree, on April 14, 1999, the Minister of Fuel and Energy of Russia, by his order No. 122, approved a new "Regulation on the procedure for the formation and

financing of local development programs from state support for the coal industry". In particular, the directions for the implementation of local development programs additionally included "assistance in the resettlement of citizens from unpromising mining towns and villages with the provision of assistance directly to resettled citizens." This made it possible to resume the program of resettlement of labor resources from the territories of the Far North and equivalent areas, where the creation of new jobs was economically inexpedient and where the mass release of workers from closed mines and from reduced related industries led to an aggravation of the social situation, since since 1997 the large-scale implementation of the resettlement program was discontinued. Now, with the liquidation of coal industry organizations in the Far North and equivalent areas, dismissed workers, disabled people, pensioners and families of dead miners were subject to resettlement. Thus, since 1999, 70 percent of the funds allocated for restructuring began to go to the resettlement of residents of unpromising mining towns and villages, and this resettlement went exclusively to the mainland. This decision of the federal authorities, perhaps, served as the core reason for such disastrous results of restructuring in the island region.

In 1999, 198.8 million rubles were transferred from the state support of the coal industry for the implementation of local development programs to finance the resettlement, at the expense of which, under tripartite agreements, it was planned to resettle 1030 families, of which 225 families were to be resettled from Sakhalin.

Table LI

Name Recipients of funds State Support	***On an annual basis 1999 Treaty.***		***Position on 01.05.2000***	
	Amount, thousand rubles.	Number of families to be resettled	Paid by the Treasury:	
			Million. rub.	Apartments
Komi Republic	108	563	101,1	533
Sakhalin Oblast	**43,9**	**225**	**12,3**	**48**
Mgachi village	*9,8*	*50*	-	-
Poronaisky district	*0,9*	*5*	*0,3*	*1*
Makarovsky district	*3,5*	*18*	-	-
Nevelsky district	*5*	*25*	*3,1*	*9*
Uglegorsk district	*16,7*	*86*	*7,2*	*31*
p. Bykov	*5*	*26*	*1,7*	*7*
Sinegorsk	*1,3*	*6*	-	-
Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk	*1,7*	*9*	-	-
Republic of Sakha	25,3	135	25,5	109
Magadan Region	17,7	88	15,1	81
Chukotka Autonomous Okrug	3,9	19	0,4	2
TOTAL:	198,8	1030	137,2	726

As can be seen from the data in the table, as of May 1, 2000, the most successful resettlement was carried out in the Komi Republic (95%) and the Magadan Region (92%). At the same time, the

work on resettlement in the Sakhalin region proceeded with a significant lag, the funds allocated in 1999 practically settled in the accounts of the branches of the federal treasury.

It should also be borne in mind that the amount indicated in the table - 43,9 million rubles. - Sakhalin received only on December 26, 1999 In addition, because of the sluggishness of regional officials, this money was a dead weight. Some heads of local administrations believed that the problem of resettlement of miners did not exist at all, and in every possible way avoided approving the lists of resettlers. They tried to use the money for other purposes, "gifting" small businesses and private entrepreneurship. For example, in the Uglegorsk district (where the situation with resettlement was the most prosperous), 66% of the total amount of revenues was allocated for this purpose. As of April 24, 2000, just over 200 miners' families were included in the lists of resettlers, of which 97 had entered into real contracts. In total, from 1995 to 2000, only 1056 people changed their place of residence, for which 98 million rubles were spent.

For the resettlement of the remaining 5000 people, about 1 billion rubles are needed. But since few funds come from Moscow under the federal restructuring program, and besides, a significant part of them remains unused, the process of leaving the miners threatens to drag on for 25 years.

In addition, the resettlement scheme today is furnished with complex bureaucratic procedures. A person is now and then entered into some registers, recorded, noted, etc. Because of this, ordinary moves have turned into a painfully long, exhausting process. Initially, the lists of people to be resettled were compiled by the liquidation commissions of enterprises. Then these documents were sent to Moscow for approval. While the papers traveled through the capital's offices, more than one month passed.

It should be noted that the liquidation commissions of the mines carefully concealed the number of storeys of the apartments to which the miners were to be relocated. No one explained to the residents of Tikhmenevo that they could, for example, choose the region of residence and that the "new" housing provided to them did not have to be new. Shortly before leaving for Zverevo (Rostov region), people accidentally learned that the "new" house for them had been redesigned from the former dormitory in which the "chemists" lived. The news, of course, was shocking, but there was nowhere to go - the people went.

With all this, no one guarantees jobs in the new place to the former Sakhalin miners. So Tikhmenevtsy who left for the Vladimir and Ivanovo regions, where there is a high level of unemployment, could not find work for a long time. What can we say about retired miners, who are not needed by anyone on the mainland.

Thus, life proved the inconsistency of the program of resettlement of mining families from the island to the mainland. In addition, many people, as they say, "stuck" to their native places and do not want to leave Sakhalin. For example, in the village of Shebunino, out of 508 families, 286 wished to get housing on Sakhalin. About 85 percent of the workers of the Yuzhno-Sakhalinskaya mine would like to stay in Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk ... There is an urgent need to abandon the total resettlement of miners to the mainland, and help them settle in the cities of the Sakhalin region. In addition, this option is beneficial for the region, because the money sent for resettlement will remain on Sakhalin: this money will be used to build new residential buildings for miners, which will help overcome another scourge of the market economy "in Russian" - unemployment. However, Moscow officials have not yet approved this program.

The same citizens who had the misfortune to work in auxiliary industries, entirely dependent on the work of the mines, had to be resettled at the expense of the local budget. However, not so much money is allocated in the regional budget for these purposes. Thus, in 2001, 4 million rubles were allocated from the regional budget for the social protection of Sakhalin residents living in mining villages where mines are closed, and not working in the coal industry.

Summing up the disappointing results of the first stage of the restructuring of the Sakhalin coal industry, we note that seven of the eleven mines owned by Sakhalinugol JSC were closed, and four

mines were transformed into limited liability companies. A different fate was prepared for the profitable coal mines that are part of Sakhalinugol.

On the fourteenth of May 1997, the administration of the city of Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk registered the Sakhalin Coal Corporation Open Joint Stock Company, the main purpose of which was to effectively manage the coal mining process. Owning a controlling stake in six coal mines of the island, the corporation carries out investment activities, provides information and consulting services in the field of economics, management, law, as well as in engineering and mine surveying, organizes the sale of products, develops new technologies in the field of coal mining, transportation of coal, etc.

The management of the corporation was well aware that it was possible to achieve its main goal - to extract coal with the maximum possible profit - only under the condition of low costs and high labor productivity, in other words, by radically reducing production costs. Thus, the main condition for the profitable operation of subsidiaries was to give maximum production by a smaller number of employees. In order to increase labor productivity, a contract was signed with each of the specialists hired, which stipulated the terms of remuneration - according to the final result. And the results were not slow to affect.

The corporation began work on September 1, 1997 By the beginning of October, the production cost of coal ranged from 180 to 260 thousand rubles / t For the first year of operation, the corporation's enterprises reduced the cost of coal by an average of 26 percent. For comparison, let's say that in Sakhalinugol before section 1, a ton cost 320 thousand rubles. The number of production personnel in 1997-2000 decreased from 2200 to 1780 people.

The average monthly accrued wages of employees of the enterprises of the Sakhalin Coal Corporation in 1998 amounted to 2675 rubles, which was 28 percent higher than the average regional level. Compared to 1997, it has increased by 23 percent, but its real size, as determined by the amount of consumer goods and services that can be purchased with it, has decreased by 2 percent.

However, the essence of the problem was that the money paid to employees of coal mining enterprises, for the most part, existed on payrolls, and people did not see "real" money for months. Non-payments have done their dirty deed.

If, in the national economy of the country as a whole, workers and employees were underpaid about 5% of their wages, then miners were delayed about 20% of their accrued wages. In the second half of the 90s, wage arrears in the coal industry averaged 5.5 months in the industry. For some coal companies, this figure reached 10-11 months.

Delays in payment of wages were caused by the following circumstances: inefficiency of many coal mining enterprises, non-payment of consumers, including budget consumers; a low share of "real" money in payments for coal; facts of embezzlement of budget funds and funds from the sale of coal due to the activities of individual heads of coal mining enterprises, as well as unscrupulous intermediaries; Rosugol's previous debts to coal and mine-building enterprises; payroll practices that are not funded by sources of funding.

Despite the fact that the main share of responsibility for wage arrears lay with employers, part of the wage arrears to miners (about 40%) arose through the fault of the state, or rather, consumers of coal and electricity financed from the budget.

By the beginning of the summer of 1998, in the industry as a whole, there was a critical state with wage arrears to miners, which increased from 2520 million rubles in 1997 to 3737.9 million rubles by May 1, 1998. And then a series of strikes took place in the country with the closure of railways, which went down in the history of restructuring as "rail wars". On May 5-8, 1998, about 2,000 workers of the Inta mines blocked the Moscow-Vorkuta railway, 12 km from the mining town of Inta (Komi Republic). On May 13, 1998, miners in the town of Anzhero-Sudzhensk in the Kemerovo region blocked the Trans-Siberian Railway. On May 18-19, 1998, the actions of the miners of Rostovugol began to block the North Caucasus Railway in the area of the Shakhty station (Rostov region). On June 3, 1998, the miners of Kuzbass again blocked the Trans-Siberian Railway.

The government of the country could not but react to the events taking place in the mining regions. On the eighth of May 1998, the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 499 "On Measures to Stabilize the Socio-Economic Situation in the Coal Mining Regions" was published in the central press, in which the Government of the Russian Federation was instructed to check the wage arrears of coal industry organizations within a month and approve measures to repay it and prevent further formation. In addition, the Decree specifically stipulated that, starting from the second half of 1998, the appropriations for compensation of electricity tariffs to the regions of the Far East, provided for in the federal budget for 1998, should be sent directly to coal mining organizations supplying coal to the power systems of these regions.

The resolution has certainly played a role in stabilizing the situation somewhat, but the situation with the payment of wage arrears has improved very slightly. Therefore, in July-August 1998, the "rail war" resumed. It took place in the Chelyabinsk region, Syktyvkar, Khabarovsk and Primorsky territories ...

Sakhalin miners also decided to keep up with the country. They had every reason to do so. By July 1998, the debts of power engineers to coal miners in the region reached 98.48 million rubles. Wage arrears to workers in the coal mining industry of Sakhalin increased to 30 million rubles. Therefore, from July 20, 1998, by decision of the boards of directors of the open-pit mines that are part of the Sakhalin Coal Corporation, all open-pit mines stopped shipping coal to power engineers. But this was not enough for ordinary workers ...

On July 25, the miners blocked the railway tracks and highways through which fuel was supplied to the Sakhalin GRES. As a result, the supply of fuel to the power plant was suspended, which was the beginning of the energy crisis in the region. Power outages in homes and businesses reached 12 hours a day. This kind of situation worried not only local, but also central authorities. In particular, the chairman of the parliamentary committee on security, Viktor Ilyukhin, sent a telegram to the region, in which he said that the State Duma was already looking for money for the miners, and asked to lift the blockade in the interests of national security. Local authorities proposed to take more decisive actions against the "blockers", in particular, to lift the blockade from the power plant with the help of riot police. However, the miners withstood both threats and promises. Only on August 6, 1998, at 4 o'clock in the morning, the power plant was unblocked.

However, non-payments continued to occur. At the beginning of 1999, Sakhalinenergo JSC owed the Sakhalin Coal Corporation already 125576,7 thousand rubles. As a result, the volume of accounts receivable increased by 105204 thousand rubles, from 110579 thousand rubles in 1997 to 215783 thousand rubles in 1998. Despite the ongoing work with the debtor (claims, lawsuits), accounts receivable did not decrease, which had a negative impact on the financial condition of the corporation. As a result of non-payment, balance sheet profit The coal corporation decreased from 10065 thousand rubles in 1998 to 2360 thousand rubles in 1999.

It should be said that a similar picture was observed not only in the Sakhalin region. It was typical for coal mining enterprises in the vast majority of regions of the country. The materials of the Accounts Chamber of the Russian Federation show that as of October 1, 1999, the accounts payable of the enterprises of the coal industry of Russia exceeded the receivables by 2.7 times and amounted to 67.3 billion rubles. Of the total amount of non-payments to the budgets of all levels, the amount of penalties and fines exceeded 60%, which completely paralyzed the solvency of manufacturing enterprises.

However, official documents of 1999 paint us a rather rosy picture of the state of the country's coal industry: "Under the influence of the growth of the dollar and the *devaluation of the ruble, as well as the improvement of world markets in the post-crisis period, there was a positive dynamics of production in export-oriented and import-substitution sectors of the economy. Electricity consumption has increased. Revenue from sales of coal products and the share of cash in total sales increased. As a result of the strengthening of the treasury and the improvement of tax collection in Russia, the financing of consumers of coal products from budgets of all levels has improved. In 1999,*

as a result of the general stabilization of industrial production in Russia, an increase in effective demand for coal, ***it was possible to reverse the crisis situation with a drop in the main gross indicators of the industry***. The increase in *coal production made it possible to improve the supply of fuel to the real sector of the economy and the population. Labor productivity and output per employee continue to grow. This year, it was possible to achieve an increase in the level of payment for products sold in cash from 22 to 36 percent ...* ».

It is possible that somewhere in Russia the "crisis situation with the fall in the main gross indicators of the industry" was reversed, but not on Sakhalin. To clarify the situation, let us turn to the annual consolidated balance sheet of OJSC Sakhalin Coal Corporation for 1999. Official figures show that for such a basic production indicator asroofing, the plan was fulfilled by only 45.4 percent, or 76.9 percent compared to the level of 1998. The critical situation with stripping was in JSC Lermontovskoye, where the implementation of the plan was only 24.4 percent. Such failure to perform stripping work threatened to lead to the complete bankruptcy of the enterprise. The reasons were the lack of the required amount of equipment, the large wear and tear of the existing fleet of mining equipment and the lack of spare parts for its restoration, the lack of investment in the renewal of fixed assets. For example, in 1998, out of 14 BelAZ vehicles, 5 (36%) had 100% wear and tear at Novikovskoye JSC, while the rest ranged from 60 to 97 percent; Of the 30 BelAZ trucks at Lermontovskoye JSC, more than 35 percent of the cars had wear and tear over 60 percent. Due to the chronic insolvency of coal consumers and as a result of the resulting shortage of working capital in 1999, an extremely high percentage of wear and tear of cars and other spare parts remained. For the same reason, enterprises did not have the opportunity to build the facilities necessary for production and purchase equipment, machinery and mechanisms in the right quantity.

Failure to comply with the stripping plan resulted in a decrease in production levels. Coal production in 1999 was 81 per cent of the plan or 94 per cent of the 1998 level. Of the six enterprises, four failed to meet the production plan: Lermontovskoye JSC (67.7%), Novikovskoye JSC (71%), Tsentralnoye JSC (76.5%) and Poyarkovugol JSC (71.1%). However, at Novikovskoye JSC, the decline in production was caused by an artificial restraint of the production process due to the lack of a market for process coal.

For the survival of the coal industry, it was necessary to radically change the status quo. And if Sakhalin consumers do not pay, then why not supply the mined coal to those who have already proven themselves in the market as a conscientious payer? And then the leaders of the UKS remembered their Far Eastern neighbors ...

In 1999, the Sakhalin Coal Corporation began supplying coal to South Korea, 80 thousand tons of Sakhalin coal were exported to Kamchatka and Chukotka, in 2000 more than 200 thousand tons were exported in the same direction and about 100 thousand tons of coal were exported to Japan. In total, in 2000, 300 thousand tons of coal went outside the region, a little less than 10 percent of the total production. But even this small amount made it possible to improve the situation in the coal industry. With the increase in the export component, the investment and tax situation in the region has also improved. Other Far Eastern territories began to show interest in Sakhalin coal.

On December 28, 2000, the Governor of the Sakhalin Region, I. Farkhutdinov, announced that the export of Sakhalin coal to Japan in 2001 was planned to be increased to 500,000 tons. However, within the region, due to non-payments, the problem of fuel reserves at power plants - GRES and CHPP-I - has worsened. To cover the lack of coal on the island, as in previous years, they began to import Neryungri coal - in 1998 its cost was 220 rubles. per ton. It would seem a profitable acquisition. However, for the transportation of this very ton, the railroad workers took 300-350 rubles. Let's add here the cost of loading and unloading, Transportation by ferry... As a result, the cost of coal from Neryungri reached the figure of 1109 rubles. per ton (the average for UKS at that time was 645 rubles). The regional media have repeatedly noted that some of the officials of the regional administration are very good at profiting from these coal supplies from the mainland. The reproaches of the media had their effect. If in 1998 about 300,000 tons of mainland coal were

imported to the island, then in 1999 the delivery was reduced to 154,000 tons (See Appendix No. 10).

The supply of Neryungri coal in the second half of the 90s led to the fact that the cost of a ton of equivalent fuel on the island increased sharply. Another reason for the rise in the price of coal was the "alternative" coal mines. The quality of coal mined on them was low, which is why instead of 6 thousand tons per day, the region's energy system was forced to burn 8 thousand.

The transport component in the price of coal also increased. For example, the transportation of a ton of coal on a 7-kilometer section of the railway from Lermontovka to the state district power station cost coal miners 52 rubles. Almost 3 thousand had to be paid from each car. The miners jokingly said that for that kind of money they were ready to push the wagons by hand, but seriously they offered to transfer this branch to them.

At the end of March 2000, the Minister of Railways of Russia Nikolai Aksenenko paid a visit to Sakhalin. His stay on the island was associated with the creation of a coal holding on Sakhalin, which was to include the administration of the Sakhalin Region, Sakhalin Coal Corporation JSC, Sakhalin Railway, and Sakhalinpodzemugol LLC. The main task of the holding company was to organize the investment process for the development of the export potential of the region's coal industry. The creation of the holding was supposed to help solve the problem with coal not only on Sakhalin, but also to send it for export for special supplies. The payback period of the project to turn Sakhalin into a coal exporter was set at 5 years.

At the beginning of 2000, the total price of the development of the Sakhalin fuel and energy complex was 191 million rubles, some of them - 70 million - came from the capital. The remaining funds were supposed to attract the holding.

The center of export coal production was determined by the Uglegorsk district, where only the Solntsevskoye deposit has licensed reserves of about 100 million tons In 2000, about 1 million tons were mined in the area (including CJSC Solntsevskoye - 200.2 thousand tons). In the same year, the management of Sakhalin Coal Corporation OJSC carried out technical re-equipment of Solntsevskoye CJSC. 18 units of mining and transport equipment were purchased in the amount of 38.3 million rubles. As a result of these investments, the company doubled its fuel production during the year. In 2001, CJSC Solntsevskoye produced 463.2 thousand tons of coal. The investment project for the development of this enterprise, prepared by UKS OJSC, intends to increase the production capacity of the coal mine to 1 million tons.

The total cost of the project as of October 2001 was 14,230 thousand US dollars. Required investment: 5 million dollars. The project implementation period is 2002-2004. The investments are supposed to be used for the construction of quarry water treatment facilities, a technological road to the open-pit mine from Uglegorsk and other facilities in accordance with the project, the purchase of quarry equipment (BelAZ heavy-duty dump trucks with a carrying capacity of 70 tons), bulldozers and excavator equipment from CATERPILLAR, etc.

The return on investment period was set at 5 years, and the start date of the project was 2002. Project implementation period: 2000-2005 The mined coal was supposed to be sold on the territory of the Sakhalin Region, in the North-Eastern regions of the Russian Federation, as well as on the foreign market. Net present income was estimated at $32.4 million.

Among the priorities for the revival of the coal industry in the Uglegorsk district was the implementation of a project for the construction of a specialized coal loading terminal in the port of Shakhtersk. According to the project, the marine transshipment complex in the Miner's port was supposed to handle 1.5 million tons of coal per year. Coal will be delivered to the pier through conveyors, and loaded onto ships with a deadweight of up to 7000 tons. These ships will deliver coal to the coastal cities and towns of Sakhalin, which will be much cheaper than transporting solid fuel by road. According to preliminary forecasts, the loading terminal was supposed to reduce the cost of transporting coal by sea for the domestic market by 30-40 percent.

The creation of a powerful sea transport hub in the Uglegorsk district required about 200 million rubles. Part of the money in this project was invested by the Ministry of Railways. In addition, according to the strategy of the regional administration, funds from projects for the development of the Sakhalin shelf began to be invested in the development of the island's coal industry. As of January 1, 2001, the total cost of the construction of the loading terminal in the port of Shakhtersk amounted to 24.7 million rubles. In October 2000, the 1st stage of the terminal was put into operation – 80 meters of the quay wall were built and technological equipment was installed: a ship loading machine, a conveyor line and a bunker. The commissioning of the terminal made it possible to increase the shipment of coal through the port. So, for 3 months (October - December), 20 ships were loaded, containing 60 thousand tons of coal. The high degree of automation of the modern coal terminal made it possible not only to significantly reduce the time of cargo operations, but also docker tariffs. If earlier cargo operations on one vessel took an average of three days, now no more than one eight-hour shift. Previously, loading one ton of coal cost 16 dollars, now 1,5 dollars. Due to the increase in coal production and exports, it is planned to build a second specialized 160-meter terminal in the port. The budget of the Sakhalin region for 2001 provided for a loan in the amount of 600 thousand dollars to the Sakhalin Coal Corporation for a period of 3 years for the construction of the second stage of the coal loading terminal in the Miner's port.

Thus, the island gradually began to resolve the issue that tormented the industry for several decades - the issue of reducing the cost of the transport component in the cost of Sakhalin coal! Well, since the possibilities of exporting solid fuel from Sakhalin increased, therefore, it was necessary to think about the growth of coal production itself.

The increase in production had to be invariably accompanied by an increase in the number of vehicles. In 2000, the corporation purchased 39 units of new equipment: 8 MAZ vehicles (carrying capacity 28 tons), 9 BelAZ trucks, 9 KamAZ trucks, 7 B-170 bulldozers, three excavators, 3 LB-500 hydraulic loaders, for which 38.2 million rubles of own funds and 38.5 million rubles of investments (Ministry of Railways and funds of the extra-budgetary fund of the regional administration) were spent. The acquisition of new high-performance equipment made it possible to restore production facilities for one enterprise (Lermontovskoye JSC). capacities, according to others (Solntsevskoye CJSC, Lopatinsky open-pit mine) - to ensure their growth. In addition, the corporation allocated 32.1 million rubles for the purchase of spare parts for mining and transport equipment.

The commissioning of new and purchase of spare parts for old equipment made it possible to significantly improve the planned production indicators: for example, in the first half of 2001, the volume of stripping increased by 922.7 thousand cubic meters compared to the first half of 2000, the cost of mining one ton of coal decreased from 263.06 rubles to 231.03 rubles, and the average monthly labor productivity increased from 63.5 tons to 70.5 tons. As a result, coal production in 2001 increased by 200,000 tons compared to 2000.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, it is worth mentioning the following. The facts presented in the work give grounds to assert that the Sakhalin coal industry has a rich history, it has accumulated a lot of historical experience. However, the use of the island's coal resources during the second half of the XIX – early XXI centuries was inefficient. At each historical stage, both objective and subjective circumstances contributed to this. But for all stages, a number of common reasons can be distinguished:

1. First of all, this is the remoteness of the island territory from the mainland, which made it difficult and expensive to transport materials and equipment, export the extracted raw materials to other regions of the country.
2. Harsh natural and geographical conditions that disrupted the normal operation of coal enterprises, vehicles transporting coal, forcing the central authorities to introduce a number of benefits and additional payments for people working in difficult climatic conditions, which led to an increase in the cost of products produced on the island.
3. Difficult mining and geological conditions, as a result of which it was necessary to spend significant financial resources of enterprises on the purchase of special machinery and equipment.
4. Lack of interest of employees in the results of their work.

At each stage of the historical development of the industry, there were also specific reasons for the low efficiency of the development of the coal industry on Sakhalin Island.

One hundred and fifty years ago, Lieutenant N.K. Boshnyak, having discovered coal on our island, opened a new page in the history of Sakhalin. It is with this discovery that the history of the Sakhalin coal industry begins. However, due to the unclear status of the island, which is an undivided territory between Russia and Japan, the question of the development of Sakhalin coal mines arose. It should be borne in mind that the decisions of the authorities regarding the lease of the Sakhalin mines were contradictory. On the one hand, it recognized the need to grant Russian subjects the right to lease the mines of Sakhalin in order to promote the development of the coal industry, to fully provide the Siberian flotilla and the Pacific squadron with cheap coal and to prevent the seizure of Sakhalin coal deposits by foreigners. But the tsarist government feared that the mines leased by private individuals would compete with the state-owned, so the authorities of Eastern Siberia, as a rule, rejected the petitions of private individuals, canceled previously issued permits or set such conditions that discouraged entrepreneurs from taking on a business associated with risk and large costs.

For the development of Sakhalin coal deposits in 1869, the tsarist government organized hard labor on the island. However, the system of using the labor of convicts only delayed the pace of development of the coal industry on Sakhalin.

The Russo-Japanese War only briefly interrupted the development of the industry, but as a result of the signing of the Russo-Japanese Peace Treaty, the southern part of Sakhalin Island, together with the richest coal deposits located on its territory, went to Japan.

The period from 1905 to 1916 was an important stage in the history of the coal industry of Northern Sakhalin. During these years, after the abolition of penal servitude, there was a more rapid development of the productive forces of the island, the composition of the population changed. Instead of forced labor, wage labor began to be used. Nevertheless, the development of the industry was hampered by a number of factors: the prohibition of foreign cabotage, protective measures of central and local authorities, etc.

The revolution that broke out in 1917 in the country and the civil war that began shortly thereafter almost did not affect the economy of Northern Sakhalin. New coal enterprises were opened on the island, geological research was carried out intensively, both by Russian and foreign

expeditions, and coal mining grew. The period of Japanese occupation of the island from 1920 to 1925 sharply worsened the situation of the coal industry. The Japanese military occupation authorities forced the closure of many enterprises, using both command-administrative and economic measures. All this led to a sharp jump in coal prices, caused unemployment among Russian miners. In 1925, the Japanese government, under pressure from the USSR, was forced to withdraw its troops from the territory of Northern Sakhalin, but as a concession, the Japanese managed to obtain a concession of a number of oil and coal deposits on the island, which existed until 1944.

In the second half of the 20s - early 40s of the twentieth centuries in Northern Sakhalin there was a very complex and contradictory process of formation and development of the Soviet coal industry. This process did not progress easily due to the most difficult natural and climatic conditions, remoteness from the center and supply bases, insufficient development of industrial and social infrastructure, limited human, financial and material resources, psychological rejection of Sakhalin as a dead place, a convict island. A significant role was also played by difficulties of a subjective nature, including the insufficient level of concern of local and central authorities to meet the basic working and living conditions of Sakhalin residents. The mass repressions of 1937-1938 played an important role in creating unfavorable factors for the life of the islanders, which gave rise to an atmosphere of fear, uncertainty, denunciation, and mutual suspicion. All this was nourished by the confrontational ideology and practice whipped up by the authorities, and was especially acutely felt in the confined space of island life.

Despite all the difficulties and problems, during this period in Northern Sakhalin it was possible to create a powerful diversified association of mining collectives. The Sakhalinugol Trust has become a city-forming factor for the regional center - the city of Aleksandrovsk-Sakhalinsky and has made a significant contribution to the creation of elementary conditions for life, work and recreation of islanders in Northern Sakhalin.

The Great Patriotic War forced many sectors of the country's industry, including coal, to switch to a war footing, however, due to the lack of a sufficient number of means of transport, the conscription of some miners into the army, the Sakhalinugol trust was forced to go for a sharp reduction in coal mining, the conservation of many mining sites.

A completely different situation developed in South Sakhalin, where not a socialist, but a capitalist system of management dominated. During the period of Japanese domination, the coal industry in the south of the island went through 2 stages: the first - protective - when the government announced a ban on the development of the main coal fields of South Sakhalin due to fear of possible competition between Sakhalin coal miners and Japanese coal miners, and the second stage - encouraging, which began in the late 20s, when, as a result of the global economic crisis, coal production in Japan decreased, and she was unable to supply her colony with sufficient solid fuel. In the second stage, the coal industry of the Karafuto governorate developed at an intensive pace. Enterprising citizens of the Land of the Rising Sun began the intensified development of the Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk coal deposits. The rational use of capital investments, private ownership of the means of production, the merciless exploitation of Japanese coal miners and the use of labor of Korean workers forcibly brought to the island allowed Japanese capitalists to achieve significant success in coal mining.

After the end of the Second World War, the coal industry of South Sakhalin was almost completely paralyzed, because during the hostilities in the south of the island, many mines and mines were destroyed or flooded. The coal industry organized by the Japanese had to be created anew. This required significant investment, and at that time there was no money in the country, because the entire western part of the USSR lay in ruins and a huge amount of money went to the restoration of cities and villages destroyed by the Nazis. And, nevertheless, the coal enterprises of South Sakhalin were restored in record time. This is the merit not only of the local authorities, but also of the Japanese miners, who until 1947 worked in the now Soviet mines of South Sakhalin.

In the second half of the twentieth century, even against the background of the subsidized Soviet economy, the Sakhalin coal industry was extremely unprofitable. The management of Sakhalinugol made an attempt to combat this evil with the help of the following measures: in the coal industry, the structure of fixed production assets was improved, measures were taken to improve production technology, and the introduction of a new mining industry equipment and quarry equipment, a number of mines were reconstructed, machines and mechanisms were transferred to automatic and remote control, which allowed most enterprises to initially achieve profitable work, but the imperfection and great deterioration of the technological complexes of the surface of most enterprises, the irrational use of equipment, low organization of labor and a number of other factors caused an increase in the unprofitability of the production Sakhalinugol Association.

The restructuring of the country's economy, which began in the mid-80s, significantly affected the island coal industry. The transition to a system of soft planning, self-financing and self-financing, the expansion of the rights of enterprises in management issues initially played a positive role, but the inconsistent and contradictory nature of the reforms of the Soviet economy brought not only benefits, but also significant harm. The attempt to once again limit oneself to half-measures led to an intensification of the crisis in the Soviet economy. In the coal industry of Sakhalin, this was reflected in the incomplete development of capital investments, aging and deterioration of the structure of production capacities, a low technical level of mining equipment, which in turn led to a reduction in labor productivity, a drop in coal production and a sharp increase in production costs, there was a decrease in coal supplies to the mainland.

At the beginning of the 90s, the transition of the country's coal industry to market rails began: free coal prices were introduced, subsidies were reduced. Soon, the process of restructuring the industry was launched. However, the hopes of the would-be reformers for a quick exit of the industry from the crisis did not materialize. But the famous slogan "We wanted the best, but it turned out - as always" was completely justified. Coal enterprises were sucked deeper and deeper into the market abyss. A crisis of non-payments began, as a consequence of this - a strike of miners, which undermined the already unstable position of mines and open-pit mines. A massive closure of unprofitable enterprises began. Many mines were liquidated, and most of the miners and workers in related specialties were left without work and livelihoods.

It is known that history is made by people. No matter how developed machines and mechanisms are, without a person it is just a pile of metal. Only human labor can breathe life into this complex technique. But it was people who were put on the 2nd plan in the complex chain of the production process. Initially, coal mines were developed by convicts who did not receive a penny for their slave labor. Subsequently, the convicts were replaced by Korean and Chinese coal miners, who received meager wages compared to Russian miners. The attitude towards them was like slag. Human slag.

Under Soviet rule, miners' wages were much higher than the national average, but there were no wages to stimulate labor productivity growth. Individual experimental measures of the Government played a positive role, but they could not reverse the general trend in the development of the socialist mode of development of production.

Poor living conditions, poor nutrition, lack of supply, chronic delays in the payment of wages - this is an incomplete list of problems that Sakhalin miners had to face in the 20-50s of our century. Subsequently, the government and local authorities went to meet the miners: departmental gardens and schools were built in many coal mines, administrative and household plants were created, medical centers, sanatoriums were organized, tens of thousands of meters of housing were put into operation. During the years of perestroika, the miners of the country "knocked out" from the government as many benefits and privileges as a simple Soviet man in the street never dreamed of. However, in the early 90s, the knocking of miners with helmets on the Humpback Bridge did not lead to any results. Currently, the miners of the island are forced to leave their homes and move to the mainland, learn new professions in their old age, look for a new job ...

Yes, today Sakhalin coal miners are going through hard times. And, nevertheless, this study convincingly proved that the region has a rich resource base for the development of the coal industry, and we have every reason to talk about the prospects for the development of the coal industry on Sakhalin.

Firstly, Sakhalin coal is invariably in demand from numerous consumers both within the region and beyond. Many regions of the Far East have a need for solid carbon fuel on the island today.

Secondly, despite the attempts of the regional administration to start gasification of the southern part of the island, it is still very far from resolving the energy problem in this way. Over the next 10 years, coal will remain the main energy raw material for power plants in South Sakhalin.

Thirdly, and most importantly, the countries of the Asia-Pacific region are showing great interest in Sakhalin coal. The favorable geographical location of the island makes it possible to export coal to Japan, Korea, China, etc. Many of these countries in the recent past have mothballed their coal enterprises and their fuel and energy complexes exist thanks to cheaper imported coal. In comparison with Australian brands of coal, which are now sold in Japan and Korea, Sakhalin coal is of higher quality and, moreover, it is much cheaper than its Australian counterparts.

Fourthly, Sakhalin Island today has a coal port with a large production capacity, which makes it possible to expand the export of coal outside the region in a relatively short time.

To date, the administration of the Sakhalin region sets itself a number of tasks to raise and develop the coal industry. To further stabilize and build capacity in the coal industry, it is planned to develop promising coal enterprises, such as CJSC Boshnyakovsky Coal Mine, Ostrovnaya, Bykovugol mines, and the Miner's Processing Plant. The task was set to complete the project of creating a loading terminal for the shipment of coal in the port of Shakhtersk with a capacity of up to 800 thousand tons per year in the near future.

Annual coal production in 2005-2010 is projected at the level of 5 million tons, of which 3,4 million tons will be directed to the needs of the region and 1,6 million tons for export outside its borders to provide coal to the Magadan, Kamchatka regions, Chukotka Autonomous Okrug, partial delivery to the Primorsky and Khabarovsk Territories and for export.

AFTERWORD

So the book about the history of the Sakhalin coal industry is finished. With the exception, perhaps, of a small economic brochure in the 70s of the last century by E. Baranchikov, this topic was not of interest to researchers for some reason. The young Sakhalin scientist Alexei Ostashev did what none of the writers and journalists, almost 40 thousand engineering and technical workers and specialists who worked in the industry over the years, failed for various reasons.

It seems that the author cannot believe and say to himself: "Well, that's all. Of course, he is tormented by dissatisfaction, doubts for each, perhaps, of the pages: "Did I say everything? Have I found out everything, found it in the archives, consistently and impartially set out in this book?"

In one work it is impossible to tell about the 150-year history of the formation and development of the coal industry of Sakhalin. Both tragic and joyful, naturallywith its ups and downs.

Another question is also natural. Why did a young, educated man with nothing to do with coal miningtake up this study? Why only he had the patience and courage to thoroughly "burn through" archival tomes and many other sources in order totry to give the history of coal mining on Sakhalin Island in a sufficiently harmonious chronology of events? There are several answers.

From the nature of the narrative, it can be traced that the author organically does not accept, is much more critical of the Soviet, and especially of the post-Soviet, than of thetsarist periods of the history of the region. From personal and curious communication with him, it seems difficult to find direct confirmation of this conclusion. Thereare quite a few introverted arguments. The young historian subtly feels many with the measure of social injustice to a person, double standards of the proclaimed slogans of universal equality and fraternity, the consequences of which often materialized on the wrong side of the deception and humiliation of the personality of the miners.

In different periods of history - in different ways. At the same time, the veil of a certain nihilism, often confirmed in the text by a rather peculiar language of writing, most likely did not constrain him in objectivity in the preparation of labor, although it was not easy for him to do so.

Documentary sources are impartial after the lapse of time. They are not subject to varnishing, even if the author is repolarized by one idea, a look. Their totality and influence for individual authors sometimes shine through in their writings and exceed the measure of truthfulness, because-he simply may not use another scale from the beings stored in the archives.

Most likely, the author managed to largely avoid sucha methodological miscalculation. For the first time in this section of the history of the region, he was able to see many positive components, without which it would be difficult to understand the entire content of the work.

The indisputable advantages include a detailed description of geologicalexploration for the discovery and study of the island's coal deposits. To some extent, in a number of sections, these descriptions, I can say, evenprevail over the main topic and can be to some extent an addition to the title of this book.

Further, the author constantly compares the social and economic results of the coal industry of the region with similar data in theFar Eastern region of the USSR and Russia, with the all-Russian - especially in the final sections.

Of exceptional historical value, in our opinion, is the detailed statistics in the "Black Gold" section of Karafuto. During the period when coal was mined by the Japanese on SaHalin.

But, perhaps, several interrelated main conclusions follow from the book. First, many of the-data from archival primary sources lead to the next sad thought. Throughout the 150-year history of coal mining,slaves or almost slaves worked on the Shah. First, in the full sense of the word. On August 1, 1862, the Governor-General of Eastern Siberia M. Korsakov By order, he simply forbade the use of labor other than convicts in mining. Then the miners were called exiled convicts, affected by many of the civil rights of that time.

Twice during the Japanese occupation from the history of Sakhalin Island, coal was mined in the Japanese mines at that time by the disenfranchised Chinese, Koreans, who controlled them in thefull sense of the word with bamboo sticks. Bestial living conditions and inhumanworking conditions, beggarly wages were taken for granted in those years.

"Recruited" workers and specialists in Soviet times were also limited in theright to choose a place of work, even at the mine, with the management of which theysigned an agreement, not to mention moving around the island. They were provided, as can be seen from the materials of the book, also for 4-5 sq. m. per person barrack housing. Until the 60s of the last century.

The miners of Sakhalin from this moment to 1990, in accordance with the current Labor Code and the Constitution of the USSR, cannot, of course, be attributed to "slaves", except for one footnote. In this paper, the conclusion is clearly visible: the number of absenteeism and truants in mines in the entire history of coal mining, incl. in the above period, is almost stable in the specific ratio. Why? Most likely, due to thefact that the miners thus expressed their hidden internal protest to the difficult working conditions underground, the conditions of life on the surface. With the development of mankind, the ever-improving technology of extraction of useful materialsand mining equipment, machines, I dare say, have not yet become reliable in execution, universal to almost daily methods Mining and geological conditions that are ergonomic for humans, and not in terms of their tactical and technical parameters.

Russia was no exception in the world history of the evolution of mining. Recall, dear readers, the 1885 novel "Germinal" by Emile Zola. It was as if the descent into the mines of Northern Sakhalin pushed the Frenchman, a zealoussupporter of the principles of naturalism, who represented the laws of society as biological laws, to create that classic work of world literature-about convict miners. Everything he told was not only in England and France or Russia.

World mining practice shows that a more or less suitable technology for the extraction of coal and other minerals in this sense is an open-pit rather than an underground method. This conclusion is confirmed bymany examples today. Until now, on all African kimberlite pipes underground at a depth of more than two kilometers, diamondsare aboriginal slaves, in the entire mining industry in Europe - outcasts from the Balkans and the Middle East, in Australia - destitute people from Southeast Asia.

The miners of the mines of Sakhalin after 1990 are also not to be envied. Althoughthey have constitutional rights and freedoms over the edge, but with monthly earnings underground for workers in leading professions up to two or three subsistence minimums, you will not go far and leave, you run especially hard to meet your needs more than once.

If we use other data from this book, we can draw the following disappointing conclusion. Over the years of the development of coal deposits, thelabor productivity of the miners has changed from 27 pounds to 27 tons per shift for each worker. But, like 150 years ago, a subsurface worker is paid a monthly salary of four to five tons perday; A hundred years earlier - the same number of pounds of coal mined by him and sold by the mine. As on the basis of the objective action of some economic law unknown to us.

The conclusion suggests itself. Labor under the ground should cost much higher than labor in other industries. Therefore, managersof fuel and energy complexes should think about the choice of energy carrier and the alternative to the underground method of their development.

Perhaps, in the same part of the afterword, it should be noted that in the forties the measure of the leadership of the USSR was forced to send women to the mines, who were taken out of mining only in the 80s.

Secondly, the book can clearly trace the evolution of the organizational and legal form of coal mining enterprises. This part of the study is, perhaps, of particular importance today, when the still young independentRussia is painfully looking for an answer to this key question of its economic and other independence and independence. Shares, artels, joint-stock company (20s of the last century), concession, trusts, combines, production association, again since 1990 a fan of joint-stock companies - JSC, OJSC, CJSC and shares (artel) in the form of LLC, CJSC - most likely, all the structures known to managers have been used over the years. The author almost does not

draw conclusions about which of them the coal industry has achieved the best results, leaves the reader the right to think for himself, while providing a rare opportunity to use detailed data on the level of mechanization, technological schemes of delivery, transportation, loading and reloading of coal, etc. of each period in the history of the coal industry of the region. Except for one, perhaps. I remember more vividly than others the episode of well-being and technological comfort during the transportation and loading of coal on ships in the village of Douai during the Japanese concession.

In this work, it is possible to fully trace the normative legal acts of theauthorities of all times concerning the development and improvement, introduction of new organizational and legal forms of management of underground coal mining. From them it is clear that there was a constant difficult search for a rationalcombination of private, collective and state capital, the choice of the supremacy of ownership of it - either the state or the owners - the owners.

In the book you can read the decisive proposal in 1957 of the deputy chairman of theSakhalin Council of National Economy B. Gorbunov to close the trusts "Aleksandrovskugol" and "Uglegorskugol". It took history almost 30 years for this proposal to be implemented. With the development of industrial infrastructure, a low-level hierarchy of power in the management of coal mining became possible. Personnel, especially engineering, have grown up, their literacy and responsibility for the results of labor have increased.

One can only smile when one reads that in tsarist times, as in our days, the investor's relatives, influential officials and persons were enrolled in the directors of joint-stock companies. Just as after 1990, Russia once also "pillared" mining allotments and the territory of the land for the purposes ofspeculation, and not the organization of coal mining on them.

Unfortunately, the author was not able to tell in more detail about many otherleaders of the region and the coal industry, who also firmly and firmlysought managerial emancipation, timely, with clear social guarantees for workers to close unprofitable mines. In my opinion, in this connection, the proposals of P. Rozenko, secretary of the regional committee of the CPSU, are cited three times, there are almost no others. We can give an example with the Jealous Georgy An Tonovich, General Director of the Sakhalinugol Association. He took up his position when he sought the obvious - the further impossibility of developing the Tikhmenevskaya and Makarovskaya mines in the existing grip of funding. Vladimir Fedorovich Nikitin, the mayor of the Aleksandrovsk-Sakhalinsky district, repeated in 1990 the fate of the Arkovo mine, which was abandoned with its two mining villages. He "repainted" her again, as once in the 30s, into a municipal enterprise and a beggarly budget of the district, extending her life for two years.

Another circumstance should be borne in mind. Any resource-extracting enterprise of foresters and fishermen, oil workers and miners has a date of birth and adate of its closure. More often - before the eyes of the life of one or two generations of people. This is the objective specificity and nature of production, because natural reserves are depleted in this geographical point for the technical capabilities achieved by society fortheir further effective production. For example, who would have thought in the 30s from the oil workers of the city of Okha, that today they will be able to extract oil from the ground through wells several kilometers long, and even bent by the hand of man from land under the shelf of Sakhalin Island.

There is in the history of the coal industry of Sakhalin a more or less positive example of the "funeral" of the mine. At the end of the 70s, the Makaryevka mine, located in the village of Douai, was closed. Its author mentions it for an hour in the book. All miners from this enterprise were then employed with the provision of housing in other mines of the Sakhalinugol association. De-mounted theequipment. Unfortunately, Other residents of the village (doctors, teachers, sellers and others), who served the miners with their work, were not given such an opportunity. Until now, some of them live in the village.

Thirdly, the author, convincingly proving the chronicle of events, leads the reader to the idea that over the past century and a half, the coal industry of Sakhalin Island has developed rapidly when stablecoal exports were ensured.

Even 120 years ago, the court adviser Y.N. Butkovsky, studying the results ofgeological work, being an enterprising and "self-supporting" person from birth, believed that semi-cokes, gas coals of the North-West of Sakhalin Island should be mined and sold mainly to China. During the period of the well-knowninternational isolation of the USSR, the Japanese twice revived the industry, from directing a significant part of the mined coal to its homeland. Perhaps this inexpensive energy source allowed it to significantly strengthen its economic potential by 1941, which, unfortunately, was militarized.

Over the past ten years, only CJSC Boshnyakovsky Coal Mine has been operating effectively and independently among the mining enterprises of the region in the new economic conditions. It confirmed its survival rate by selling almost all of the coal mined for export.

The countries of the Asia-Pacific region are showing great interest in Sakhalin coal. Many of them at one time mothballed coalenterprises. Their energy and industrial needs are still largely supported by cheaper imported coal. In comparison with the Austrianbrands of coal, which are now sold in Japan and Korea, Sakhalin coal is of no less high quality, and besides, due to the much smaller transport component, it is cheaper than its Australian counterparts.

To date, the administration of the Sakhalin region sets itself a number of tasks to raise and develop the coal industry. It is planned to produce 1 million tons of coal per year in the Uglegorsk district to be fully exported. To further stabilize and increase the potential of the industry, the-development of promising coal enterprises is planned, such as the Solntsevsky and Poronaisky district open-pit mines, Boshnyakovsky Coal Mine CJSC, Ostrovnaya and Bykovugol mines, and the Miner's Processing Plant. Thetask is to complete the reconstruction of the loading thermi in the near future cash for the shipment of coal in the port of Shakhtersk with a capacity of up to 1 million tons per year. In 2000, 80 meters of additional length of the berth were already put into operation.

Due to the still rather high danger of the operation of nuclear power plants,especially the disposal of their waste, instability and the tendency of rising prices for hydrocarbons, it is possible that the energy sector will again mainlydemand solid fuels.

Fourthly, it is clear from the study that Sakhalin Island has colossalreserves of coal and brown coal. Almost for 700 km. from the north from the village of Mgachi and south to the village of Novikovo, coal deposits are known and explored. There is also a well-known common everyday opinion of many - "we live on black gold, but we live", it is built by people, it is finally transformed into an understanding of a simple and understandable conclusion - it is very necessary, Enslave a lotso that what we walk on in the full sense of the word every day effectively works for us.

The book clearly tells that coal itself does not "go" to the mountain. Dearreader, one of the author's documents in the book shows how the convicts passed the mined coal seven (!) times from hand to hand in bags to each other so that it became a "marketable product", worth something to the consumer.

Nowadays, strange as it may seem, the number of such cycles has not decreased much, despite mechanized complexes, electric locomotive traction underground and powerful excavators and dump trucks in coal mines.

At any mine in the world today, coal from under the combine of the mechanical complex falls on the conveyor (once), from the district bunker - into the trolley (two); If there is a single-stage-inclined field - lifting to the rail haulage (three), unloading into a surface bunker or industrial warehouse (four), loading into a railway car or a consumer's car (five). At the open-pit mines, each piece of coal is reloaded at least three times (six operations according to the backhoe-dump truck scheme). Sorry, dear reader, for this educational program. It was the author who emphasized in the narrative the extraordinary labor intensity in coal mining.

He also showed periods of "explosions", significant increases in the supply of solidfuel: until 1917, by 1945, 1979, a record amount of coal was mined in history- without 40 thousand 6 million tons.

These were different periods of the political structure of Russia. Even the states were different. But the author rightly leads to the idea that a special miner's working people, who have their own,

special solidarity conditioned by the conditions of labor- only collective efforts, only mutual assistance can, under certain conditions, give results that do not follow in any way from the level of technical equipment and perfection of the organization of labor in coal mining. The author failed to highlight in more detail the fruitful activities of the Soviet trade unions, when they clearly and fundamentally fulfilled the state the authority to organize labor, organizing the Stakhanov movement, competing for the title of "Shock Worker of Communist Labor" and "Winner of such and such a five-year plan."

However, as well as the activities of the primary party organizations of the CPSU, the mines of the plant, then the Sakhalinugol association.

In conclusion, we can only thank the author for his work and expresshis desire to create new interesting historical works.

Valery Belonosov
mining engineer-surveyor,
member of the Union of Journalists of Russia.